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The DigiTal SwiTch: From cauSaliTy To relaTionShipS
Today, investments in digital humanities are carried out at many universi-
ties all over the world, and research calls that encourage various forms of 
multidisciplinary database projects, preferably with one foot within the 
natural sciences and technologically oriented social sciences, are staple 
goods. The question we must ask ourselves is: How do digital media affect 
the knowledge production in comparative literature—and in the humani-
ties in general? What new theoretical frameworks do we need to address 
the digital? What new methods and methodologies are possible? Or can, 
and maybe even should, we just continue as before?
Based on this challenge, Jonas Ingvarsson’s heuristic arguments in 
Towards a Digital Epistemology suggest a number of possibilities for the 
future design of comparative literature and the humanities. The ambition 
here seems to be that through the digital—as a lens and mode of thought, 
which Ingvarsson consistently maintains—we afford a new understanding 
of (and for) comparative literature and the history of the humanities. In 
short, it is about conceptualizing the technological situation of which we 
are always already inevitably a part. With ease, at times almost with a cocky 
elegance, Ingvarsson incorporates an impressive and compelling energy 
into his argument.
Ingvarsson argues that the consequences of digitization for the human-
ities are far-reaching, beyond digital tools and mechanical distant reading 
techniques. Based on a combination of posthumanist-oriented philoso-
phies of technology and media theory, Ingvarsson argues that the digital 
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affords a new paradigm of knowledge: a digital epistemology. The purpose 
of the book is to elucidate the far-reaching consequences of this digital 
epistemology.
One crucial point of this epistemology is the shift from causality to 
relationships. This also involves an increased awareness of the physical 
presence and the importance of material practices for knowledge produc-
tion. Comparative literature must therefore also become a media archaeol-
ogy, where these material relationships and the researcher’s presence in the 
field, are situated, theorized and investigated. Digital epistemology, and 
the media archaeological practices in its wake, also include a postdigital 
perspective, where “analog nostalgia,” with its occasional fetish-like rela-
tionship with retro techniques and old media, is highlighted by Ingvarsson 
as “one of the most concrete expressions of media materiality observed 
through digital epistemology” (ibid.). Ingvarsson’s study not only actual-
izes the trivial truth that media—as Bolter and Grusin (1999) noted in 
McLuhan’s aftermath—remediate older media; he also shows how a reme-
diated medium operates in a contemporary environment. The media 
archaeological object is made active in a feedback loop in which its history 
is changed by the contemporary, but where the object’s history also influ-
ences the contemporary.
Ingvarsson presents two early modern media technologies—cabinets of 
curiosities and the emblem—to demonstrate that the “concept of digital 
epistemology can address and frame literary and artistic practices from 
practically any historical period” (Chap. 1). Here, the haunting activity of 
the media archaeological object is emphasized, as these forms “will not 
primarily be treated as historically situated expressions of older world 
views, but rather as productive modes of thought, capable of illuminating 
our own digital times” (ibid.).
The cabinet of curiosities, Ingvarsson says, like other early modern 
archives and collections, is not organized according to the principle of 
provenance that governs the modern archive, according to which objects 
are sorted by origin. Instead, the curiosity cabinet applies the principle of 
pertinence, which structures objects according to a material, spatial and, 
above all, relational order. The cabinet encourages “the crossing of bor-
ders, and the affirmation of similarities between nature and culture, 
between artifact and organic, the grotesque and the beautiful” (Chap. 3). 
The cabinet’s knowledge production is performative and associative, and 
operates with a contingent and recursive composition of objects rather 
than with a symbolic and linear logic.
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Through analyses of works by, among others, Göran Printz-Påhlson, 
Johannes Heldén and Olga Tokarczuk, we are shown how the principle of 
pertinence through the spatial juxtaposition of the poem and the book 
page “establishes new, perhaps surprising, but not random relationships” 
(ibid.). Here, the principle of pertinence and a digital epistemology, 
emphasize that representation is ongoing and performative. In a similar 
way, the early modern emblem genre is combined with electronic litera-
ture and digital interfaces. The emblem’s juxtaposition of disparate 
objects—heading, image, text—does not aim, Ingvarsson says, to generate 
specific knowledge, not even concerning the often allegorical referential 
content of the image. The emblematic text, as well as the electronic one, 
is neither complete nor permanent. The perspective of digital epistemol-
ogy here makes the emblem and the electronic text, the literary object 
itself, visible as text machines.
Johannes Heldén’s cybernetic eco-poetry is taken here as one example 
of the topicality of emblems in contemporary aesthetic practice. Contrary 
to utopian dreams of the internet and the web as the absolute archive, 
Heldén’s poetry emphasizes, precisely by demanding participation and 
embodiment, information and meaning as ephemeral and incomplete pro-
cesses. In particular, the slippage between the electronic Entropy Edition 
(2010) and the printed poetry collection Entropi (2010) underscores how 
each participatory configuration also inevitably marks a lost opportunity, 
while at the same time making clear that it is precisely this lack and loss of 
obvious meaning-bearing structure (“pattern,” in Hayles’ terminology) 
that force new configurations. In this way, according to Ingvarsson, the 
emblem and the electronic text both, as modes of thought, encourage the 
reader to “combine and compose, initializing a thought process, rather 
than reveal something completed”, both therefore operating “in line with 
emblematic epistemology” (Chap. 2).
What comparative literature and the humanities as a whole must do, in 
order to operate within this paradigm of digital epistemology, is, if not to 
replace, then at least to supplement meaning content and interpretation 
with materiality and composition. As Ingvarsson argues, “juxtapositions 
constitute the pedagogical core of digital epistemology” (Chap. 2). The 
objective may seem to be to fundamentally challenge the curriculum of 
comparative literature, arguing a shift from a practice based on provenance 
and causal relationships to the spatial relations of the principle of perti-
nence: from interpretation to juxtaposition; from meaningful content and 
distance to materiality and presence. But the ambition is not—at least not 
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explicitly—to portray traditional humanities and close reading of canonized 
objects as a necessarily outdated business. This strict opposition between 
old and new humanities instead arises, it seems, when digital (as well as 
non-digital) tools are regarded as neutral and universal processes, which is 
exactly what a digital epistemology opposes. On the contrary, a digital 
epistemology is aware that digital tools and forms of expression are histori-
cally conditioned, just as the codex and print culture have always been, but 
also that the tools themselves influence how this condition is expressed. 
Ingvarsson’s ambition is to both promote the digital reading skills that a 
contemporary media situation produces, and at the same time encourage 
new perspectives on traditional humanistic educational content.
Stockholm, Sweden Per Israelson
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This volume consists of texts that were written during the course of a 
research project entitled Representations and Reconfigurations of the 
Digital in Swedish Literature and Art 1950–2010 (RepRecDigit, see 
reprecdigit.se) and financed by the Swedish Research Council (VR) 
2013–2018. The majority of these texts have been published in 
Scandinavian magazines, but they were edited, and combined into four 
chapters and published in book-length format in Swedish by the Fall of 
2018 as Bomber Virus Kuriosakabinett: Texter om digital epistemologi 
(Rojal Förlag). The production of that book has been an integral part 
of the project, as I have co-operated with digital artist, bookbinder and 
Rojal Förlag founder Olle Essvik, who continuously explores the rela-
tion between new technology and old craftsmanship. The result was a 
book which was bound by hand in 100 copies, and whose covers were 
made from used books, discarded from the shelves—a media archaeo-
logical recycling. For this English version we are not that lucky, but it is 
worth pointing out that the very materiality of the first version is indeed 
part of the argumentation of the pages to follow.
I would like to express my gratitude to Vetenskapsrådet (the Swedish 
Research Council) for funding, and to my colleagues in this project: Jakob 
Lien, Cecilia Lindhé and Jesper Olsson. Moreover, in RepRecDigit we 
decided to co-operate with artists on articles and in seminars, and I am 
very thankful for their contributions not only to this volume but to the 
project as a whole: Olle Essvik, Johannes Heldén and Imri Sandström—
geniuses! The open access edition of this book was made possible by 
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Abstract The notion of digital epistemology as applied in this volume 
could in some of its applications be understood as an attempt to do digital 
humanities without being committed to digital tools and objects. This, 
however, is not a programmatic stance, rather a reminder that the episte-
mological consequences of digitization can be traced also in texts and art-
work that are not “about” digital objects; and without using digital tools 
to perform the analysis. In this introduction, Cecilia Lindhé (Digital 
Humanities Quarterly, 7(1). http://www.digital- humanities.org/dhq/
vol/7/1/000161/000161.html. Accessed May 2020, 2013), Alan Liu 
(Theses on the Epistemology of the Digital: Advice for the Cambridge Centre 
for Digital Knowledge. http://liu.english.ucsb.edu/theses- on- the- 
epistemology- of- the- digital- page/. Accessed Apr 2020, 2014) and Marcel 
O’Gorman (E-Crit: Digital Media, Critical Theory and the Humanities. 
University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2006) are mentioned as sources of 
inspiration; media archaeology is identified as an important perspective; 
and early modern forms and genres such as the emblem and the cabinets 
of curiosities are presented and suggested as points of reference.
This project started out as an obstinate reflection. Having experienced dif-
ferent forms of digital humanities practices for more than a decade, I 
started to think about a “digital humanities sans digital tools, methods and 
objects.” It must indeed be possible, I thought, to discuss the effects of 
2
digitization on art, literature, or on the production of knowledge in gen-
eral, not primarily as something related to certain tools or objects. “The 
digital” within the humanities, for example, could be explored not only in 
databases, archives and big data, nor in topic modeling and speculative 
visualizations; neither should the objects of study be restricted to com-
puter games, to electronic works of art or to literary texts and artworks 
explicitly relating to computerization and other digital expressions. I asked 
myself: How has digitization affected literary works that in no way treat or 
depict the digital? And: Can we approach “the digital” as “things to think 
with” (to paraphrase Sherry Turkle)?1
Soon enough, of course, I found out I was not alone—the above quote 
from Alexander R. Galloway being perhaps the most striking remark in 
this regard. The result, nevertheless, is this volume, a collection of texts 
which share the ambition of exploring and probing the concept of digital 
epistemology. It should be stated immediately that the scope of this concept 
or, rather, of these two words—“digital” and “epistemology”—by far out-
reaches the ambitions of this volume. However, the very same two words 
have been guiding the observations made in the chapters to follow.
The notion of digital epistemology as applied in this volume, thus, 
could—in some of its applications—be understood as the abovementioned 
“digital humanities sans digital tools and objects.” This, is not a program-
matic stance, though, but rather a reminder that the epistemological con-
sequences of digitization can be traced also in texts and artwork that are 
not “about” computers, networks or fiberoptic cables; and also without 
using specialized digital tools to perform the analysis (of course, we still 
use the computer to search for texts, facts and illustrative examples, and to 
write down and edit our reflections). But indeed, the following pages will 
also analyze texts that either treat digital culture as an object, or are digital 
born electronic works of literature (I am not as stubbornly consequent as 
Galloway in this regard).
Many have noted—and the humanities of today should perhaps pay 
wider attention to—the fact that more or less every cultural artifact today 
is digitally permeated in one way or another, in some or many aspects of 
its processes of production and distribution. For the sake of the argument 
in this volume, it will thus be necessary to approximate a working defini-
tion of how the “digital” in “digital epistemology” (and in some respects, 
the “analog”) should be understood in this particular context.
1 I think of Turkle’s anthology Evocative Objects, which praise the return of the physical 




The texts that follow suggest that “the digital” can be regarded as a per-
spective, “a lens,” or as a starting point for different forms of historical 
reflection. To clarify this position, the notion of the digital in this context 
needs to be narrowed down. An obvious observation could be that the 
digital, in a historical context, somehow follows from, and extrapolates, 
“the analog,” or at least the broadcasting media. That could have been the 
easy part. However, as has been argued by Jonathan Sterne (2016), analog 
and digital are not a binary couple. Rather, the concept of “analog” is 
more or less a construction derived from digital culture: “The idea of ana-
log as everything not-digital is in fact newer than the idea of the digital,” 
Sterne claims (Sterne 2016, 32, his italics). This is a valid, and from a 
media history perspective very interesting, point. Moreover, as we shall see 
(and return to), the analog, in its old Oxford English Dictionary definitions 
(presented by Sterne), will actually become a driving force in the notion of 
digital epistemology. The practice of juxtaposition is indeed analog in the 
sense that it points out “similarities to another unrelated group” (ibid., 
34). Digital and analog, thus, are teaming up in this endeavor.
Another take on digital versus analog is provided by Galloway’s book 
on French philosopher François Laurelle, quoted above. While somehow 
keeping the binary alive, Galloway not only stresses the point that “digi-
tal” primarily is a mode of thought rather than a set of machines, networks 
or databases, but also notes that it “conjures a relation – a true miracle – 
between aggregates of things that really should have nothing at all to say 
to one another” (Galloway 2014, 63).2
Today we experience a network of communications media and systems 
which differs radically from the situation we experienced only a few 
decades ago. This situation also changes the conditions of how we pro-
duce, perceive and distribute data; it changes artistic expressions and our 
2 Considering the connections to emblem books that the concept of digital epistemology 
will encourage me to take, the continuation of this quote is interesting: “The digital must 
transcend the conditions of its own being. It must transcend the fact of its own self- alienation. 
It is therefore the most emblematic form of the transcendental” (ibid. my italics—and of 
course “emblematic” here is metaphorical, but nevertheless…). The relation between analog 
and digital in Galloway’s account of Laruelle, however, is complex. Later in the book 
Galloway makes the distinction between analog and digital in terms of “a difference” (digi-
tal) in contrast to “an identity” (analog) (ibid., 70). These considerations, though interesting 
in their own right, fall somewhat outside the scope of this volume.
1 DIGITAL EPISTEMOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 
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accumulation of knowledge. To gather this heterogenic change in one 
single volume would be utterly presumptuous. Moreover, the change itself 
has a history—the notion, and materiality, of the digital is from a historical 
point of view far from a homogenic phenomenon. The new order of 
things, regarding the organizing and handling of information that com-
puters imposed from, say, the 1960s onwards, had an impact on culture 
and fostered modes of thought that differ radically from the effects of 
games, social media, ubiquitous computing and intelligent textiles we can 
observe (and, alas, are being observed by…) today. Here already the 
notions of “the digital” and “digitization” run into some difficulties 
(which will be discussed in Chap. 4). “The digital,” in the current context, 
will be approached from a historical and epistemological point of view 
and, even more restricted, this perspective will be analyzed mostly through 
aesthetical and (some) pedagogical examples. In this volume, Alan Liu, 
Cecilia Lindhé and Marcel O’Gorman will work as points of departure for 
the explorations that follow.
1.2  liu/linDhé/o’gorman
In 2014, Professor Alan Liu (Dept. of English, University of California, 
Santa Barbara) presented a brief blog post suggesting how to approach the 
notion of “digital epistemology” (Liu 2014).3 Liu’s text operates on 
another level of abstraction than we will encounter in this volume, but in 
essence he shares the same objective: digital competences should not be a 
concern only for those who explore digital objects or electronic culture, 
nor for those who do big data, text mining or work with the digitization 
of cultural heritages—rather, and moreover, Liu explains, “digital knowl-
edge should announce an epistemic shift for the academic practice as such” 
(ibid.). Digitization challenges the core of academic and pedagogical prac-
tice, not only by the appearance of new tools and objects, but by the fact 
that our modes of thought and our way to structure data and knowledge 
are changing.
3 The purpose of Alan Liu’s post is to challenge underlying structures for the production 
and dissemination of knowledge within academia in general, and within the humanities in 
particular. Digitization must be incorporated within the humanities in a more profound way 
than through the digital objects we investigate—that is, fan fiction, blogs, games and 
streams—or through the databases and archives we utilize and systematize, and which for 




Cecilia Lindhé’s essay “‘A Visual Sense is Born in the Fingertips’: 
Towards a Digital Ekphrasis” (Lindhé 2013) stands out as a more distinct 
point of departure for several of the arguments put forward in this book. 
In this article she discusses the notion of “ekphrasis” through a “digi-
tal lens”:
This article, then, has as its wider scope to deconstruct the filter of printing 
technologies, with which we look at cultural history, and instead – with “the 
digital” as a lens in the form of digital literature and art – renegotiate an 
aesthetic practice that emanates from both rhetoric and print technology. 
(Lindhé 2013)
Accordingly, I want to highlight one possible path for the digital 
humanities: the digital as a critical lens on aesthetic concepts and cultural 
history. Lindhé’s argument, which has been indicative for reflections on 
digital epistemology, is that “the digital” (here represented by digital art 
and literature) should be considered as a perspective, with the same critical 
potential as for example poststructuralism, gender theory and postcolo-
nialism. She furthermore notes that “digital perspectives on classic con-
cepts could challenge or revise more or less taken-for-granted assumptions 
in the humanities” (ibid.).
Another important contribution to the argument in this volume comes 
from Marcel O’Gorman, who already in 2006 published the thought- 
provoking E-Crit: Digital Media, Critical Theory and the Humanities 
(O’Gorman 2006). O’Gorman’s argument is that digital culture calls for 
a new pedagogical approach, a new way to relate the humanities not only 
to the contemporary digital environment, but also to cultural history. The 
humanities of today, O’Gorman argues, utilize only a fraction of the 
potential that digital media offer, more particularly those aspects of digital 
culture that most resemble print media; that is, databases, archives and 
scanned books. And, he warns, if the humanists are not aware of this, there 
is a risk that we will end up being digital archivists rather than critical theo-
rists (ibid., 11).4
Regardless of whether you are digitally oriented or not in your aca-
demic and pedagogical exercises, it is important to remember that the 
4 “If humanities scholars do not make a concerted effort to relinquish traditional defini-
tions of literature and scholarship, their professional destiny will be that of ‘digital archivist,’ 
and their success will be measured by the size of their supposedly canon-undermining archive 
projects.”
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practice of the humanities is not a given constant, but rather a 
“Gutenbergian” practice, with its roots in a postromantic fantasy about 
the hero, the genius, the nation and the authentic expression. Of course, 
this fantasy has been challenged throughout the latter half of the twentieth 
century (feminism, postcolonialism, structuralism, deconstruction, New 
Historicism), but digital culture offers us yet a new paradigm, and 
O’Gorman suggests a shift in academic practice from “hermeneutics” to 
“heuretics,” and from “interpretation” to “invention”:
[T]he result of this “fever for archiving” does not transform the humanities 
in any significant way or render humanities research more suitable to a cul-
ture of computing. New media have done little to alter the practices of 
humanities scholars, except perhaps by accelerating  – by means of more 
accessible databases  – the rate at which hermeneutics can be performed. 
Once again, I should stress the point that I am interested less in hermeneu-
tics (interpretation) than I am in heuretics (invention). More specifically, 
this book asks the following question: Just as Ramus’s scholarly method had 
a great influence in shaping a print apparatus that has persisted for five cen-
turies, might it not be possible to invent scholarly methods to shape the 
digital apparatus? (ibid., 50, see also 98–100)
This quote is interesting, since it touches upon a couple of arguments 
already hinted at above, but that will be brought forward in Chap. 4, that 
even the digital of course has a history—different materialities, different 
epistemologies. Because, in all fairness, we must admit that digital meth-
ods have been considerably elaborated even through the decade and a half 
that has passed since O’Gorman wrote this in 2006. First, different meth-
ods of mapping, such as GIS (which stands for Graphic Information 
System), and various forms of visualization, 3D scanning, open access 
archives and many more features have all increased the sensibility and vari-
ation of digital methods. Second, and connected to the first, it is not really 
the case that digital archives and their methods primarily supported 
hermeneutics, but rather that distant reading techniques, developed by 
the likes of Moretti (2013) and Jockers (2013), served as complementary 
strategies, actually challenging the very notion of hermeneutics as an 
instrument in writing the history of literature. On the other hand, 
O’Gorman still has it right, I believe, when he asks for heuretics and inven-
tion, since distant reading may be many things, but has yet to show a more 
playful and artistic agenda. And he is still right in asking for scholarly 
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methods to “shape the digital apparatus,” since distant reading techniques 
and different forms of handling big data still seem very alien to many “tra-
ditional” humanists.5
O’Gorman’s attitude to the analytical practice in the humanities could 
be understood not as an interpretative exercise aiming at a satisfactory 
(not to mention final) reading of a single work of art (more on his “hyperi-
conomy” method in Chap. 5). Instead, this “digital” approach is con-
cerned with bold juxtapositions and propositions to relate to the work in 
more productive contexts. The idea is to study a work of art not primarily 
in order to “explain” it, but rather to see what it—combined with other 
aspects—can generate. In line with this position, and in line with the met-
aphors of the digital age, we can address the cultural artifact (the literary 
text) as a node in a network of symbols, functions, materialities and noise.6
Following Liu, Lindhé and O’Gorman (and others), this book has the 
ambition to shed some light on the notion of a (not the) digital epistemol-
ogy. In this context, thus, “the digital” is not primarily regarded as tools 
(computers, databases, networks) or as objects (fan fiction, archives, 
Twitter poetry, games, electronic literature), but as a critical, discourse 
analytical and media archaeological concept, by which we can establish 
productive perspectives on our aesthetic and cultural environment and—
not least—on aesthetic and cultural history.
Moreover, “digital epistemology” is not primarily a tool, or a concept, 
for establishing causality; it is not about cause and effects, but rather about 
relations. The relation between art and its context, between body and text, 
between human, machine and environment. And between postmodern 
and—in this case—early modern modes of thought. These relations are 
indeed possible to detect all through the history of cultural artifacts, but 
the concept of digital epistemology will accentuate this media historical 
perspective even further. New media always remind us of the relation 
5 But things are happening in this area, too: many scholars have the ambition to merge 
topic modeling and distant reading techniques with questions put forward by the traditional 
humanities. For an interesting example, see Andrew Piper (2018).
6 Of course, this is not a new idea, but was put forward for example in the notion of dis-
course networks introduced by Friedrich Kittler (1990), and is also in line with the rhizom-
atic approach to culture and society presented by Deleuze and Guattari (1987). A point that 
will be suggested in this volume, however, is that both models (those of Kittler and those of 
Deleuze/Guattari) are congenial (and parallel) to the evolution of digital techniques of stor-
age and dissemination. These theories, alongside for example media archaeology, are in 
themselves expressions of a digital epistemology. We will return to that.
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between old and new. By emphasizing this, I am subscribing to the notion 
of recursive historiography, as proposed by Markus Krajewski in The Server 
(2018). To define this, Krajewski first quotes the mathematical definition 
of recursion as “returning (to known values); obtained via recourse of 
what is known.”7 Then he transforms this concept to the media archaeo-
logical discourse, noting that it inspires both historical comparisons and a 
possibility of creating, through iterative juxtapositions, a new historical 
narrative. And he concludes that “[w]hat is via this recursive procedure is 
not merely the possibility of connecting two non-simultaneous phenom-
ena but also the ability of a concept to invoke itself” (Krajewski 2018, 158).8
In this context, the concept of digital epistemology, as we shall see, not 
only establishes relationships between early modern and contemporary 
cultural expressions, but moreover revisits the narrative of digital history 
from the 1960s to the 2010s. This concept will also highlight new rela-
tions between objects within the same category, establishing and trying 
out new connections between—for example—literary texts. In a post on 
Litteraturbanken (“The Swedish Literature Bank”), a researcher in the 
history of ideas, Andreas Önnerfors, highlights that the archive of 
Litteraturbanken makes a perfect example of a digital cabinet of curiosi-
ties, where texts can be ordered in a way that “facilitates how we can rec-
ognize the different voices of the literary texts through the thin walls of 
time and titles,” and furthermore:
The digital library of Litteraturbanken orders the names of the authors care-
fully, and alphabetically, and in a list – but which physical library should in 
the next move rearrange all the books so that they suddenly were sorted 
alphabetically by titles? Öjungfrun [Island Virgin], and Anteckningar om Öl 
[Notes on Beer], Yttersta domen [The Final Judgement] and Äktenskap och 
demokrati [Marriage and Democracy], Vivisektioner [Vivisections] and Vuer 
af Stockholm [Views of Stockholm], are arranged in immediate relations to 
each other. These thin walls everywhere …. Regardless author or title: the 
digital reproduces the asymmetric, spectral logic of the curiosity chamber, 
where the hierarchies between time and space are not totalitarian but tran-
scendent, exceeding. (Önnerfors 2017)
7 Kirkness, Deutsches Fremdwörterbuch, Bd 3 (1977), quoted in Krajewski (2018).
8 If you engage in adaptation studies (for example the transformation from novel to film) 
these recursions are commonplace. Every new version not only is changed in relation to the 
original, the original is also forever changed. You never experience the Mona Lisa the same 
way after having encountered Marcel Duchamp’s L.H.O.O.Q. For a “recursive” adaptation 
analysis, see Ingvarsson (2012).
 J. INGVARSSON
9
The juxtaposition of digital culture and the cabinets of curiosity will be 
a recurring motif in this volume.
1.3  EpistEmology anD Early moDErn moDEs 
of thought
In a work which embraces epistemological as well as media archaeological 
perspectives, Michel Foucault will appear as a given reference; even more 
so, since the texts in this volume, in their discussions of digital epistemol-
ogy, make recurring connections between the digital age and early modern 
modes of thought. Similar connections are explored in Les Mots et Les 
Choses, Foucault’s ambitious outline for a history of thought and order 
from the Renaissance onwards (Foucault 2002). Of vital importance for 
the ideas brought forward in Foucault’s book (and as a point for departure 
also for this volume) are the categories “order,” “episteme,” and “archae-
ology” (we will soon return to the latter category). The notion of order 
(“l’ordre”) is explained by Foucault as follows:
Order is, at one and the same time, that which is given in things as their 
inner law, the hidden network that determines the way they confront one 
another, and also that which has no existence except in the grid created by a 
glance, an examination, a language; and it is only in the blank spaces of this 
grid that order manifests itself in depth as though already there, waiting in 
silence for the moment of its expression. (ibid., xxi)
Order, in this regard, thus points to the relations between objects and 
the discourse utilized to arrange them. In Towards a Digital Epistemology, 
the order of things, for example in the cabinets of curiosities—or 
Kunstkammer (I will use the terms interchangeably)—and the Renaissance 
emblem will be related to a number of positions and practices in our con-
temporary digital age. As for the notion of episteme, Foucault suggests the 
following:
In any given culture and at any given moment, there is always only one 
episteme that defines the conditions of possibility of all knowledge, whether 
expressed in a theory or silently invested in a practice. (ibid., 183)
In the texts that follow, suggestions will be made that digitization 
indeed has set the conditions for such an episteme, and this, of course, is 
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also in line with Lindhé’s claim that digitization, regarded as a “critical 
lens,” can offer us new perspectives on our age as well as on history 
(Lindhé 2013). Moreover, Foucault’s definition is well in line with the 
definition of epistemology proposed by historian of science Professor 
Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, who use the term epistemology “for reflecting on 
the historical conditions under which, and the means with which, things 
are made into objects of knowledge” (Rheinberger 2010, 2).
In the context of this volume, both Foucault’s and Rheinberger’s per-
spectives contribute to the epistemological approach where we regard 
digitization as a historically situated phenomenon, which dictates the con-
ditions for how knowledge is produced and presented. Thus understood, 
epistemology and “modes of thought” are closely related; media and cul-
tural artifacts not only depict our existence but, moreover, determine how 
we observe it.
1.3.1  The Emblem
The concept of “modes of thought”—here associated with “epistemol-
ogy”—in this study emanates from Peter M. Daly’s presentation of the 
then (1979) recent German reception of the emblem (Daly 1979). 
Inspired by Albrecht Schöne and Dieter Walter Jöns, Daly suggests that 
we should separate the emblem as art form from the emblem as a mode of 
thought.9 The emblem, considered as a genre, had many forms, but the 
emblematic (!) emblem consisted of a heading (inscriptio), an illustration 
(pictura), and a comment (subscriptio). The emblems were mostly gath-
ered in emblem books, an immensely popular genre in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, especially in France and Germany, as well as in 
Belgium and the Netherlands. The pictura often could have quite a bizarre 
or grotesque composition, arguably to catch the attention of the reader 
and stylistically a remnant from the medieval bestiaries that were one 
important source of inspiration. The bestiaries displayed many examples of 
the wonders of God’s creation and also contained fables and moralities, 
and thus can be seen as foreboding not only the emblem books, but also 
the Kunstkammer. The emblem books did not display a fixed set of rules 
or regulations on what was to be called an emblem. Some books did not 
contain pictures at all, while some contained pictures only. In some cases 
9 The emblem as an art form (in relation to its function as a “mode of thought”) will be 
further discussed in the following chapters.
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the subscriptio only consisted of a few lines, while in others they could be 
stretched out to several pages. John Manning goes on to point out, and 
rightly so, the trouble of trying to capture the emblem at all in any defini-
tion: “The mistake that so many theoreticians make is that they look for a 
normative embodiment of form, which denies the very flexibility that gave 
the genre life” (Manning 2002, 25) (Fig. 1.1).10
The emblem genre rises parallel to the evolving industry of book print-
ing, and surely was a good indicator of the skills of the printer, since the 
emblems naturally often displayed a multimodal character, combining 
typesetting and woodcuts. Despite the enigmatic and combinatory charac-
ter of many emblems, however, they should not be treated as riddles or 
rebuses to be solved, but rather, as pointed out by for example John 
Manning and Peter M. Daly, as devices to set in motion thought pro-
cesses, often (obviously) with a moral or religious tendency (Daly 1979; 
Manning 2002, passim). Thus, the emblematic mode of thought encour-
aged combination and composition; a call to create, rather than to 
interpret.
By shifting focus from studying the emblem as a form or genre to 
regarding it as a mode of thought, Daly suggests, we can approach the 
emblem not only as a trick of signs and symbols, but moreover as corre-
sponding to biblical, mythological and allegorical presumptions on how 
the world—according to the consumers of the emblem—was indeed orga-
nized. It is not primarily a matter of the “form” of the emblem, nor about 
any sort of “realism,” but rather a reflection of the experiences that the 
reader—or viewer—of an emblem has (ibid. passim).
This is in line with John Manning’s observation that the various expres-
sions of the emblems corresponded to, and embodied, the realities in six-
teenth- and seventeenth-century Europe:
10 Manning starts this discussion with the following statement:
It is apparent, even at this stage, that we have taken the wrong track. What is an 
emblem? It’s not even a good question. It implies that the answer lies in the same 
eternal present as the question, and that there is an emblem, a normative type, that 
the emblem is one thing at all times in all places. (p. 21)
In fact, though, this is not in contradiction to Daly, who clearly distinguishes the emblem 
as an artistic expression and as a mode of thought.
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Fig. 1.1 Copper engraving probably by Jan Gerritsz Swelinck (born around 




There was literally nothing under the sun that was not emblematic – at least 
potentially. The four elements, the heavens, fourfooted beasts, birds, fishes, 
plants, stones and insects could instruct the “eye of understanding.” What 
made this symbolic universe different from the medieval “Book of Nature” 
was the active participation of the individual within the construction of sig-
nificance. (ibid., 30, my italics)
What Manning points out here is thus, firstly, that the emblem was not 
only an art form but in fact corresponded to the observation of the contem-
porary environment, of nature and culture. The emblem is thus given 
epistemological qualities. Second, the author emphasizes here that the 
emblem, considered as a mode of thought, called for activity, in contrast 
to the more passive interpretation that characterized the Middle Ages’ 
approach to the “book of nature” (for example in the bestiaries) that could 
be “read” as an appendix to the Bible, proving the greatness of the Creator. 
This medieval “text” was in some sense finished, which is not the case for 
the emblematic mode of thought. And while, as Manning and Daly sug-
gest, the seventeenth century established an emblematic epistemology, 
our own time establishes a digital ditto, with several striking similarities.
1.3.2  The Cabinets of Curiosity
The other early modern phenomenon that will be repeatedly addressed in 
the chapters to come is the cabinet of curiosities. This had its heyday dur-
ing the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They could be 
designed as huge cabinets with a variety of compartments, drawers and 
booths, or even occupy entire rooms, like a kind of museum.11 The 
 collections aimed to create an overview of the accumulated knowledge of 
the time, and with their combination of manufactured (often bizarre) arti-
facts and natural or found objects in artistic arrangements, the Kunstkammer 
of course also constituted a monument to their powerful owner. Here, 
tangible materiality was combined with an associative and artistic practice, 
which, however, could follow fairly strict principles. In his overview of the 
cabinets of curiosities in European cultural life, art historian Horst 
11 For a historical account of the cabinets of curiosities in Europe, see Horst Bredekamp 
(1995). Bredekamp also outlines a contemporary epistemic shift, where the text and book 
give way to more multimodal modes of thought, which actualize contemporary aesthetic 
practices: “[W]e are experiencing a phase of Copernican change from the dominance of 
language to the hegemony of images” (ibid., 113).
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Bredekamp presents a fairly common order for them in the seventeenth 
century (Fig. 1.2):
Naturalia – objects from the natural kingdom as well as ancient sculptures
Artificialia – arts and crafts
Scientifica – globes, watches, measuring and weighing tools
Exotica  – odd objects that could also appear in any other category. 
(Bredekamp 1995, 34, and passim)
Some details to observe here: that ancient sculptures belonged to 
“nature,” while arts and crafts are sorted into the same category (which 
may be understood as corresponding to the Aristotelian notion of techné). 
Bredekamp also highlights the significance Francis Bacon gave to the 
design of the Kunstkammer: Bacon argued for the importance of play in 
the process of relating the various objects to each other, and “play” should 
Fig. 1.2 “Musei Wormiani Historia,” the frontispiece from the Museum 
Wormianum depicting Ole Worm’s cabinet of curiosities (Public Domain)
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be understood here in a broad sense—associations, jokes, games or letting 
objects play with one another (ibid., 67). The associative and pleasure- 
oriented approach seems to be central for Bacon. Elaborating on this 
“playful” aspect of science, Bredekamp notes that the cabinet’s perhaps 
most important contribution is to situate knowledge not as a hidden core 
of an expression or person, but as something that arises in free association:
Reflections of the thought expounded through the Kunstkammer have 
remained alive in history of style, psychoanalysis, and in iconology – that is, 
in everything expressing the knowledge that playfulness is a necessary pre-
requisite for the mind to be creative and that the essence, the inner core of 
an effort or a person, has not remained intact in the center or in the linear 
path to that center, but in free, concomitant phenomena void of obvious 
purpose. (ibid., 109)
Instead of the straight order of cause and effects, cabinets of curiosity 
present related phenomena for no apparent purpose, but inspiring creativ-
ity and reflection. In an essay on the Museum of Jurassic Technology in 
Los Angeles, Susan A. Crane also emphasizes the difference between the 
objects in the Kunstkammer and the objects in a museum, where the curi-
osities were assembled for their individual stories and the cabinet also 
freely combined fact and fiction (exhibiting many “fake objects,” such as 
unicorn horns), while the museums that emerged in the nineteenth cen-
tury ordered their objects for the purpose of systematically telling the 
greater narrative of the nation or of history (Crane 2000, 72). We will 
return to this in Chap. 3.
1.3.3  Epistemology Engines and Recursive Historiography
From the perspective of digital epistemology, digital expressions and phe-
nomena are not studied primarily for their technical benefits, but rather 
for how they can relate to the production of the episteme of our time, as 
reflected in culture. This mirrors the reflections on epistemology, technol-
ogy and embodiment put forward by the philosopher of technology Don 
Ihde in Bodies in Technology (Ihde 2002). Ihde lets technical innovations 
throughout history serve as objects which bring together human and 
mechanical agency, leading to the production of knowledge: “My devices,” 
he claims, “will be particular machines or technologies, which provide the 
paradigmatic metaphors for knowledge themselves” (ibid., 69). Ihde 
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suggests that this relation between humans and machines should be called 
epistemology engines, a relation which generates questions about how we 
perceive, obtain and distribute our understanding of the environment.
So, then, what does digital epistemology mean? If we return to Alan 
Liu’s short text—induced by the establishment of a “Centre for Digital 
Knowledge”—he suggests that a research institute based on these 
presumptions would have to question the notion of “Centre” itself, 
“since that form is vested in traditional ways of organizing knowledge 
production that the digital is currently reinvesting in a wider, differently 
articulated network of institutions, collectives, and media” (Liu 2014). 
The tradition of organizing and distributing knowledge is challenged. Liu 
continues:
It thus seems clear that a Centre for Digital Knowledge that relies solely on 
traditional institutional forms – even the now normative “interdisciplinary” 
form (e.g., a centre that creates weak-tie intersections among faculty in dif-
ferent fields) [sic] – will be cut off from some of the most robust conceptual 
and practical adventures of digital knowledge. A key test for the proposed 
Centre for Digital Knowledge, therefore, will be whether it is willing at least 
on occasion to accommodate non-standard forms of knowledge organiza-
tion, production, presentation, exploration, and dissemination acclimated 
to the digital age or open to its networked ethos. (ibid.)
Following Liu, digitization should have consequences for how we 
organize the very formation of knowledge, once again motivating the 
concept of digital epistemology. This stand also motivates us, along with 
Friedrich Kittler, to regard digitization as a “discourse network” or a 
“writing- down- system” (Kittler 1990, passim). Texts and works of art cre-
ated during the digital (r)evolution of the post–World War II period can 
be said to reproduce different kinds of digital logic whether or not they are 
“born digital,” and whether or not they explicitly address or describe 
digitization. A novel, or any work of art, need not be “about” computers 
to express a digital logic or order of things.
Moreover, and as a consequence of the above, the concept of digital 
epistemology can address and frame literary and artistic practices from 
practically any historical period. “Digital” logic, “digital” forms and “digi-
tal” modes of thought anticipate digital technology and can therefore be 
observed in art from different times. This lets us return to, and elaborate 
upon, the concept of recursive historiography, as presented by Marcus 
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Krajewski above (Krajewski 2018, 158). In the introduction to the anthol-
ogy Deep Classics, historian Shane Butler (2016) points out how our rela-
tion to premodern and ancient times for a long time has been characterized 
by distance, more or less rooted in rhetoric: terms like “ancient times,” the 
“Middle Ages,” the “Renaissance” generate a discourse of distancing and 
progress, which makes us prone to regard the past as a precursor of our 
own time, instead of realizing that these cultural expressions are perfect 
representations of their own time and not in need of any “direction” to be 
so. In so reasoning, he shows how the aesthetic practices of the past also 
are representations of modes of thought. Butler takes an example from 
Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents, where the famous psychoanalyst 
draws parallels between ancient Rome and the human psyche: all the his-
torical buildings, the ruins, the ones built after or on top of the older 
structures, all of them exist de facto as historical objects through which we 
understand our own times (and the parallel for Freud, obviously, is that 
our memories function the same way). As Butler points out:
Riffling fantastically in the archaeological cross-section, Freud joins the 
city’s classical and post-classical architecture into a seamless tradition. As 
with the unconscious, nothing is ever finally, fully lost here. (ibid., 10)
Another point of reference here could be one of Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
“untimely meditations,” more precisely The Use and Abuse of History, 
where the philosopher laments the view of history as something passed, 
something to reflect upon only for the sake of “Bildung.” On the con-
trary, he claims, the only thing that makes history relevant is its presence 
in the now, and the presence of the now in history:
It is true that man can only become man by first suppressing this unhistori-
cal element in his thoughts, comparisons, distinctions, and conclusions, let-
ting a clear sudden light break through these misty clouds by his power of 
turning the past to the uses of the present. But an excess of history makes 
him flag again, while without the veil of the unhistorical he would never 
have the courage to begin. What deeds could man ever have done if he had 
not been enveloped in the dust-cloud of the unhistorical? (Nietzsche 1909, 11)
Nietzsche and Freud both place emphasis on parallels between, and the 
presence of, then and now in the now, much the same as T.S. Eliot was to 
demonstrate with The Waste Land some decades later, and this approach 
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to history also characterizes this volume. Early modern genres and order 
of things such as the Kunstkammer and the emblem will not primarily be 
treated as historically situated expressions of older world views, but rather 
as productive modes of thought, capable of illuminating our own digital 
times. By focusing on epistemological rather than intermedia aspects, we 
can study not only the relation between texts and other media, but also on 
how our digital culture actually consists in different modes of thought, 
and how this can generate pedagogical as well as methodological chal-
lenges and possibilities. Alan Liu, again, describes this situation as that 
“the goal is to engage the topic of what it means to ‘know’ in the digital 
age in a spirit of serious play – at once disciplined and exploratory of new 
paradigms” (Liu 2014). Serious play, where we explore what it means to 
search and find knowledge in and about the world in which we now par-
ticipate. This also echoes Johanna Drucker’s statement in Graphesis: Visual 
Forms of Knowledge Production:
We have to have a way to talk about what it is we are doing, and how, and 
to reflect critically and imaginatively if tools of the new era are to be means 
to think with, rather than instruments of a vastly engineered ideological 
apparatus that merely has its way with us. (Drucker 2014, 194)
“The tools of the new era”: our digital utensils and interfaces are not 
neutral, but “objects-to-think-with.”12 In a way, this is a cybernetic line of 
thought—human and machine (and “nature”) are agents in a communi-
cating system. In Graphesis, thus, Drucker poses the important question 
12 By extrapolating concepts from Sherry Turkle and Don Ihde, Marcel O’Gorman, in 
Necromedia (2015), explores the concept of “Objects to think with,” which informs him in 
the “critical making” and artistic practice he performs at the Critical Media Lab (CriMeLab) 
in Waterloo, Ontario. Critical Making, moreover, is a concept launched by (among others) 
Matt Ratto at the University of Toronto. The idea is that critical theory should materialize in 
different forms of material design or labs, resulting in something that is not primarily a rep-
resentation of theory, but an actual part of the critical reflection, in order “to use material 
forms of engagement with technologies to supplement and extend critical reflection and, in 
doing so, to reconnect our lived experiences with technologies to social and conceptual cri-
tique” (Matt Ratto and Robert Ree 2012).
As for O’Gorman, his take on critical making (although he does not label it as such) means 
that he is mixing analysis with art installations, “to provide scholars with models for engaging 
in formal experiments with new media for the sake of intervening in the formation of digital 
culture. But in order to do so … we must learn to think more like engineers or digital artists 




about what role digital tools play in how humanities regard their tradi-
tional approach to (and dissemination of) their results. A recurring figure 
of thought for Drucker is that we today have the tools to visualize and 
problematize research within the humanities in ways that the different 
fields traditionally have not encouraged. Moreover, she shows how many 
of these new visualization techniques actually have early modern predeces-
sors. For example, Drucker discusses the notion of “interface” in a way 
that forebodes some lines of reasoning in this present volume:
The critical design of interpretative interface will push beyond the goals of 
“efficient” and “transparent” designs for the organization of behaviors and 
actions, and mobilize a critical network that exposes, calls to attention, its 
madeness – and by extension, the constructedness of knowledge, its inter-
pretative dimensions. This will orchestrate, at least a bit, the shift from con-
ceptions of interface as things and entities to that of an event-space of 
interpretative activity. (Drucker 2014, 178)
Drucker identifies the visual interfaces as something that guides our 
thought patterns and, in the continuation of this argument, a main topic 
in Graphesis becomes the epistemological effect of our digital forms of 
representation:
More attention to acts of producing and less emphasis on product, the cre-
ation of an interface that is meant to expose and support the activity of 
interpretation, rather than to display finished forms, would be a good start-
ing place. (ibid., 179)
When interfaces are regarded as productive meeting places rather than 
as representations of something already finished, we can start to realize the 
imaginary potential of digital tools. Invention rather than interpretation, 
as Marcel O’Gorman suggests, heuretics rather than hermeneutics 
(O’Gorman 2006, 50 and 99). The emphasis in Drucker’s argument lies 
on materiality: the tradition of humanistic interpretations needs to be 
vitalized with the (digital) forms for the dissemination that cultural expres-
sions today utilize. Drucker juxtaposes digital visualizations with 
early and premodern forms, genres and rhetorical modes, although these 
juxtapositions in her presentation function more as historical footnotes, 
rather than as epistemological tools.
1 DIGITAL EPISTEMOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 
20
But, as we shall see, early modern modes of thought can be regarded 
not only as historical points of reference, but moreover as recursive (in 
Krajewski’s terms) and congenial models for approaching contemporary 
cultural expressions, while at the same time a broader insight into the 
functionality of digital interfaces may instruct the understanding of early 
modern aesthetics.13 In this volume, phenomena like salon culture, cabi-
nets of curiosities, emblem books and the archival principle of pertinence 
will be addressed. This approach also leads to reflections upon how the 
interfaces of the humanities have influenced the content of education, 
research and communication.
This volume is far from the first to relate digital culture to early modern 
orders and genres. For example, the Kunstkammer is repeatedly taken as a 
point of reference in regard to digital interfaces. In a thesis from 1996 with the 
title “The Computer as an Irrational Cabinet,” Charles Gere discusses at length 
why the computer “space” should be related to the cabinet of curiosities, and 
emblematics, rather than to the traditional museum: “The computer can 
become a space for a modern ‘emblematics,’ where elements are juxtaposed in 
different configurations to engender new meanings.” He refers further to 
“benjaminian techniques of juxtaposition, montage and collage” in order to 
deconstruct “how we represent object and material culture” (Gere 1996, 84). 
The thesis then goes on to discuss possible “multimedia” interfaces inspired by 
the notion of the cabinet.
In What is Media Archaeology? Jussi Parikka makes some observations 
on the same relationship, albeit just en passant, but in so doing he empha-
sizes an important point:
Indeed, to an extent, one could say that it’s not only the curiosity cabinets and 
such-like that have been a focus of rethinking media and archives through mod-
els of heterogeneous order and amazement … but also that media history itself 
can become such a curiosity cabinet – for better or for worse, as the danger lies in 
being drawn into writing about “curiosities” for their own sake, instead of asking 
the simple and critical question “why”: why is this particular technology impor-
tant, and what is the argument behind this research into this curiosity of media 
history. (Parikka 2012, 65, my italics)
13 Of course, there are many other expressions and phenomena that could have been 
addressed to exemplify the relation, or juxtaposition, between early modernity and our own 
time, as for example title pages, frontispieces and tissue interleaves. Moreover—since media 
archaeology could be said to question the demarcations between different epochs and -isms—
the romantic fragment (not to mention the romantic ruin) could serve as a perfect illustration 
to computer game aesthetics.
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The following pages are an attempt to address this “curiosity of media 
history,” not only observing similarities for their own sake, but also put-
ting them in a productive relationship to each other.
1.4  mEDia archaEology
In Friending the Past: The Sense of History in the Digital Age (2018), Alan 
Liu discusses the relation to history brought forward by the use of digital 
tools and perspectives. As in this volume, Liu sees important links between 
and possibilities for the combination of media archaeology and digital 
humanities: “What is the sense of history of the network age discoverable 
through media archeology?” he asks (ibid., 101).14 He also quotes the 
introduction to the Amodern 2 issue on “Network Archaeology”:
Drawing from the field of media archaeology, we conceptualize network 
archaeology as a call to investigate networks past and present – using current 
networks to catalyze new directions for historical inquiry and drawing upon 
historical cases to inform our understanding of today’s networked culture. 
(ibid., 140; and Starosielski et al. 2012)
Once again, Liu touches upon perspectives very close to the ones addressed 
in this volume, and once again, we operate on different levels of abstraction. 
Interestingly enough, Liu does not approach this sense of history from an 
epistemological point of view (which could be expected given his earlier blog 
post). However, he does some important work in merging distant and close 
reading techniques, and he discusses the possibility of media archaeology per-
spectives in the study of both historical and contemporary interfaces (especially 
in an interesting analysis of “timelines”).
By extrapolating Liu’s proposals, both in the blog post and in Friending 
the Past, the concept of digital epistemology could be said to establish a 
multidimensional and media archaeological approach to culture. The 
media archaeological perspective is shown primarily in the attention 
directed to the materialities of media, and on the insistence upon a histor-
izing, yet non-linear, perspective. In the following pages this will be appar-
ent when we look at digital history from the 1960s onwards, and when we 
juxtapose early modern expressions with present digital culture.
14 See also http://amodern.net/article/network-archaeology/ (accessed May 2020). The 
quote, by the way, ends with a footnote—to Liu!
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With its roots in discourse analysis and media history (counting Michel 
Foucault and Marshall McLuhan among its ancestors), media archaeology 
is well suited to describing these conditions. But it also seems apparent 
that this theoretical perspective can be regarded as an actual expression of 
the digital epistemology that is examined here, and several factors could be 
seen as consolidating this argument. For example, search engines such as 
Google and Bing, as well as library databases, encourage delving into one- 
year studies, or more or less random juxtapositions between topics or his-
torical moments. The evolution of search engines and digital databases 
happens to coincide with fatigue concerning the hermeneutical paradigm, 
which has permeated the academic discourse of modernity—that is, dur-
ing the last two centuries. Not that media archaeologists should be using 
Google or Bing more than their hermeneutic colleagues (if they ever were 
to be divided into two camps), but it becomes apparent that the “episte-
mology of the internet” is well matched with media archaeological 
approaches. It is reasonable to suggest—bearing in mind Marshall 
McLuhan’s dictum from Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man 
that the content of every new medium is always another medium—that 
the media archaeologist’s fascination with the (neglected, preferably) 
materialities of the history of media is both an effect of the possibilities 
brought forward by new technology, and a result of the increasing interest 
in analog nostalgia and the tactile qualities of media in art, music and lit-
erature we have seen in the past decades. In this volume, one argument 
thus will be that this analog and tactile nostalgia is an effect of, rather than 
a reaction to, digital media. These explorations, combined with a 
Foucauldian critique of the linearity of historiography, are common 
denominators for the heterogenous practices that are sorted under the 
media archaeological umbrella. This critical stance, we may remember, is 
articulated in The Archaeology of Knowledge:
There are the notions of development and evolution: they make it possible 
to group a succession of dispersed events, to link them to one and the same 
organizing principle, to subject them to the exemplary power of life … to 
discover, already at work in each beginning, a principle of coherence and the 
outline of a future unity. (Foucault 1972, 21–22)
For the French philosopher these coherences and unities are restric-
tions rather than representations of a “correct” order. As a consequence, 
the categories with which we normally describe the progress of cultural 
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history—that is, epochs, genres, -isms—no longer can be seen as given. 
On the contrary, in Foucault’s analysis they appear as means of power and 
sorting tools, by which one includes some objects in history and excludes 
others. One counter-strategy against these tendencies could be (as did 
Nietzsche, Freud and Foucault) to regard history as something contem-
porary, the past as an active ingredient in the now—and it is apparent that 
digital tools have facilitated this approach.
Media archaeologists, apparently, find inspiration in Foucault and The 
Archaeology of Knowledge, but they also turn to Walter Benjamin’s 
Passagen-Werk, where the physical spaces—the arcades—function as nodes 
for analyzing a string of related phenomena:
Method of this project: literary montage. I needn't say anything. Merely 
show. I shall purloin no valuables, appropriate no ingenious formulations. 
But the rags, the refuse – these I will not inventory but allow, in the only 
way possible, to come into their own: by making use of them. (Benjamin 
1999, 460)
Benjamin’s lines of reasoning, his method (rather than his view of his-
tory), is clearly echoed in Foucault’s reflections in The Archaeology of 
Knowledge:15
15 For a discussion on the differences between Foucault’s and Benjamin’s sense of history, 
see Paul Mazzocchi (2008) and Paul Aaron Greenberg (2016). Greenberg concludes with 
the following observation:
To reiterate, briefly: While he rejects a progressive reading of history, Benjamin nev-
ertheless retains (and even intensifies) the historical materialist promise of human 
salvation through revolution as politically desirable. Unlike most Marxists, however, 
he claims that such revolution might have a messianic character. Foucault, meanwhile, 
calls on genealogical critique to agitate subjects into new relationships with institu-
tions and practices thought to be immobile and ahistorical. This process, he thinks, 
might allow people to begin to change themselves in order to rearrange the world 
around them. While Benjamin and Foucault both reject any traditional theory of his-
tory as progressive or even linear, their theories generate different implications for 
political struggle. In particular, they differ in important ways about the possibility and 
desirability of emancipation.
As for connections between Foucault and Benjamin from a media archaeological perspec-
tive, they are more about method, strategies to overturn the narrative of history, rather than 
the political view of history itself.
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For archaeological analysis, contradictions are neither appearances to be 
overcome, nor secret principles to be uncovered. They are objects to be 
described for themselves, without any attempt being made to discover from 
what point of view they can be dissipated, or at what level they can be radi-
calized and effects become causes. (Foucault 1972, 151)
The contradictions here work in a “rhizomatic” way rather than as a 
dialectical synthesis. No secrets, no enigma, only these contradictions we 
call history. With digital epistemology, digitization is regarded as (differ-
ent) modes of thought, modes which encourage juxtapositions and treat 
cultural history as a montage.
In an essay discussing “The World Wide Web as Curiosity Museum,” 
Michelle Henning connects Foucault’s archaeology to the “Berlin school 
of ‘media archaeologists’” and also to Benjamin’s method:
The practice of writing history should be, according to Benjamin, not 
sequential, but based on the establishing of constellations, a collage-like 
process in which past moments and historical material operate as denatural-
izing “shock” to the present. (Henning 2007, 73)
Media archaeologists, thus, possibly inspired by Benjamin’s method 
and Foucault’s challenge to historiography, apply different strategies in 
order to write those alternative histories Foucault calls upon. For example, 
they may, as does the Finnish media archaeologist Erkki Huhtamo in 
Illusions in Motion 2013, regard the history of media as a more or less 
literally archaeological endeavor, tracing those technological artifacts that 
are forgotten, or that never found their way into the histories of arts or 
media (Huhtamo 2013). Or, as Finnish compatriot Jussi Parikka notes, 
taking cinema as a case in point: “The emphasis in media archaeology has 
been on nineteenth-century devices that seem to gesture not only a way 
towards the birth of cinema, but also to the possibilities of differing 
routes” (Parikka 2012, 64). Another method is to study very narrow time 
spans, maybe just one single year (Hans-Ulrich Gumbrecht 1997), and to 
use the year as a more neutral point of departure in writing history, as in 
for example A New History of French Literature and the accompanying 
volume A New History of German Literature, where entries appear by year 
and not by subject, genre or epoch (Hollier 1989; Ryan and Wellbery 
2004).16 Another version of this model is to bypass the evolutionary 
16 For a survey of different approaches to the “one-year-method”, see North (2001).
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narrative of history by juxtaposing, or contrasting, shorter or longer time 
spans, as in Friedrich Kittler’s groundbreaking study Discourse Networks 
1800/1900 (Kittler 1990) or—on a more humble scale—as in an essay by 
this book’s author on H.G. Wells’ and Orson Welles’ respective versions of 
The War of the Worlds (Ingvarsson 2012).
1.5  thE Book
The following chapters approach the notion of digital epistemology from 
different heuristic angles. In Chap. 2, “Evoking McLuhan’s Juxtapositions 
in the Digital Age: Archaeology and the Mosaic,” the media archaeologi-
cal juxtaposition of then and now is traced to the practice of Marshall 
McLuhan, and how he contrasted his own time with the Renaissance. But 
the chapter also points to some important differences between McLuhan 
and the media archaeology of the digital age. This is followed by some 
quick examples of recursive juxtapositions between older forms and the 
digital age. The chapter ends with two contemporary examples of “analog 
nostalgia.”
Chapter 3, “CCC versus WWW: Digital Epistemology and Literary 
Text,” traces “the digital” in literary texts that do not obviously treat digi-
tal phenomena, and continues to suggest the use of some early modern 
genres and orders of things as reference points to (our) contemporary lit-
erature. Chapter 4, “‘Books Are Machines’: Materiality and Agency 
1960–2010,” approaches digital history in two ways. First, the progres-
sion from huge machines to ubiquitous computing is juxtaposed with the 
technologies of fear, shifting from bombs to viruses, tentatively as a result 
of the Y2K scare (and as I am writing this, the Covid-19 pandemic is mak-
ing the virus threat more obvious than ever; the following chapters, 
though, were written before the outbreak, so I leave it to the reader to 
make further observations). Second, two Swedish literary experiments, 
one from 1965 and the other from 2010, are analyzed in their staging of 
digital technologies and the effect this has on the notion of agency. Finally, 
in Chap. 5, “Towards a 21st Century Pedagogy for the Humanities,” the 
juxtaposition between digital culture and early modern modes of thought 
is extrapolated, and the approach here could be regarded as more peda-
gogical, ending in a list of suggestions for how collaborations could be 
encouraged between digital humanists and historians of art or literature.
Since my approach is that of offering perspectives, rather than promot-
ing a one-dimensional argument, I will not even try to summarize the 
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content. Moreover, considering the relative brevity of this work, it is my 
hope that the reader will not find it all too necessary to have a final repeti-
tion of my proposals and perspectives.
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CHAPTER 2
Evoking McLuhan’s Juxtapositions 
in the Digital Age: Archaeology 
and the Mosaic
Abstract The connections between our own digital age and early mod-
ern modes of thought bear resemblance to Marshall McLuhan’s method 
of juxtaposing the age of television with Renaissance culture. By study-
ing early modern modes of thought, we can understand our own tech-
nological times better. But also: By critically reflecting upon 
contemporary technological culture, we will gain new insights into early 
modern aesthetics and rhetoric, and the epistemological/ontological 
discourses embracing them. This is a media archaeological approach, 
where the digital is not primarily seen as a set of gadgets, machines or 
electronic networks, but rather as modes of thought. While pointing out 
some important differences between McLuhan’s approach and media 
archaeology, the concept of digital epistemology also states some strik-
ing similarities—treating media as a lens, or an interface, for observing 
culture, history and society.
2.1  The PasT and The ConTemPorary1
In a video clip from the website Marshall McLuhan Speaks labeled “The 
Future of the Future is the Present,” McLuhan finds his answer in 
Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida:
1 This chapter was written with valuable contributions from Cecilia Lindhé.
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One touch of nature makes the whole world kin, That all with one consent 
praise new-born gawds, Though they are made and moulded of things 
past …. (Shakespeare 1609, quoted in McLuhan 1967a)
McLuhan comments upon this in the following words:
The new is always made up with the old, or, rather, what people see in the 
new is always the old thing, the rearview mirror. The future of the future is 
the present, and this I something that people are terrified of. (ibid.)
Even McLuhan’s own “news,” thus, could be said to be old. Indeed, it 
is fair to argue that the real importance of McLuhan’s philosophy lay not 
in his musings about contemporary media culture, nor in his predictions 
about the media ecology of the future, although they may be remarkable 
in their accuracy. As a matter of fact, what his readers and viewers tend to 
interpret as “predictions” and “prophecies” often, in their striking con-
temporaneity, were nothing but observations. Let us also be honest and 
admit that the web tends to preserve those predictions (or observations) 
that seem accurate, but generously overlooks the vast bulk of statements 
that simply went haywire (see for example Wolf 1996).
Rather than being a media guru, or an electronic prophet, or the sage 
of the digital age, Marshall McLuhan first and last, as Elena Lamberti has 
reminded us, was a professor of English Literature (Lamberti 2012, 7). 
This observation is confirmed by a very significant feature of McLuhan’s 
work: not the eye to the future, but his recurring observations on history, 
and the ways in which he repeatedly oscillates between the past and the 
now, with a special fondness for the later Renaissance and Elizabethan era 
(and of course for modernist authors such as Joyce, Pound, Eliot and 
Wyndham Lewis; ibid. passim). In this light, it comes as no surprise that a 
comment on the future includes “the present” as well as a quote from 
Shakespeare.
Then again, we already knew this, having read The Gutenberg Galaxy, 
where the author opens his argument with an explanation of how 
Shakespeare’s King Lear is indeed all about the restructuring of the senses 
in the Elizabethan age. And we soon get a sense of why this book relies so 
heavily upon Shakespeare in its opening pages:
King Lear is a kind of elaborate case history of people translating themselves 
out of a world of roles into the new world of jobs. This is a process of 
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 stripping and denudation which does not occur instantly except in artistic 
vision. But Shakespeare saw that it happened in his time. He was not talking 
about the future. However, the older world of roles had lingered on as a ghost 
just as after a century of electricity the West still feels the presence of the older 
values of literacy and privacy and separateness. (McLuhan 1962, 14, 
italics added)
This, in turn, is a mere affirmation of the statement in the prologue of 
The Gutenberg Galaxy, where the author claims that “We are today as far 
into the electric age as the Elizabethans had advanced into the typographi-
cal and mechanical age” (ibid., 1). Moreover, in the early pages of 
Understanding Media, the author delivers a string of Shakespearian 
quotes, opened with the following observation:
A fairly complete handbook for studying the extensions of man could be 
made up from selections from Shakespeare. Some might quibble about 
whether or not he was referring to TV in these familiar lines from Romeo 
and Juliet:
But soft! what light through yonder window breaks?
It speaks, and yet says nothing. (McLuhan 1964, 9)
But McLuhan’s keen interest in Shakespearian explorations of the 
senses is not only a showcase of literary analysis, nor a provocative specula-
tion, it also sets the standard for his own aesthetic and analytical approach 
to cultural history, which to a large extent consists in recurring juxtaposi-
tions between the electronic age and aesthetic history. Interestingly 
enough, this feature in his writings seems to have been somewhat over-
looked (Lamberti being one major exception, dealing, however, mostly 
with his modernist roots), although McLuhan’s former student, and one 
of his most articulate critics, Donald F. Theall already in 1971 observed 
the following:
Paradoxically McLuhan, like Eliot, makes history important by making it 
here and now. Besides that, however, McLuhan also makes history impor-
tant by making it the way of understanding the “now”. Without discussion 
of the Greeks, of the Middle Ages, of the Renaissance, and of the interven-
ing centuries, it would not be possible to see what actually is happening in 
the current period. (Theall 1971, 22)
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What should be noted of this historical method, though, is that for 
McLuhan the Elizabethan era was of interest in a paradoxical way. On the 
one hand, the process when Gutenberg’s invention is interiorized into the 
sense apparatus of Western Man is very much like the process we “now” (in 
the 1950s and 1960s, that is) experience with the rapid increase of elec-
tronic communications. But on the other hand, this restructuring of our 
senses is completely different in the Elizabethan era and our own: the dis-
tance of the eye and the separation of mechanics fostered by Gutenberg’s 
innovation versus the intimacy of the tactile media and the inclusion of the 
Global Village (famously represented by television, which in McLuhan’s 
view is an audio-tactile medium).
Within the broad field of media archaeology, McLuhan’s philosophy 
has had a major, but even here somewhat overlooked, importance. When 
McLuhan is recognized as one of the founding fathers of media archaeol-
ogy, it is more likely his observations of the materiality of media that are 
mentioned, while a philosopher like Michel Foucault often is credited with 
the theoretical framework pertaining to the historical aspects (the “archae-
ology” of media archaeology). But it is fair to say that many aspects of 
media archaeological historiography are rooted in McLuhan’s work as 
well. To clarify this, it is useful to return to some aspects of the media 
archaeological field.
2.2  mCLuhan, media arChaeoLogy 
and hisToriograPhy
The heterogeneous perspectives gathered under the media archaeology 
banner could be said to have in common a historical focus on the material-
ity of communication, combined with a (Foucauldian) critique of estab-
lished lines of historical developments, including genres, epochs and 
norms. The archaeological attitude can also be understood as a reaction 
to, and fatigue with, the hermeneutic paradigm that has dominated the 
academic discourse for almost 200 years. It comes as no surprise (from a 
media archaeological point of view) that this fatigue is expressed side by 
side with the development of databases, web browsing and the new pos-
sibilities for arranging material in new and productive ways. Media archae-
ology, then, not only is a useful tool for describing digital epistemology, 
the theory in itself is actually a congenial expression of this concept.
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One of Foucault’s lines of argument is that the categories utilized to 
describe the progression of cultural history—epochs, genres, -isms and so 
on—are not a set of given parameters (Foucault 2002, passim). On the 
contrary, these parameters have emanated from and established power 
relations, sorting out which objects fit “history” and which do not. A 
counter-reaction to these tendencies is to regard history as an agent in 
contemporary times and, vice versa, to observe history through the lens of 
our contemporary media (Lindhé 2013). This strategy may have its mod-
ernist roots in the aesthetics of, for example, T.S.  Eliot and Gertrude 
Stein, but it is obvious that digital tools and resources facilitate this decon-
structive practice. In the introduction (Chap. 1) other strategies for estab-
lishing alternative histories were mentioned, such as the purely 
archaeological interest in unsuccessful or forgotten technologies of com-
munication, as well as exploring moments rather than epochs or the pro-
gression of history, and, finally, operating with juxtapositions over a smaller 
or wider time span.
There are obvious connections between many features of media archae-
ology and McLuhan’s media philosophy. But it is important also to note 
some striking differences between the media archaeology of today and 
McLuhan’s historical determinism. Where McLuhan’s version of history 
with few exceptions was the history of the fittest, and the story of the 
dominant technologies (the technological, rather than natural selection), 
his historiographic narrative—regardless of the frequent juxtapositions—
also was the history of History (with a capital “H”). His aim was not to 
question the progress of history, but to put a different, yet radical, angle 
on the events as they occurred in this History. By stressing the importance 
of media as an agent of change, McLuhan rewrote the history of commu-
nications without altering or challenging its evolutionary narrative. This is 
important enough, though, and if he did not pay very much attention to 
the failures of (or in) communication history, it was simply because they, 
in his view, did not promote enough societal and sensorial change.
Within the field of media archaeology, however, as stated in Chap. 1, 
major attention is directed to the forgotten or failed technologies of the 
past, be it Betamax videos from the 1980s or optical signal systems from 
the mid-nineteenth century. This interest, of course, is driven not only out 
of curiosity, but also for ideological reasons; inspired by for example 
microhistory, many media archaeologists will put forward alternative and 
foreseen agents in the history of communications and of social life (if not 
necessarily social change, on a larger scale). It could also be seen as a 
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strategy to deconstruct the tendencies of technological determinism fos-
tered in the media philosophies of the Toronto School.2
Media archaeological juxtapositions, then, may serve different purposes 
than in McLuhan’s work: sometimes just to avoid the ideological tenden-
cies of historical evolution. But then again, juxtapositions are sometimes 
utilized in almost the same way as in McLuhan’s work: to mirror different 
epochs and expressions, and to highlight surprising similarities, as well as 
to stress important differences.
2.3  sTraTegies and JuxTaPosiTions
This is the point where McLuhan and media archaeology both converge 
with digital epistemology. As mentioned in the first chapter, to approach 
digital culture from an epistemological point of view means to shift focus 
from the technology itself to artworks and to the order of things and 
archives. Instead of exploring big data, databases or tablets, smartphones, 
applications, networks and other material and technical expressions of 
digital culture, focus lies on more abstract relations, such as on how litera-
ture and art, philosophy and theory somehow correspond to the digital 
challenge without necessarily mentioning or describing it. In short, digital 
epistemology means a shift of the figure/ground relationship of digital 
culture.
The figure/ground concept McLuhan derived from ambiguous images 
used in Gestalt psychology, like the famous Duck/Rabbit or the well- 
known image with the facial profiles that also form a vase. When McLuhan 
uses this concept, he wants to point out how, for example, the shift from 
the description of the content of the media to the medium itself implies 
such a change in perspective where the foundation and the figure change 
place. In the same way, accepting digitization as a lens is a shift in how we 
relate to contemporary culture. “The digital,” then, does not primarily 
consist of objects or tools, but rather indicates a perspective—a perspective 
shift, even.3
2 The “The Toronto School of Communication Theory” is the label on the tradition from 
Marshall McLuhan, with roots in scholars such as Harold Adams Innis and Eric A. Havelock, 
and continued by McLuhan’s collaborators and followers, such as Ed Carpenter, Walter 
J. Ong and Neil Postman.
3 As presented elsewhere in this book, such perspectives have been proposed by, among 




In order to further clarify what digital epistemology could mean in 
analytical practice, we can mention some strategies which, as their com-
mon denominator, have the use of digital culture as a “lens,” rather than 
as an object or tool (Lindhé 2013). The list is by no means exhaustive, but 
is rather primarily an indicator of what this perspective can generate:
 1. Reading history in the light of digital culture. That is: Are there 
certain relations that could be established if we look at history from a 
digital point of view? Does post–World War II history have a digital 
materiality that affects how we look at happenings in the past?
 2. Reading analog literature and art as if they were electronic texts. 
That is: What happens if we analyze for example a nineteenth-century 
print novel in terms of embodiment, processes, performativity, materi-
ality and even “software,” or other buzz concepts in the short analytical 
tradition of cybertexts and digital culture? Will this encourage a focus 
not on what an artwork means, but what it does?
 3. Relating literary texts and artworks to digital history. That is: What 
does it mean to relate cultural artifacts to the communicational and 
organizational logic that has been put forward—in different ways—by 
digital technology since the 1950s?
 4. Explore digital expressions as related to early modern (and pre-
modern) modes of thought. That is: What is the effect of using digi-
tization as a “lens” through which you explore new dimensions of old 
concepts, genres and cultural artifacts? How can we explore parallels 
and interconnections between digital expressions and early modern 
modes of thought; and between digital culture and genres that were 
popular before the Romantics, before modernity? By emphasizing 
these qualities within the electronic culture of today, we might discover 
new aspects of early modern expressions and genres such as salon cul-
ture; the archival “principle of pertinence”; the cabinet of curiosities; 
the emblem, and others. But we might also, and likewise importantly, 
discover new aspects of digital objects and artworks.
In the concluding pages of this chapter, only the two final approaches 
will be taken into consideration. What all these aspects of digital episte-
mology do have in common, though, is that the digital is regarded as a 
mode of thought, rather than as a set of gadgets, machines or electronic 
networks. To clarify the argument, let us take a brief look at a few juxtapo-
sitions between digital and early modern expressions.
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2.3.1  Salon Culture versus Social Media
Salon culture was an informal yet well-structured meeting place for intel-
lectuals, flourishing in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
Conversations and confidences shared space with tableaux vivants, lec-
tures, readings, musical entertainment and political intrigues. Salon cul-
ture favored the conversation, the diary, the letter, the oral and private 
genres. You could describe it as an informal channel for culture and infor-
mation, an early modern file-sharing system.
Usually the hosts of these gatherings were women, and experiments 
with roles, gender, sexual ambiguity and identity were encouraged. In 
short, the salon—where art, politics and cultural analyses mix with the 
private and subjective—shares many characteristics with social media such 
as blogs and vlogs, Instagram, Facebook, YouTube, TikTok and Twitter: 
confidences, social and sexual role-playing, informal conversations, online 
diaries, home recordings, intellectual and political discussions and agita-
tions are shared online in more or less closed communities.
As these similarities encourage further research, it is important also to 
note important differences. For example, while many social media are 
actively administrated and their members chosen by invitation or accep-
tance of their request to join, the social control of the salon was a com-
pletely different affair: class, status and cultural positions made all the 
difference in this environment, while class and status probably will not 
stop you from interacting with Facebook and Instagram.
Observing these similarities and differences, it is fair to assume that by 
approaching salon culture through the lens of social media, and social 
media through the lens of salon culture, we will gain new insights into 
both phenomena.
2.3.2  The Principle of Pertinence and the Mosaic of McLuhan
It is interesting to note that many aesthetic expressions, as well as many 
features of our digital culture (consciously or—more likely—not), seem to 
adhere to the principle of pertinence, briefly mentioned in Chap. 1 (and 
further explored in Chap. 3). Before the principle of provenance – with its 
emphasis on origin and verifiable kinship – became the guiding principle 
of modernity, applied to archives and museums, the principle of 
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pertinence was the archival practice that governed the order of things4 
This order—also called the subject order, or dossier system—archived 
items according to likeness, subject and themes. It is an archival arrange-
ment that may, to our eyes, convey an unstructured impression, but at the 
same time it offers a more creative and challenging structure and this 
arrangement seems congenial to how we actually handle information in 
our digital everyday lives. The etymology behind this archive principle is 
telling: pertineo translates in the Lewis and Short Dictionary (Lewis and 
Short 1849) as “to reach, extend” and “to belong, relate, concern, pertain 
or have reference to, affect”—a more horizontal, associative and mosaic 
pattern. These distinctive features could obviously be related to McLuhan 
and his notion of the mosaic structure of his own texts. As Lamberti 
observes: “McLuhan uses his mosaic to question traditional ideas of 
knowledge and to move the reader from a linear (logical, ordered, exclu-
sive) to an acoustic (non-logical, simultaneous, inclusive) perspective” 
(Lamberti 2012, 32). The expression Lamberti here termed “traditional” 
could, in the present context, rather be termed “post-romantic” or “mod-
ern” (as in “modernity”). McLuhan’s own practice, his inviting and juxta-
posing style, challenges, just like the principle of pertinence, the logical, 
dualistic and linear order that modernity had made the standard mode of 
thought of Western knowledge.
2.3.3  Electronic Literature versus the Renaissance Emblem
How does the logic of the webpage, electronic literature, memes or com-
puter games relate to the genre of the emblem? Just like the digital in digi-
tal epistemology, the emblem and the cabinet of curiosities were not 
simply genres or forms, they were modes of thought (see Chap. 1, and the 
following chapters). Repeating John Manning’s observation that “[t]here 
was literally nothing under the sun that was not emblematic  – at least 
potentially” (Manning 2002, 130), it is notable that our environment 
4 See for example Alan Giroux 1989: “Today, pertinence-based classifications are widely 
discredited in the archival world. It is seen as the anathema to good archival practice” (p. 26), 
and further: “The common link, or key property, among documents was found within their 
contents, not outside in their context of creation,” p.  27. It was Kristin Veel’s thesis, 
“Narrative Negotiations: Information Structures in Literary Fiction” 2009, that made me 
aware of these different archival principles.
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(artificial or not) is once again—or, is always already—filled with signifi-
cance. The success of Pokémon Go a few years ago is a striking example, as 
is the ever-expanding plethora of augmented reality (AR) apps, where old 
ruins can be virtually restored to their former glory just by directing your 
smartphone to the site. The same can be said of most computer games, 
where every item, every pixel, is fueled with possible importance. A pro-
verbial conclusion in McLuhanesque language could sound like this: the 
diegetic discourse of the ludoverse is emblematic.5
As mentioned in Chap. 1, the emblematic mode of thought encour-
aged combination and composition, a call to create rather than to 
interpret. It is not difficult to observe this emblematic structure, as 
well as the emblematic mode of thought, in works of electronic litera-
ture, computer games and—even—in the very structure of most web-
pages. Electronic texts, such as Johannes Heldén’s The Prime Directive 
or J.R. Carpenter’s The Gathering Cloud, display the same iconic 
structure as the emblematic emblem: pictura, inscriptio, subscriptio 
(Heldén 2006; Carpenter 2016). And the mode of thought, to com-
bine and compose, and initializing a thought process rather than 
revealing something completed, is in line with emblematic epistemol-
ogy (and—it must be said—so is a lot of traditionally written poetry 
too, but then again, many poems are indeed emblematic). The same 
applies to webpages and memes: the combination of inscriptio, pictura 
and subscriptio represents the very form of the internet. Memes often 
display a very intricate combination of text, sound and visual elements, 
and moreover, like the emblem, often allude to contemporary myths 
and beliefs (it is common that memes challenge taken-for-granted 
assumptions in politics or popular culture). And while many webpages 
may have self-contained and rather unenigmatic content, they do 
(mostly) point out a direction, if not to God or a higher morality, at 
least to other webpages, or to the new gods and jurors—advertisers, 
social media.
5 And this is where digital epistemology reveals its congenial connection not only to media 
archaeology, but to theoretical concepts such as object-oriented ontology, speculative real-
ism, and actor-network theory—but that is another essay.
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2.4  inTerfaCe. mosaiC
As indicated by the above, digital epistemology is a concept applied to 
approach digital culture as a lens, or an interface, vis-à-vis early modern 
and premodern aesthetics, genres and works of art. Interestingly enough, 
in The Gutenberg Galaxy McLuhan uses the notion of interface in a way 
that actually is a misunderstanding of the concept. But then again, this 
mistake leads him to a conclusion that coincides with vital aspects of digi-
tal epistemology:
Two cultures or technologies can, like astronomical galaxies, pass through 
one another without collision; but not without change of configuration. 
In modern physics there is, similarly, the concept of “interface” or the 
meeting and metamorphosis of two structures. Such “interfaciality” is the 
very key to the Renaissance as to our twentieth century. (McLuhan 
1962, 149)
McLuhan’s mistake transforms this quote to a media archaeological 
object in itself. The “interface” McLuhan is referring to is certainly 
something other than today’s “interface.” The Swedish translation (by 
Richard Matz 1967b) used the word “interfas” (“interphase”), but if 
you search for that term on the web you will stumble upon articles on 
cell cycles. The English word “interface,” though, has a wider mean-
ing and leads to, among other topics, physics. The Encyclopedia 
Britannica states:
Interface, surface separating two phases of matter, each of which may be 
solid, liquid, or gaseous. An interface is not a geometric surface but a thin 
layer that has properties differing from those of the bulk material on either 
side of the interface.
Apparently, an interface is something that separates matter. It is not 
about systems that collide or pass each other, but the place where different 
functions meet and to some extent are delimited. That the data industry 
adopted the concept of interface to describe the zone that both separates 
and unites users and machines, software and hardware seems logical. But 
the concept that McLuhan most likely was looking for is interference. 
Encyclopedia Britannica again:
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Interference, in physics, the net effect of the combination of two or more 
wave trains moving on intersecting or coincident paths. The effect is that of 
the addition of the amplitudes of the individual waves at each point affected 
by more than one wave.
So, then, what shall we do with this information? The wrongful uses of 
interference, interface and interphase could be puns, as they appear in the 
works of Imri Sandström, which we will explore in the coming chapter. 
McLuhan’s mistake, though, opens up a very productive perspective for 
the media archaeologist. McLuhan’s interface, then, becomes an intersec-
tion between historical and contemporary discourses; the metamorphosis 
of history when observed through the lens of communications media. 
Media, then, work as interfaces, not only in relation to the immediate 
content, but also to the study (and use) of history.
When Elena Lamberti probes “the literary Origins of Media Studies,” 
she directs her attention mostly to McLuhan’s modernist influences. And 
quite rightly so—McLuhan’s mosaic definitely goes back to the aesthetics 
of Pound, Eliot, Joyce and Lewis. But then again, what they did in turn 
was to bring the early modern, premodern and antique culture to their 
own times—What might have been and what has been //Point to one end, 
which is always present, as T.  S. Eliot points out in “Burnt Norton.” 
Modernism may, after all, emanate from “interfaciality”—that is, from the 
method of historical juxtapositions—and the mosaic is a very congenial 
(and emblematic) form to present them.
Finally, to operationalize the media archaeological juxtapositions 
discussed above, we will end this chapter by looking at two works that 
explore digital technology as well as analog nostalgia. In various ways 
they juxtapose media historical impacts that at once affirm McLuhan’s 
historical gaze, and the media archaeologist’s interest in materiality 
and margins.
2.5  hegnhøJ and essvik. maTeriaLiTy 
and anaLog nosTaLgia
The Enemies of Books is a small book written by William Blades and first 
published by Trumner & Co. in London in 1881. The book also exists in 
an exclusive new edition, and we shall return to it soon. Blades is listed on 
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the title page also as the author of The Life and Typography of William 
Caxton. This Caxton, in turn, is known for having printed the first book 
in the English language in 1471—The Recuyell of the Historyes of Troyes—
and for having developed a typeface that survived in modified form even 
into our day. However, the book The Enemies of Books, as the title suggests, 
describes a series of phenomena that, in concrete terms, threaten the 
material existence of books. William Blades (1824–1890) himself was a 
typographer, publisher and book collector, and had a great interest in 
book history and typography.
So then: Who are the enemies of the book? Blades lists them chapter by 
chapter: fire; water; gas and heat; dust and neglect; ignorance and narrow-
mindedness; bookworms; other insects; and, finally, bookbinders and col-
lectors—no, not even his own trade is free from accusations.
Next to the new edition of Blade’s adorable book, I have a box sealed 
with a rubber band. On the band someone wrote, in Danish: 
“FORSIKTIG  – INDEHOLDER POETSNE,” which translates to: 
“CAUTION  – CONTAINS POETS’ SNOW.” The box has the same 
color as beige wrapping paper, and a label on the front gives us a title in 
typed capital letters: ELLA ER MIT NAVN VIL DU KØBE DET? (ELLA 
IS MY NAME WOULD YOU BUY IT?) (Hegnhøj 2014). On the reverse 
is a similar label with the publisher’s note: “These are Ella’s left notes, as 
we found them in the Private behind the secondhand bookstore in a box 
under Ella’s bed.” If you open the box you find almost 140 typewritten 
sheets with a band around it. And here we also find “poet’s snow”—circu-
lar clippings from a classic hole puncher.
The events described in this prose lyrical children’s and teen novel 
revolve around Ella, whose very poignant account emerges in typewritten 
diary sheets as an ongoing work in progress, with an almost relentless sad 
tone of loss. The old cliché of the “found manuscript” reinforces the 
impression of something lost, almost even before the reading began: What 
happened? Why has anyone found this? Does the one who wrote this still 
live? (The real author, Mette Hegnhøj, thankfully is alive and kicking). 
The narrative describes Ella, who lives behind a secondhand bookstore 
run by her mother. Ella wants a cat. And suddenly a cat emerges, a lost 
little rascal that the girl takes for her own and calls Kattekismus 
(Catechismus) after Luther’s catechism—from which Ella ripped pages to 
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make paper rats. But after nine days, Kattekismus disappears: “Without cat 
after with cat /is worse than /without cat before with cat. /I know that 
now” (Fig. 2.1).
Ella’s mother claims that her daughter was affected by asthma caused 
by the cat, but she herself thinks it is the books she is allergic to. In grow-
ing frustration, the girl attacks her mother’s antique store with a hole 
puncher—and creates the “poetic snow” that comes with the box. The 
reader may guess the gloomy truth about the cat’s disappearance, but Ella 
lives in hope. And hidden in this hope is also the longing for a lost father. 
Mette Hegnhøj’s poetic text establishes the sentimentality of loss, not 
only through the lyrical prose sheets, but also in the materiality that Ella 
er mitt navn exhibits. The author is said to have used nine different type-
writers to create the book, so it is not a matter of digital manipulation. 
Also, the box’s “poet’s snow” is mechanically made—these really are 
punch clippings.
The typewriter and hole puncher represent an office and paper culture 
that we have more or less left behind.6 These are tools that at their appear-
ance had the potential of positioning women in an initial stage of emanci-
pation, because a woman could enter the labor market as a typist, but at 
the same time she was so underpaid that she had to work very hard if she 
did not have the luck to be married. The office, nevertheless, represents 
increased social mobility for women at the end of the nineteenth century 
and beginning of the twentieth, a fact that Friedrich Kittler discusses in his 
familiar Dracula essay—and that is also described as a process with obsta-
cles, in Swedish author Elin Wägner’s fine debut novel Norrtullsligan 
from 1908 (translated as Men and Other Misfortunes 2002; Kittler 1997; 
Wägner 2002). Ella’s typewriter, in contrast, describes a voluntarily 
6 On the standardizations of the office and paper culture in Sweden during the twentieth 
century, see Charlie Järpvall (2016).
Fig. 2.1 Mette 
Hegnhøj, “Catechismus, 
Come back!” (From Ella 




chosen enclosure, because after the cat’s disappearance she refuses to go 
out. Only when she seems to have produced enough poet’s snow does she 
leave home. The final word of the narrative is “Ella?” followed by a last 
typewritten sign bearing the book’s title: “Ella is my name. Do you want 
to buy it?”
The cat’s name, Kattekismus, addresses the Danish title of Dr. Martin 
Luther’s catechism: Katekismus and Den lille katekismus. Considered from 
a media archaeological perspective, this is more than a pun—Luther’s ref-
ormation is intimately associated with the establishment of the printing 
press: “I simply taught, preached, and wrote God’s Word; otherwise I did 
nothing,” Luther preached. “And while I slept, or drank Wittenberg beer 
with my friends Philip and Amsdorf, I did nothing; the Word did every-
thing” (Luther 1522). Moreover, the theses the reformer according to 
tradition nailed on the church door in Wittenberg find a resonance in the 
signs and proclamations Ella very innovatively creates, mostly with the 
x-key on her typewriter: “IN A WAR THE BOOK WILL DIE,” for exam-
ple (Fig. 2.2). She finds a little note in the bookstore: “Ordered goods, it 
said on the receipt. /And kitten. /Sold is sold Ella.” The mother thus 
claims that she sold the cat and by so doing she buys herself the forgive-
ness of sins, the receipt being a (probably falsified) letter of indulgence. 
The literal disintegration of Luther’s catechism strengthens the bond 
between cat and child, and also calls into question an anthropocentric 
humanism that puts the relationship between humans first, and empha-
sizes the links between literal education and learned knowledge—where 
Luther’s Small Catechism long served as the eye of the needle. But Ella 
becomes an enemy of books and produces poet’s snow.
Yes. Let us return to The Enemies of Books. My copy is thus a new edi-
tion, published by Rojal Förlag, in Gothenburg, Sweden (Essvik 2018). 
Behind this small publishing house we find the artist and bookbinder Olle 
Essvik, who in several different projects merges the digital with the tactile; 
cultural history meets new technology. Rojal’s edition of Blade’s book is 
accompanied by a small booklet describing the process of creation. As a 
bookbinder, Essvik searches the internet for books on books, and finds a 
very expensive copy of William Blade’s book in a British antique store. 
The artist orders the book, scans the pages and prints the sheets. Essvik is 
searching the web again, this time for descriptions of bookbinding 
machines. He starts from these and constructs a bookbinding apparatus, 
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the parts of which he prints on a 3D printer. With this machine, he binds 
200 copies of the book and sells it as a conceptual work of art. An expres-
sion, if you so wish, of love for the book’s enemies. Many people believe 
that the very concept of digitizing is an enemy to the book, but what we 
are witnessing here is how digital technology is specifically used to main-
tain a craft which is gradually languishing. Media history as a media 
archaeological loop.
Hegnhøj and Essvik, two literary projects that in different ways decon-
struct the classic book format—one by using typewriters and putting the 
book in a cardboard box together with punch clippings; the other by rec-
reating an antiquarian book using a scanner and a 3D-printed bookbinding 
machine. Hegnhøj does not flirt with digital culture; on the contrary, the 
Fig. 2.2 Mette Hegnhøj, “IN A WAR THE BOOK WILL DIE” (From Ella er 
mit navn, vil du købe det? 2014)
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production process is strikingly analog (or non-digital)7—nine typewriters, 
real punches, papers in a box, rubber cord. But it is still our own contem-
porary age of digitization that give a special nimbus to Hegnhøj’s method. 
Of course, the workload would have been more or less the same, and the 
narrative content of the story would have been interpreted in a similar way, 
if Ella er mit navn had been published 30, 50 or 75 years ago. But as an 
artistic and tactile expression, our digital environment is decisive for how 
the text is perceived.8 Essvik’s strategy for merging digitization and cultural 
history is of a completely different nature. With great zeal he explores (in 
several projects) the relationship between new technology and old crafts, or 
constructs computer games of Samuel Beckett and Franz Kafka.9
In both cases, we are dealing with expressions of what we today call 
“analog nostalgia”—a concept that mainly circulates in postdigital and 
media archaeological research (and which we will explore further in Chap. 
3). This fascination for the analog can be expressed in the reuse of various 
retro techniques, for example—as in Hegnhøj’s and Essvik’s works—by 
emphasizing the paper and the book as media with certain material quali-
ties, or reproducing sounds of crackling vinyl on sound recordings. Analog 
nostalgia should not be seen as an escape from our digital age, but rather 
as paying attention to the materiality that has always characterized all 
media expressions, from the embodiment of the ancient rhetoric and the 
tactility of the codex to digital culture’s at once virtual and presence- 
creating tendencies.
Today’s technologies, thus, can become tools for reapproaching his-
tory, and actually rewriting it, in ways both McLuhan and media archaeol-
ogy have suggested—although their approaches to this rewriting probably 
would differ. Both Hegnhøj’s and Essvik’s works offer us the opportunity 
to reflect upon media history and media materiality, and thus they point 
out something important: that juxtapositions constitute the pedagogical 
core of digital epistemology (Fig. 2.3).
7 As explained in Chap. 1, “analog” and “digital” are not symmetrical entities, not a 
binary couple.
8 Hegnhøj, Mette (2017) published the book En prik og en streg (A Dot and a Line). The 
instruction that followed was: “There are no pictures in this book. And that’s because you 
are supposed to lie on your stomach while someone reads it to you – and simultaneously 
draws the stories on your back!” More tactility in the digital age.
9 For an overview of Essvik’s works, see https://www.jimpalt.org/ and http://www.rojal.
se/ (accessed April 2020).
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Fig. 2.3 Olle Essvik, pictures describing the making a new copy of William 
Blade’s book with a binding machine constructed with the help of a 3D printer 
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CHAPTER 3
CCC versus WWW: Digital Epistemology 
and Literary Text
Abstract This chapter explores the concept of digital epistemology as a 
mode of thought. The digital is approached as a “lens” (Lindhé, Digital 
Humanities Quarterly, 7, nr 1. http://www.digitalhumanities.org/dhq/
vol/7/1/000161/000161.html. Accessed Apr 2020 (2013)), focused 
on the relation between cultural history, literary texts and digital discourse. 
Examining examples from different literary texts, from the 1960s to the 
2000s, this chapter establishes a media archaeological juxtaposition 
between digital culture and early modern modes of thought such as the 
Kunstkammer, the emblem, the fragment, and also the archival principle 
of pertinence. The chapter argues that digital epistemology possesses a 
dual function: enhancing the reading of art and literature in the light of 
digital culture, and inviting a reconsideration—and even restoration—of 
the impact of early modern aesthetics.
3.1  The Mechanical hand
In a remarkable piece of prose lyric from 1966, the Swedish author Göran 
Printz-Påhlson (1931–2006) lends his voice to Charles Babbage:
No man can add an inch to his height, says the Bible. Yet once I saw the 
detective Vidocq change his height by circa an inch and a half. It has always 
been my experience that one ought to maintain the greatest accuracy even 
in small things.
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No one has taught me more than my machine. I know that a law of 
nature is a miracle. When I see the dragonfly, I see its nymph contained in 
its glittering flight. How much more probable is it that any one law will 
prove to be invalid than it will prove to be sound. It must happen in the end: 
that wheels and levers move accurately but that the other number will 
appear, the unexpected, the incalculable, when the nymph bursts into a 
dragonfly. I see a hand in life, the unchanging hand of The Great Effacer.
Therefore, be scrupulous and guard your reason, in order that you may 
recognize the miracle when it occurs. I wrote to Tennyson that his informa-
tion was incorrect when he sang ‘Every minute dies a man, /Every minute 
one is born.’ In fact, every minute one and one-sixteenth of a man is born. 
I refuse to abandon this one-sixteenth of a man. (Printz-Påhlson 2011, 165, 
in Robert Achambeau’s translation)1
This reflection has a full title that almost makes for a piece of prose lyric 
in itself: “Sir Charles Babbage Returns to Trinity College after having 
commissioned the Swedish mechanic Scheutz to build a difference engine. 
On the bank of the River Cam he gazes at the Bridge of Sighs and contem-
plates the life of the dragonfly.” Already the title, thus, seems to suggest 
some sort of information overload, if not in its content (the reader may 
have quite some use for this background) but in relation to common title 
practices. Moreover, the poem has as its subject a machine that produces 
other overloads—in the end “one-sixteenth of a man.”
The Swedish original where this poem was published in 1966, Gradiva 
och andra dikter, has on its cover a photography of a mechanical hand, 
which at first glance looks like some form of prosthesis. The back cover 
explains that the photo is of “the mechanism in the hand of the ‘musici-
enne,’ the piano playing doll, which Henri-Louis Jaquet-Drotz displayed 
on an exhibition of automata in Paris 1783.” Is this the hand of the poet? 
Poetry as an automated process? The Death of the Author?
The original collection is divided into four parts: the first one, in the 
form of a play, is a paraphrase on the German author Wilhelm Jensen’s 
novella Gradiva from 1902 (which, obviously, has lent the poetry collec-
tion its name); part 2 contains poems about, among others, the Rosenberg 
couple accused of espionage, the (Swedish/Amercian) union martyr Joe 
Hill, Gustave de Beaumont and Alexis de Tocqueville, and the escape art-
ist Houdini; part 4 is a short suite which under the headline “Summary” 
1 Printz-Påhlson’s poems are translated by Robert Achambeau. I have taken the liberty of 
adding two commas in the above-quoted text. All other translations from Scandinavian lan-
guages are by me. See also Printz-Påhlson (1966, 57).
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contains three poems written in English about the comic characters 
Superman, Bringing Up Father and The Katzenjammer Kids. If this did 
indeed make up a “summary” it may be as a comment upon the meta- 
poetic and cross-border character of the collection. The author comments 
in a footnote that “I have called Summary the section where I gather three 
poems in English about comic characters, in order to argue, for sure, that 
you don’t have to be less serious when you write about Superman, Bringing 
Up Father or The Katzenjammer Kids, than when you write about the 
Rosenbergs” (Printz-Påhlson 1966, 69).
But it is part 3 of the book that is of particular interest to us, since here 
we find mechanical dolls, monsters and machines. The title of this section 
is “The Automata” (“Automaterna”) and it contains six prose lyric texts, 
the first dedicated to the abovementioned French watchmaker and con-
structor of automata Jaquet-Drotz; thereafter a reflection in the words of 
Mary Shelley’s “Man-Made Monster”2; this is followed by a poem called 
“Formula Transition,” inspired by the programming language Fortran; 
and the text quoted in the opening of this chapter is about Charles 
Babbage, the man behind the difference engine and the analytical engine, 
both considered pioneering steps towards the construction of the modern 
computer. The Automata section proceeds with a short text about the 
mechanical doll Olimpia (from E.T.A. Hoffmann’s romantic novella The 
Sandman) and the suite ends with the poem “Turing Machine,” where 
this theoretical construction is juxtaposed with “other kinds of machines … 
more abstract automata, stolidly intrepid and inaccessible, eating their 
tape in mathematical formulae”(Printz-Påhlson 2011, 162; 1966, 59). 
But these machines, so the poem tells us, “imitate within the language”—
so maybe this, as the front cover photo, could be seen as another meta-
phor for the poet.
2 At the end of the poem, the author lets the “monster” utter the following words:
For myself, it seems as if my background and construction limit the possibilities for 
the successful development of my personality in socially acceptable forms. Evidently, 
I must choose between two possible careers: either to seek self-expression in the pur-
suit of crime – within which vast and varied field of activity sexual murder ought to 
offer unsurpassed opportunities for a creature of my disposition  – or during my 
remaining years quietly to warm my hands at the not altogether fantastically blazing 
but nonetheless never entirely extinguished fires of scholarship. (Printz-Påhlson 
2011, p. 166; 1966, pp. 54–55).
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What makes the Automata suite interesting is that it provides a con-
crete—and early (1966)—example of the representation of the digital in 
Swedish literature, while at the same time serving as a suitable gateway to 
the digital epistemology discussed in this volume. The representation of 
the digital is found explicitly in the Fortran poem, but indirectly also in the 
passages about Babbage and the Turing machine, since both of these 
names represent innovations and theoretical perspectives fundamental to 
the construction of the modern computer. However, the entire short sec-
tion, which thus thematizes automata and other similar artifacts (such as 
Frankenstein’s monster), can be seen as a manifestation of the more 
abstract, epistemological dimension examined in this book. Although the 
majority of the Automata texts do not explicitly deal with computers or 
digital technology, they nevertheless can clearly be seen as expressions of a 
discourse in which the digital marks its presence even when it is not articu-
lated: Why write about Shelley, Babbage and eighteenth-century automata 
in 1966? Or, for that matter, why do poetry of cartoon comics? The latter 
could, of course, be related to the enthusiastic reception of pop art in the 
1960s (Warhol, Lichtenstein, Fahlström, etc.), but also—or precisely 
because of this—be seen as a perspective shift away from the book’s hege-
monic status as a literary communicator, to a more complex cultural dis-
course, where media, technical artifacts and popular expressions occupy 
the same position as “the sunset” and “the sea.”3
Let us now move forward, to the Swedish 1990s.
3.2  The liTerary TexT: OperaTiOn ccc
The heading of this chapter may seem a little enigmatic. Here is an 
explanation:
3 “The poem about the beautiful sunset has run into some problems,” wrote the Danish 
critic Staffan Hejlskov Larsen (1971, 172). Maybe he was thinking of the Swedish poet 
Göran Palm, who in 1964 made a sensation with his poem “Havet” (“The Sea”). In a free 
English translation:
I stand in front of the sea.
There it is.
There is the sea.
I look at it.
The Sea. Well.
It’s like at the Louvre. (Palm 1964)
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When the three books were written I did have a computer, but my search for 
information did not go through search engines, googling or by any other 
ether devices. No http://www. WorldWideWeb – but rather http: //ccc.
CarCargoCollections.4 The body instead of the ether. I am not saying this 
to heroize an older, more artisan mode of production, but to give a reason-
able historical record. And to cast a suspicion that the way of writing or the 
choice of mediation already was inherent in the air I was breathing, that 
others had already begun with something I did not know of (but still some-
how was affected by). (Gunnar D. Hansson 2009)
The quote comes from a lecture in 2008 by the Swedish author and pro-
fessor in comparative literature Gunnar D. Hansson. In the 1990s he had 
written a number of books, Olunn, Lunnebok and Idegransöarna, dealing 
with (in turn) mackerels, puffins and yews. By the year 2008 these books were 
released in a compilation volume (Hansson 2008), and that was the reason for 
Hansson’s reflection, which may serve as some kind of poetics in reverse.
These books are remarkable in many ways, not least in their structure. 
Since Hansson was an established poet, the titles ended up in the poetry 
section of bookstores, but they could just as well have been categorized as 
prose, documentary literature, folklore research, sagas, encyclopedias, 
travelogues and so on. Around the topic of each volume, the author pres-
ents poems, essays, prose, facts, tales, tables and speculations, but all this 
in the complete absence of summary syntheses, conclusions or overall rea-
soning. How do you summarize a mackerel, anyway? Or, as British bota-
nist Alan Mitchell says, speaking about the yew: “There is no theoretical 
end to this tree, no need for it to die” (Hansson 2009). Clearly, there is 
something unsorted and encyclopedic about these texts. They become 
archives, but hardly sorted according to the post-romantic principle of 
provenance—by cause and origin, that is—but rather by the more associa-
tive order we stumbled upon in previous chapters: the principle of perti-
nence—to which we will return soon.
So, we look for expressions of a “digital epistemology” and find it in a 
formal order, or “disorder,” in books about mackerels, puffins and yews. In 
the case of the trilogy, the author himself suggests that there was something 
outside his own conscious creation which influenced the arranging of his 
texts, “something I did not know of (but still somehow was affected by).” 
What his self-insight confirms is that what he envisioned in the early 1990s 
was not intentionally related to digital technology, but that he is aware that 
4 Originally it read “http://BBB:BilBåtBibliotek,” which stands for car, boat and library.
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his books in their very form and structure nevertheless came to embody 
some of the characteristics of the new media (that Gunnar D. Hansson by 
that time had translated, and introduced to the Swedish public, Walter 
J. Ong’s Orality & Literacy may have helped his self-observation).
There are, of course, more examples. In the “CCC era” Swedish author 
Gabriella Håkansson published her debut novel, the sequential story 
Operation B (from 1997, with a digital sequel published on the Bonnier 
website as Operation SnabelBeta – “snabel-a” being the Swedish word for 
the “at” sign, the title would translate to something like “Operation Bat 
Sign”).5 The first part of the novel describes a woman who has been mar-
ried to a man for several decades, before she finally—and as part of an 
ongoing research project—simply kills him, since the investigation is over. 
The notion of reckless science, which in this way brutally affects people’s 
lives, constitutes a stark contrast to the 1990s’ most radical postmodern 
notions that “everything” is “text.” At the same time, Håkansson’s novel 
is largely playing with the notions of text and narrative.
It is, indeed, an obscure “Operation” that holds the novel’s fragments 
together. A conspiracy? Or simply the conditions for power? Or an alle-
gory about the task of writing novels when the great Narrative no longer 
has an end—“the end of history?” In Håkansson’s case, moreover, the 
absence of an end became literal when new sequences were published on 
the internet, in what may have been the first network-based work in 
Sweden published by an established publisher (Bonnier). One of these 
“digital sequences” relates a slideshow (yet another obsolete technology) 
presented by a psychiatrist. The case she presents is about a man who has 
become obsessed with repairing the sewer at his summer cottage, and as a 
result has lost his family—and his sanity. The therapy suggested is to build 
small models of the living room where the pipe system is actually finished, 
after which the man is allowed to build a slightly larger model, and so on 
to more and more models, the last of which is at a natural size. The treat-
ment method is described as a success. But what happens when the repre-
sentation can no longer be separated from “reality,” the original? Is it the 
reality that is lost—or is it the representation? Will fiction disappear, or will 
we (as did many in the 1990s) rather argue that everything consists of 
stories? Of text? Gabriella Håkansson’s 1990s were greatly influenced by 
these issues—we saw it in Cultural Studies insisting that “everything” is a 
story, and in the pedagogs’ ever-expanding notion of text and of course 
the oft-cited, and misunderstood, Derridean phrase il n’y as pas de 
5 The link to Operation SnabelBeta was, unfortunately, broken long ago.
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hors- texte. The story of the summer cottage does not differ from the sum-
mer cottage. The research project does not differ from life.
From a digital perspective, can we perhaps turn the problem upside- 
down and ask ourselves if instead it is our representations that are always 
already reality? This, of course, may be considered an epistemological fact, 
but our digital habits further emphasize this—the representations we cre-
ate are constantly ongoing. The original concept of mimesis also included 
methexis, participation (Sypher 1968, xviii; Kelty 2016). An imitation was 
not primarily a representation, it meant performing something, a partici-
pation, just as in many of today’s digital forms of expression; and also in 
the rudimentary interactive text that Operation SnabelBeta resulted in.6
To summarize this far, by reading through the looking glass of digital 
epistemology, we can detect traces of digital order, and digital structures, 
in texts that do not explicitly deal with computer technology, but rather 
display themes and orders that can be productively related to their digital 
environments.
3.3  pOsTdigiTaliTy and analOg nOsTalgia
The fact that the digital “exists everywhere” has its origin in the observation 
that our environment is built on “code” rather than “codex” (although 
these are not binary concepts, since most codices today rely on code). This 
generates notions—and staging—of our entire existence as actually translat-
able and reproducible. As Rasmus Fleischer points out in his Det postdigi-
tala manifestet (“The Postdigital Manifesto”), the only thing that keeps the 
music alive is the copying; that is, reproduction. Each listen to a CD or a 
downloaded file actually creates a new copy at the moment of playback 
(Fleischer 2009, 53).7 The boundary between copy and original is chal-
lenged, a fact that leading market forces, for obvious reasons, resist by all 
6 Gabriella Håkansson has told that she had big plans, and got some pledges from the pub-
lisher, regarding her digital sequel. Gradually the publisher curbed its enthusiasm, and in the 
end there remained some clickable chapters, a rudimentary hypertext (private conversation).
7 The full quote reads:
All use of digital information means that the information is deleted. If a computer 
program fails to erase the tracks, the computer hangs up and in the worst case has to 
be restarted. All digital files will be deleted sooner or later. This is too staggering to 
think about in one’s everyday interactions with computers. … A digital file cannot be 
made permanent except by incessant copying. Without being copied further, it is 
impossible for a digital file to survive even half as long as an old gramophone record.
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means possible. But this insight also makes us aware—or makes us suspect—
that our own identities are not that original, either. William S. Burroughs’ 
experiment with tape recorders in the 1960s, and the conclusion that we all, 
our speech, our bodies, are always already pre- recorded, looks uncomfort-
ably prophetic (Burroughs 1962). Try to say something new at a party, 
something you never said before. If, in the 1960s, this could be received as 
a striking but nonetheless curious observation, the same statement in our 
own—posthumanist, digital—era becomes an existential reality.
The observation of these phenomena has given rise to the “postdigital” 
condition that inspired Fleischer’s manifesto. That being said, it is impor-
tant to realize that this is not to be confused with an “anti-digital” atti-
tude, nor a notion of something to surface “after” the digital. Rather, the 
notion of the postdigital expresses an awareness that digitization has cre-
ated certain phenomena and artifacts which cannot easily be incorporated 
into the traditional capitalist logic that is often regarded as associated with 
digital culture (as long as it does not threaten its own interests). It is also 
about letting us understand that the digital cannot be realized without 
analog receptors in the form of text, sound, light and so on; this is the 
starting point for an analysis of the complex and—as we observed in Chap. 
1—non-binary relationship between digital and analog culture.
One expression of a postdigital approach to cultural production is what 
has come to be called “analog nostalgia,” which was mentioned in the 
previous chapter. The concept of analog nostalgia has been attributed to 
Laura Marks and was launched around 2000. In the essay “Analogue 
Nostalgia and the Aesthetics of Remediation” from 2014, Dominik Schrey 
parallels the phenomenon with the ruin cult and fragment aesthetics of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Schrey 2014; see also Marks 2002).8 
In a prolongation of Marks, Schrey claims that analog nostalgia is partly 
that digital technology is used to emphasize the analog, and partly that it 
is the “noise” rather than the “signal” that is noticed:
[T]he phenomenon is not about the refusal of digital technologies, but 
exclusively about the digital remediation of analogue aesthetics within the 
8 Ruin romanticism and fragment aesthetics, albeit not early modern, are two highly inter-
esting art historical concepts in the light of digital epistemology. Moreover, it has to be said 
that early modernity is not an end in itself here; rather, it is the recursive (see Chap. 1) oscil-
lation between different historical moments and genres that is in focus. It will be interesting, 
in coming projects, to further explore both these romantic phenomena as well as premodern 
forms and classic rhetoric through the digital lens.
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digital. To put it in terms of communication theory, analogue nostalgia is 
directed towards the noise, not the signal. In the broadest sense, it operates 
as a strategy of re-enchanting an object through aesthetic defamiliarisation 
[sic] as it is characterised by deliberate imperfection. (Schrey 2014, 34)
Of course, it is in this “noisy soundscape” that we also identify the rattle 
of the machine, relive the shortcomings of Dolby B, feel the weight of the 
book and connect the vinyl player through Bluetooth or the computer’s 
USB port. Analog nostalgia, thus, is one of the most concrete expressions 
of media materiality observed through digital epistemology.
Examples of this materiality from our own twenty-first century can be 
found in the Swedish poet Johan Jönsson’s astonishingly extensive collec-
tion of poems, which must almost be described in terms of a postdigital 
and poetic epistemology: Mot, vidare, mot (2014, “Towards, further, 
towards”) counts 1562 pages and med.bort.in. (2012, “with.away.with.”) 
counts 1244 pages (Jönsson 2012, 2014). Another expression of this 
materiality is Swedish journal OEI’s monumental relation to paper con-
sumption, publishing issues that are so dense as to almost oppose distribu-
tion.9 Whether or not these works are produced with “the digital” in 
mind, their mere presence among pdf files, smartphones, websites and 
snapchats makes for a brutal statement that definitely differs from how the 
same products would have been perceived 50 years earlier. Through their 
manifest materialities these expressions establish media archaeological 
access points where concepts such as “digital” and “analog” can be further 
problematized.10
Former Swedish Academy member Lotta Lotass is another writer who 
stubbornly drives an analog nostalgic campaign. Her neo-modernist 
approach of presenting literary fiction in a box of pamphlets, as in Den vita 
jorden (“The White Soil” or “The White Earth”, 2007), or as a 50-meter- 
long telegram strip containing one single sentence, as in Fjärrskrift 
(“Teleprints” 2011), is a tangible expression of a postdigital discourse. It 
is notable that many of Lotass’ texts contain a lot of technology (many 
explorers, many technological advances), but digital technology is mostly 
absent on the explicit level of the texts. However, it is not a case of Lotass 
9 For example, OEI #53–54, “Dokument, Dispositiv, Deskription, Diskurs,” counts 1280 
pages, while OEI #63–64, “Strata, geologisk tid, jordkonst/Land art i Sverige,” counts a 
humble 688 pages. It has happened more than once that the editors have asked subscribers 
to collect the journal at the office, since they are too expensive to send by mail.
10 On the relation between analog and digital, see the introductory Chap. 1.
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creating these works to “challenge,” “resist” or even “relate to” her digital 
contemporary—digital epistemology establishes its own relationships 
(moreover, Lotass has created digital works as well). What seems to char-
acterize Lotass’ prose, however, is the almost demonstrative lack of net-
works. Sometimes (like in Den vita jorden) it seems that the text itself lacks 
a common network. Make it a box instead.
3.4  digiTal. TacTile. cabineT
(DO NOT touch the objects
The surface absorbs
salt, dirt and fat.
Do not touch.
The acids of the skin
causes oxidation.):
…
These lines are translated from the Finland Swedish poet Ralf Andtbacka’s 
(2008) collection of poetry Wunderkammer (Andtbacka 2008, 18). This 
poem—probably an objet trouvé, and as such possibly a note from a 
museum somewhere—establishes a paradox. Twice, the reader is prompted 
not to touch the objects. But by this very gesture—the injunction not to 
touch—a tactile dimension is established in these brief lines. “We will not 
ever come closer, and yet more distant, to the thing-in-itself,” as Swedish 
critic Mattias Pirholt notes in a review (Pirholt 2010). It is an observation 
of tactility that is enhanced by the information about our fingers, as index 
and digit (Peters 2016). Fingers (index, digit) are not only digital, but also 
contain salt, dirt and fat, and they carry acid which may cause oxidation. 
The human touch is a chemical laboratory.
In Wunderkammer one finds several reflections on humanity’s relation 
to the objects around us. The motto of the book reads (in Swedish): 
“There is something odd about things. /How they gather, and silent stay; 
/how they disperse, if you may.” It is poetry that almost could be a text-
book example of actor-network theory—the objects are indeed agents in 
Andtbacka’s poetry.11 And these objects are constantly engaged in new 
11 Actor-network theory (ANT) is a way of describing our relationship to objects that are 
not normally attributed agency. For an account of some of the theory’s trends, see Latour 
(2005). In an article explaining some of the theory’s premises, Latour (1996) argues:
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relationships, not only in language (this is more than language poetry), 
but rather in the very relation of things to each other, to language, to 
human beings, to life. Neither are the digital objects excluded—primarily 
they mark their presence through the playful, neo-modernist typography. 
But as we shall see, there are also media archaeological points of contact 
between a digital epistemology and the aesthetics based on the 
Wunderkammer that gave the poetry collection its name.
I have already described some basic characteristics of the cabinet of 
curiosities in Chap. 1. With Horst Bredekamp—and Francis Bacon—the 
playfulness of the Kunstkammer was emphasized (Bredekamp 1995, 67). 
In Ralf Andtbacka’s Wunderkammer, tooCabinets of curiosities, the poetic 
structure is maintained by this playful materiality—digital as well as tac-
tile—and by negotiating the relation between sorting and association. 
Andtbacka’s collection of poems refers not only through the title, but also 
in its practice, typographically, thematically and ironically (Malmio 2020), 
to the cabinet of curiosities as an order of knowledge. But this is also put 
in relation to digital technology as a system of information management.
It is thus rewarding to read Andtbacka’s book in the light of the asso-
ciative logic of the Kunstkammer, but also as an expression of a digital 
epistemology and, further, to see the Kunstkammer’s mode of thought as 
a congenial expression of this epistemology. As for the expressions of digi-
tal technology in Andtbacka’s text (Fig.  3.1), they are most evident 
through the book’s typographical playfulness, but also through a list, at 
the end, of (for the book’s research) relevant web pages, sorted in the 
form of an hourglass and with the supplementary invitation to “record the 
date when you discover that all the verses in the poem are dead” (Andtbacka 
2008, 147, my italics). The poet’s insistence that the prosaic internet 
addresses are “verses” in a “poem” establishes another relationship 
between art and digital culture, and between “life” and “death”: a URL 
or, rather, a verse that can “die” must have had a life.
AT [Latour’s abbreviation for ANT] has been developed by students of science and 
technology and their claim is that it is utterly impossible to understand what holds 
society together without reinjecting in its fabric the facts manufactured by natural and 
social sciences and the artefacts designed by engineers. As a second approximation, 
AT is thus the claim that the only way to achieve this reinjection of things into our 
understanding of the social fabric is through a network-like ontology and social theory.
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Fig. 3.1 Ralf Andtbacka (From Wunderkammer 2008, photograph)
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One of the poems in Wunderkammer carries the title “Naturalia & 
artificialia,” and thus directly addresses two sorting principles of the cabi-
nets (the other two, according to Bredekamp, being Scientifica and 
Exotica; see Chap. 1, and Bredekamp 1995, 34). The poem begins with a 
classification of a plant, written according to the order established by Carl 
von Linné: Name; Class; Order; Family; and Place of Growth. Interestingly 
enough, Horst Bredekamp points out that precisely Linnaeus’s sexual sys-
tem is one of the clearest examples of the new modern order that entered 
at the same time as the status of cabinets of curiosities started to decline 
(Bredekamp 1995, 88–91). Enter modernity. Thus, the first lines of the 
poem juxtapose—consciously or not—two contradictory systems of 
knowledge: the associative practice of the Kunstkammer and the system-
atic logic of Linné.12
Returning to the introductory quote from Andtbacka’s book, we see a 
typographic peculiarity that recurs in the first half of the book::…A colon 
followed by an ellipsis (and throughout the book these ellipses are 
repeated). The colon suggests a following paragraph or sentence, often 
with some informational content. Also, the ellipsis suggests something to 
be continued. With this tiny typographic detail, the poet fuses disparate 
elements “in free, concomitant phenomena void of obvious purpose” 
(again, Bredekamp 1995, 109), whether the reader accepts this or not. 
Andtbacka thus locates the cabinet to language itself: not only to language 
but also to typography and—finally—to digital technology. Nevertheless, 
as previously pointed out, this is not a laboratory for language poets only. 
The materiality of the Wunderkammer is tactile, and epistemological.
3.5  The principle Of perTinence
The organizational principle of the cabinet of curiosities, and Andtbacka’s 
book, once again lead us to one of the observations we made in Chap. 2, 
and of Gunnar D. Hansson’s poetics, namely the principle of pertinence. 
The principle of pertinence (and, consequently, also the Kunstkammer) 
can be seen as an attempt to maintain a divine order, a model of the 
12 This collision of epistemic systems is similar to the observation made by Norbert Wiener, 
in the introduction to his groundbreaking work Cybernetics: or Control and Communication 
in the Animal and the Machine (1948). In the opening pages Wiener actually analyzes a 
German nursery rhyme, which mentions clouds and stars, and he observes that this little 
song actually combines two different epistemes: astronomy and meteorology (Wiener 
1948, 30).
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world.13 The principle of provenance, on the other hand, transforms the 
archive from a “message” into a resource for these models. As already 
noted, Susan A. Crane, in her essay about cabinets of curiosities and the 
Museum of Jurassic Technology, describe the objects in the Kunstkammer 
as telling stories, blending fact and fiction: “[T]he desirability of the curi-
ous object lay in its relation to a known or acceptable story” (Crane 2000, 
72). The objects in the museum, on the other hand, should be seen as 
representations, as part of the great national mythmaking: “[T]he histori-
cal object participated in a narrative uniting location and experience” 
(ibid., 76). The archive ordered by provenance, arranged by source and 
origin, also tells a story about the archive’s own creation, a story that dif-
fers significantly from those told by the principle of pertinence.
This principle—also, we may remind ourselves, known as the subject 
principle or the dossier system—coincides with Horst Bredekamp’s 
description of the cabinets’ mode of thought: the true expression of an 
object or a person is discovered in freely associated phenomena, with no 
obvious connection. In the essay written for Litteraturbanken 2017 (see 
Chap. 1), Andreas Önnerfors also argues for the connection between cabi-
nets of curiosities and the principle of pertinence:
The digital softens up staggered epochs and makes the texts of the past 
immediately present, with a potentially acute contemporary relevance. In 
the digital Wunderkammer, knowledge can be formed through a creative 
combination of different approaches, which challenges our classic notions of 
the relationship between text and context. Furthermore, I argued that the 
digitalisation of the searchable whole of the text also dissolves the classical 
hegemony of earlier knowledge organizations. (Önnerfors 2017)
Moreover, these tendencies coincide with several of the approaches 
within the emerging field of media archaeology, and this becomes even 
clearer by considering the synonyms for English’s “pertinence” that The 
Merriam-Webster Dictionary lists: applicability, bearing, connection, mate-
riality, relevance—all of which seem to be relevant to the media archaeo-
logical discourse.14 Not only Google but also many pre- and early modern 
forms of thought harmonize with this way of arranging and commenting 
13 Pointed out by Otto Fischer, professor of rhetoric at Uppsala University, private 
conversation.
14 See the Merriam-Webster online entry for “pertinence”, https://www.merriam- webster.
com/dictionary/pertinence (accessed May 2020).
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on existence. The recursive move from provenance to pertinence thus 
becomes a key to the description of a digital epistemology. In light of the 
principle of pertinence, we can return to texts such as Lotta Lotass’ 
Aerodynamiska Tal (“Aerodynamic Figures”) from 2001, a catalog of 
famous aircraft sorted by the years they appear in history (Lotass 2001). 
Also, Gunnar D. Hansson’s AB Neandertal (1996, “Neandertal Inc.”), 
builds on the associative principles of the previously mentioned trilogy, 
but this time the text is arranged alphabetically. Already the title can be 
read as a compressed “list” which simultaneously marks a beginning and 
an end: AB, as in the alphabet. Neanderthal, the extinct archaic human 
species.
The relationship between pertinence, cabinets of curiosities and media 
archaeology is further strengthened by the fact that it was the Enlightenment 
and systematic ordering of progressing Modernity that brought an end to 
the organizational principle of the Kunstkammer. Patrick Mauriès writes 
in Cabinets of Curiosities how the escalating interest in optics and tele-
scopes in the eighteenth century was viewed with skepticism among col-
lectors of curiosities, as these tools were devoted to the study of the 
particular and the individual object, rather than letting the viewer marvel 
at the irregularities of creation (Mauriès 2015, 182).15 The classic cabinet 
encouraged combinations, the crossing of borders and the affirmation of 
similarities between nature and culture, artifact and organic, the grotesque 
and the beautiful. The cabinets that materialized in the nineteenth century 
with few exceptions exhibit a museum order, where provenance and sci-
ence are prevailing principles. It is the organizational, and by reason struc-
tured, order of modernity that has made its entry:
The cult of curiosities was a cult of summation, of the sum total of things, 
of juxtaposition and addition repeated ad infinitum; the Age of 
Enlightenment, to reiterate a contrast that is now time-honoured, adopted 
a stance at the opposite extreme, placing itself firmly on the side of universal-
ity, of a hierarchal world view, and of an assumption of the validity of the 
15 Patrick Mauriès 2015 (2002), p. 182:
If he [Emanuele Tesauro] took as his title for his most celebrated work The Aristotelian 
Telescope (Il Cannochiale aristotelico, Turn, 1675), it was in order – significantly – to 
lament the fact that the telescope diminished the mystery of creation.
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broader categories of reason.[footnote in quotation] After 1750, the collec-
tor of curiosities and “patient pedant,” as represented by Sir Thomas 
Browne, was to give way to the Encyclopaedists, who dismissed the naivety 
and archaic approach of their predecessors with withering scorn … 
(ibid., 189)16
Media archaeology adopts Foucault’s (and several other postmodern 
thinkers’) criticism of modernity’s trust in reason. Through media- 
historical juxtapositions, archaeological “finds” and alternative historio-
graphical strategies, modernity appears more or less as a parenthesis, a way 
of arranging culture and science that has certainly been educational and 
systematically satisfying, but at the same time exclusive, elitist and not the 
least arbitrary. This is echoed in a fine formulation by Rasmus Fleischer in 
his Det postdigitala manifestet:
Between the pre-modern and the post-digital, we find, as if folded-in, the 
whole package that is usually called modernity. A systematic division of such 
things as body and soul, nature and culture, object and subject, were its 
characteristics. At the end of the eighteenth century, “culture” was invented 
as its own sphere, defined as a counterpart to the sphere of industrial pro-
duction. (Fleischer 2009, 26)
Digital works, so far, are absent in this presentation—but only to clarify 
that digital epistemology is not necessarily a matter of digital objects. An 
important ambition with the concept of digital epistemology, however, is 
to abolish the sometimes still quite sharp distinction between on the one 
hand digital born, electronic works and on the other hand traditional 
book culture—or other media, for that matter.
The present text should therefore be regarded as a sketch, as another 
attempt (I mentioned a few in the first chapter) to put “the digital” in a 
new light and to connect the (post)digital with early modern culture. As 
we have seen, media archaeology as a concept shares many of the princi-
ples that can be found in some early modern modes of thought, as well as 
in many of today’s digital expressions. Search engines and digital interfaces 
(in telephones, tablets and computers) as well as electronic works, 
16 The footnote in the quote refers to Guiseppi Olmi, “Théâtres du monde, les collections 
européennes des XVIe et XVII siècles,” in Roland Schaer (ed.), Tous les savoirs du monde: 




computer games and memes exhibit multimodal expressions that expose 
many similarities to early modern forms. The search engine and the com-
puter desktop are not limited to genres but to function, and they re-exam-
ine relationships between cause and effect, materiality and distance, 
provenance and pertinence. Electronic literature, games and memes blend 
texts, images and sounds into a multimodal experience that has more in 
common with the cabinet of curiosities, the emblem and fragment aes-
thetics than with linear narratives, provenance principles and strict 
categorizations.
3.6  iMri sandsTröM: language and The principle 
Of perTinence
The Swedish artist and author Imri Sandström’s “text box” Det kom-
mande skallet/The Coming Shall, from 2017, in this context is an example 
of both analog nostalgia and (post)digital remediation. Her work also dis-
plays features we could describe as a “principle of pertinence of language.”17 
By various stagings, Sandström’s work establishes an interaction between 
text and image that, through its activist approach, its enargeia, in Cecilia 
Lindhé’s words could be called “ekphrastic”; that is, directed speech that 
calls for the reader’s (or listener’s) own creation of images, the viewer’s 
own activity (Sandström 2017; Lindhé 2013).
Sandström works in a variety of formats, such as text in book form, 
installations, performances, visual and digital art. In 2019 she finished her 
PhD project in Literary Composition at the University of Gothenburg, 
with the title Tvärsöver otysta tider/Across Unquiet Times (Sandström 
2019). In dialog with, among others, the American critic and poet Susan 
Howe, Sandström in this project mainly focused on installing a number of 
relations between the history of the Västerbotten region in Sweden and 
New England, USA. She does this partly through juxtapositions of both 
these regions, inspired by postcolonial theory as well as by Bakhtin’s con-
cept of the chronotope (Bakhtin 1981), but also by bold transformation 
maneuvers such as various different “counterintuitive” translations with 
homonymous practices and puns. Thus, Bakhtin’s “Chronotope” becomes 
17 In Kungliga Biblioteket (the Swedish Royal Library) the arrangement of files in accor-
dance with the principle of pertinence was called “the dossier system,” which seems appropri-
ate in this case, since Sandström’s work, the text box, indeed could be seen as a dossier. Again 
thanks to Otto Fischer for this information, unpublished conversation.
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“Kronotorp” (a small Swedish croft, instituted by the state for colonizing 
the North), where the notions of time and space in the literary text trans-
form into a postcolonial discourse about the state’s desire to control 
northern labor in the first half of the twentieth century (Sandström 2017, 
35–38). Another example of how Sandström plays with homonymous jux-
tapositions can look like this:
I översätts till svenskans in. The Swedish word i means in.
…
I skogen In the woods
I skogen I the woods
[ – – –]
The English I is pronounced AJ
Jag, I uttalat aj in Swedish
this is an expression of pain:
“AJ, det gör ont!”
“I, it hurts!”. (Ibid.)
Sandström’s project in this text box—or dossier—embraces several of 
the aspects that the perspective of digital epistemology brings forth. The 
very act of publishing texts in a box confirms previously noted strategies 
for establishing paper and print culture’s tactility in our digitized and 
screen-mediated existence (we have mentioned Lotta Lotass’ Den vita jor-
den, Johan Jönsson’s poetry collections, the monumental editions of the 
magazine OEI). Moreover, the content of these dozens of small text 
booklets in turn remediates digital installations that have either been pre-
sented as installation performances or published on the author’s website 
(or both).
It is thus a seemingly loosely connected work, characterized by both 
analog nostalgia and tactility, as well as reuse and reconfiguration of digital 
installations. “Seemingly,” that is, because the project has some very clear 
nodes. One node is represented by the before-mentioned geographical 
juxtaposition of New England and Västerbotten, and thereby a “mono-
logical” dialog between Susan Howe and Imri Sandström (“monologi-
cal,” since this dialog takes place on Sandström’s terms and with 
well-chosen reuse of text passages by Howe); another node is linguistic 
labs with homonyms, direct translations and puns (Chronotope/
Kronotorp; I/AJ), which in repetitive practices twine the work together.
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Sandström’s box presents the title and subheading on both sides, in 




is a selection of
cross-readings
of
Västerbotten’s and New England’s
histories and literatures




















This extensive, almost archaic title/subtitle (the thoughts go to the 
elaborate subtitles of early seventeenth- and eighteenth-century novels) 
also suggests what the reader of these small booklets can expect.18 Text 
18 See for example the first edition of Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe: THE LIFE AND 
STRANGE SURPRISING ADVENTURES OF ROBINSON CRUSOE, OF YORK, MAR 
INER: Who lived Eight and Twenty years, all alone in an uninhabited Island on the Coast of 
AMERICA, near the mouth of the Great River of OROONOQUE; Having been cast on Shore 
by Shipwreck, all the Men perished but himself. WITH An Account how he was last strangely 
delivered by PYRATES. Written by Himself. LONDON: Printed for W. TAYLOR at the Ship 
3 CCC VERSUS WWW: DIGITAL EPISTEMOLOGY AND LITERARY TEXT 
68
becomes sound in the various translation acts; the reader is tempted (or 
sometimes almost forced) to read aloud. But also, the visual installations 
of the texts (where a fragment from the Pietist theologian Cotton Mather 
can be enlarged into absurdum until only cloudy pixels are visible) chal-
lenges the normal relationship between language and materiality. Swedish 
blogger and literary critic Bernur (Björn Kohlström) identified this as 
follows:
Writing about writing: this is a performative act, which focuses on the lin-
guistic. Sandström also utilizes the book page, where English and Swedish 
can run quadruply, but sometimes also left untranslated, or part of an 
exchange between the untranslatable, where “yet another deviant” becomes 
“ännu en eljest,” without your reacting to something happening in the 
translation. It is a creative language game performed here. And, as a result, 
a linguistic leak occurs. (Bernur 2018)
This “leak” works productively and poetically. And even though 
Sandström’s translations cannot be said to be strictly digital maneuvers, 
they can still be seen as results of both digital and artistic visualizations of 
the linguistic practice that has been explored both in scenic performances 
and on the research project’s website.19 Together, these practices form a 
linguistic cabinet of curiosities in which the words, sounds and meanings 
are explored and shifted in an associative way, “a writing that in some way 
transcends,” as Bernur writes (ibid.). So, we are back to the principle of 
pertinence again. To continue in line with Sandström’s own puns, we can 
conclude that the province is not described with provenance.
In the language games and puns presented in works such as Across and 
The Hiss of History (represented also as digital performances on the proj-
ect’s website, as well as in the “dossier” The Coming Shall), both visual and 
acoustic aspects of the language are used as starting points for oscillatory 
and associative movements between the languages  to be used and explored. 
Sandström can approach the language etymologically and lead us to the 
Greek roots of a word like “history.” This, of course, is a traditional 
humanities approach, based on provenance; that is, origin and derivation. 
But the overall structure of the project coincides to a much greater extent 
in Pater-Noster. MDCCXIX.  See: http://www.pierre-marteau.com/editions/1719- 
robinson- crusoe.html (accessed April 2020).
19 Sandström’s project has continually been updated on the website The Pages, http://
www.howeacrossreading.imrisandstrom.com/ (accessed April 2020).
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with the “dossier system,” the principle of pertinence, since here, too, it is 
the object itself, not its origin, that establishes new, perhaps surprising, but 
not random relationships. This can happen if we take the language seri-
ously, something that Sandström unceasingly demonstrates through her 
provocative direct translations, homophonic parallels, the unsettling of 
meaning and puns (which always have a serious undertone). We can 
describe it as an exploration of resonances, similarities and transcendences 
based on the principle of pertinence.
A congenial description of this principle can be found in one of the 
authors that Sandström (alongside Susan Howe) most often cites: 
Gertrude Stein. In “If I Told Him: A Completed Portrait of Picasso,” we 
read the following lines:
Exact resemblance to exact resemblance the exact resemblance as exact as a 
resemblance, exactly as resembling, exactly resembling, exactly in resem-
blance exactly a resemblance, exactly and resemblance. For this is so. 
(Stein 1924)
History in Sandström’s work resembles the word “Hiss,” as in “a hiss-
ing,” like the sound of the snake. Sandström cites the Webster dictionary 
which describes the sound of a human hissing thus: “To express contempt 
or disapprobation by hissing.” But in The Hiss of History, of course, the 
most irritating “hiss” comes from the masculine subject (“his”) who, 
purely semantically, not to mention actually, has been the dominating sub-
ject of history through the centuries. This, as we know, is an observation 
that has become something of a gender theory commonplace, but which 
in Sandström’s work is thus twisted even further. And this subject is also 
found in Gertrude Stein’s poem:
He he he he and he and he and and he and he and he and and as and as he 
and as he and he. He is and as he is, and as he is and he is, he is and as he 
and he and as he is and he and he and and he and he. (ibid.)
However, it is possible to add yet another twist to this (although 
Sandström does not mention it herself). Maybe we should change the 
word History, add the letter T and then get Thistory. Using the term 
Thistory instead of History would be congenial with what we might call a 
postmodernist credo: that each story told conceals another story. Thistory 
is always pregnant with Thatstory. Here again Gertrude Stein: “Let me 
recite what history teaches. History teaches.” (ibid.)
3 CCC VERSUS WWW: DIGITAL EPISTEMOLOGY AND LITERARY TEXT 
70
The box, The Coming Shall (as well as the website), moreover contains 
the permutation O You Banner, Flapping, Flapping, Flapping, Flapping 
(Fig. 3.2), which can be seen as a media archaeological deconstruction of 
one of the Puritan priest and author Cotton Mather’s books. Sandström 
describes the visual material of this project as based upon
a photograph of the lower corner of an entry in a print-on-demand version 
of a scanned version of Magnalia Christi Americana: or, the ecclesiastical 
history of New-England, from its first planting in the year 1620. to the year of 
our Lord, 1698. In seven books. … By … Cotton Mather … (Sandström 2017, 
Oh You Banner, 4)
Sandström challenges and permutates this material through a variety of 
materializations (of a fragment of the scanned version of the page): as 
Fig. 3.2 Imri Sandström, from Flapping, Flapping, Flapping, Flapping (2014), 
screenshot (“This is a photograph of a risograph print of Flapping, Flapping, 
Flapping, Flapping, a digital image based on an excerpt from the Gale ECCO print 
on demand-version of a scanned version of Magnalia Christi Americana: or, the 
ecclesiastical history of New-England, from its first planting in the year 1620. unto 
the year of our Lord, 1698. In seven books. ... By ... Cotton Mather, ...”, quote from 
Flapping, Flapping, Flapping, Flapping)
 J. INGVARSSON
71
enlarged print; as a risograph print; as a textile flag; and, finally, as a flag 
trampled in blueberry rice, leaving bloodstain-like imprints. This is an 
emblematic work in many respects where the headline, visual elements and 
elaborate comments establish an oscillating relationship, to history, mate-
riality, gender and moral appeal, which at the same time leaves much to 
the reader/viewer to extrapolate.
3.7  KunstKammer pOeTics
Three small penguins, maybe 10–12 cm in height, standing on a small 
shelf. The note beneath them says: “The Basic Forms of Penguin Qi Gong 
or Settling Yourself in the Ice!” And there is a relatively long narrative 
displayed behind the penguins. It is a text about polar expeditions, pen-
guins and Qi Gong. Apart from the observation (?) that penguins tend to 
stand in positions which mimic the positions in classic Qi Gong, the text 
does not make much sense. The list of references does not make much 
sense, either. All of them seem to be fake, except the one to the controver-
sial psychoanalyst Wilhelm Reich’s work on the Orgone. Whatever has 
that title to do with anything here?
Another item: “Two Parts of a Typewriter on Which Walter Benjamin 
Wrote His Famous Essay ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction’.” The story told informs us that when in Dresden, to visit 
the dancer Mary Wigman, Benjamin continued the work on his famous 
essay, traveling with his portable typewriter. Unfortunately, the machine 
broke down, jammed, just at the letter “a” in the word “Kamera.” When 
he obtained a new typewriter, the manuscript shows a change in typing 
style right at that word. Two fully recognizable references (Benjamin and 
Kittler) are here paired with two arguably (not to say obviously) fake ones. 
And even if we ignore the fact that Benjamin did not like typewriters and 
produced almost every manuscript in handwriting, this story of course is 
too good to be true.
The Museum der unerhörten Dinge (Museum of Unheard [of] Things) 
in Berlin, where these items are displayed, is really something special. The 
exhibition catalog describes the museum thus:
Museum der Unerhörten Dinge is
a “Literary Cabinet of Curiosities”
founded and curated by Roland Albrecht,
located between house numbers 5 and 6
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on Crellestraße in Schönenberg, Berlin
The museum displays unique things
and their unheard (of) stories,
all categorized according to weight,
and holds the record of being
the most visited museum in Berlin
(if one offsets the number of visitors
to the square meters of the exhibition space)
…
It intends to grow as the museum collection expands.
At the present moment (Fall 2015) it contains 78 items. (Albrecht 2015, 
front matter)
I enter the museum with two friends. And suddenly the space seems 
full. It is that tiny. Yes, this museum contains fewer than 80 items, and the 
exhibition space may possibly be less than 25 m2. Yet, I spend hours in 
here. Why? As observed by Crane above, “the desirability of the curious 
object lay in its relation to a known or acceptable story.” And this is pre-
cisely the story of this museum. The objects may seem irrelevant, or at best 
bizarre, but the narratives around them are so fascinating. And they con-
firm yet another of the criteria set out by Crane:
Curiosities belonged in a cabinet, where their unique stories retained them 
in each place; historical objects, however, derived their significance as much 
from their original site, or their collection site, as they did from an individual 
story. In this sense, the historical object participated in a narrative uniting 
location and experience, whereas the curiosity represented a transferable 
story. (Crane 2000, 76)
So, the object in a museum is exhibited to confirm the greater narra-
tive, while the object in the KunstkammerCabinets of Curiosities is there 
for its own sake. Or for its relation to other objects rather than to the 
greater narrative. This is exactly what this Berlin Museum does. In what 
seems to be a further deconstruction of the notion that a museum should 
be contained in a unifying narrative, the exhibition catalog presents the 
objects in order of weight, from 1 g to 3800 g. Or, to be precise, to 21,311 
g, which is the weight of the totality of the museum’s objects.
The objects in themselves seem ordinary (a wedding photo, a bunch of 
screws), or maybe bizarre (“Film snippets of subfilms”, “The Wasp 
Honeycomb Collection Point in Kröte”), but they do have this in 
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common—the narratives attached to them are really captivating. And they 
blend fact and fiction without a blink. When Susan A. Crane visits David 
Wilson’s Museum of Jurassic Technology in Los Angeles, she is struck by 
the same experience. And as a first comment on the “fake artifact” she 
quotes Samuel Johnson’s reaction to Ossian manuscripts: “had it really 
been an ancient work, a true specimen [of] how men thought at the time, 
it would have been a curiosity of the first rate. As a modern production, it 
is nothing” (ibid., 64). Thinking about this harsh judgment of the fake 
artifact, Crane reflects on her experience at the Jurassic Museum of 
Technology and concludes:
To turn Johnson on his head: the value of curiosities is the opposite of that 
of antiquities. Rather than being “nothing,” the modern curiosity is what 
curiosities have always been: a mixture of the natural and the artifactual (in 
the old sense of the word, meaning “man-made”), the historical and the 
ahistorical. … Asking whether Jurassic technology is fact or fiction is beside 
the point. In the presence of museums, whether actual or represented, we 
still ask about veracity; to visit a curiosity cabinet, one must be prepared to 
be confounded. (ibid., 64–65)
This is a really productive feature of the epistemology of the 
Kunstkammer: that fake and veracity were not binary opposites in the nar-
ratives that constituted the totality of the collections. They were all parts 
of the wonders of the world (which indeed is another unifying narrative, 
but on a completely different scale than the ones prevalent in the muse-
ums that followed). It is also a strategy that may shed some deconstructive 
light on the notion of “fake news” so prevalent in the political discourse 
(and social media) of 2020. You may ask if it is problematic to mix fact and 
fiction as an artist or curator in this way, in the era of fake news? Or should 
we rather see it as a counter-strategy, to make us aware and observant, 
through the “shock” of confusion? Perhaps we could establish a genre, or 
type of texts and installations, that we label “Kunstkammer poetics,” 
which without hesitation, and deliberately, mixes fact and fiction, in order 
to make us astonishingly aware?
To blend the authentic with the artificial is, of course, not a new feature 
of the digital age. The point here, though, is that the very same blend has 
different connotations in the age of digital communications than in the 
ages of romantic irony or avant-garde modernism. Another reason, rather 
than the historical moment, for a different reception of Kunstkammer 
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poetics is that we easily can check the facts and call them fake. Thus the 
“confusion” may work as a pedagogical tool. And in terms of embodiment 
this strategy is interesting. To take the above example, I suddenly got very 
interested in the relation between Walter Benjamin and typewriters. I had 
to move myself, physically, from reading the text on the wall in the museum 
(or, to be honest, from the same text in the catalog) to my computer, 
browsing for “Benjamin” and “typewriter,” or “Benjamin” and “manu-
script.” Just as with the emblem, the Kunstkammer poetics does not make 
me stay in the text; the solution, “the riddle,” is not contained in the text, 
or the objects, alone, but in my embodiment of the text by my actions on 
the internet, and the agency this action invests me with.
Kunstkammer poetics. The 2018 Nobel Prize winner, Polish author Olga 
Tokarczuk, creates in her 2007 novel Flights (Bieguni, trans. 2017) a prismatic 
effect in her oscillating reflections on travel and movement (Tokarczuk 2017). 
The novel has no coherent narrative, but rather a handful of them, spanning 
from the seventeenth to the twenty-first century, and the novel is, as it turns 
out, a prime example of Kunstkammer poetics.
In the fragment “New Athens,” the narrator concludes that no book 
becomes obsolete as quickly as the guidebook.20 But two of these s/he 
stills holds on to, albeit they are very old. The first is a Polish guidebook 
from the early eighteenth century, from which the text cites a long pas-
sage: “On other strange and wonderful persons of the world: That is 
Anacepholus, alias Headless, or Cynocephalus, alias Dog-Headed; and in 
other persons of curious form.” What follows is indeed a page-long list of 
very curious, more or less human beings, which ends with the statement 
that every one of these creatures, as odd as he or she may be, inevitably is 
the descendant of Adam, and thus deserves salvation (ibid., 76–78).
In this fragment alone, Tokarczuk establishes several aspects of the cab-
inet of curiosities. The quote in itself, from the Polish priest Benedykt 
Chmielowski, is an obvious display of the bizarre wonders of the world, 
pure Kunstkammer prose, but Tokarczuk’s fragment in itself establishes 
several juxtapositions. The end of the paragraph reads: “The other one is 
Melville’s Moby Dick. //Though, if you can just check Wikipedia from 
time to time, that’s also perfectly sufficient” (ibid., 78). So here the narra-
tor suggests, as the second of two guidebooks, “written with real passion, 
and a genuine desire to portray the world,” Melville’s Moby-Dick—a novel 
20 I call the sections in Tokarczuk’s novel “fragments,” and this also bears witness to the 
intimate connections between Kunstkammer poetics and Romantic fragment aesthetics, a 
relationship worthy of future study.
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that in itself mix fact and fiction, statistics, archaic prose and sea adven-
tures.21 The very recommendation to make complementary use of 
Wikipedia, moreover, emphasizes the bodily involvement in Kunstkammer 
poetics: move in and out of texts, check, get back, continue. Is this “The 
New Athens” addressed in the title of the fragment (Athens not men-
tioned otherwise)? Is Wikipedia—or Moby-Dick, or the cabinet of curiosi-
ties, or all of them—the new locus for education, maieutics and philosophy?
No coincidence, then, that the next fragment in Tokarczuk’s novel is 
called “Wikipedia,” where the narrator hails “mankind’s most honest cog-
nitive project,” coming “straight out of our own heads, like Athena [!] out 
of Zeus’s,” and maybe “the greatest wonder of the world,” since it “will 
hold everything” (ibid., 78). But then the narrator starts to question this:
After all what it has in it can only be what we can put into words – what we 
have words for. And in that sense, it wouldn’t be able to hold every-
thing at all.
We should have some other collection of knowledge, then, to balance 
that one out – its inverse, its inner lining, everything we don’t know, all the 
things that can’t be captured in any index, can’t be handled by any search 
engine. For the vastness of these contents cannot be traversed from word to 
word  – you have to step in between the words, into the unfathomable 
abysses between ideas. With every step we’ll slip and fall.
It would appear the only option is to get in even deeper.
Matter and anti-matter.
Information and anti-information. (Ibid., 78–79)
So suddenly, Wikipedia, in all its wonder, needs to be supplemented by 
the void. This brings us back to the Museum of Unheard (of) Things and 
the introduction to the catalog, entitled “The Void and the Spontaneous 
Decay of the Vacuum or New Proofs of God,” which begins thus:
The question of the void has occupied humankind since time immemorial 
and indeed concerns the question “where do I come from, where am I 
going?” It is the question about our existence, about the inescapable fact of 
death that plagues us. The void implies the question of being and thereby 
the question of space, for a void can only be conceived of spatially and a 
being fills up a space.
21 And also, in 2010, being adapted as Fred Benenson’s Emoji Dick; that is, Moby-Dick 
entirely narrated in emojis.
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The void is a place of nothingness, a place filled with nothingness. 
(Albrecht 2015, 2)
Why this occupation with nothingness when presenting a museum that 
contains 74 objects? Is it the void, the nothingness, that brings meaning 
to the objects in the Kunstkammer? Or is the quest for the dark matter in 
the universe: “It’s a thing which we know exists, but without being able 
to access it, with any instruments” (Tokarczuk 2017, 233). Or is it the 
case that things we do not understand can only be reached by embracing 
the absurd, the fantastic, the curiosity? Tokarczuk’s novel oscillates 
between the known and the absurd, and a recurring motif is the letters 
written by Josefine Soliman addressed to Emperor Francis I, begging him 
to return her father’s body “stuffed and chemically treated – on view in 
the Cabinet of Natural Curiosities at the court of Your Majesty” (the 
father Angel being of African descent; ibid., 269). The void here seems to 
be the very body of poor Angel Soliman, and perhaps also the lack of any 
response from the royal highness. And moreover, a reminder of the not 
always pleasant objects on display in cabinets of curiosities.
Flights also displays an ongoing oscillation between stillness, as in the cabi-
nets’ exhibitions, and movement. As the title suggests, flights, like in air-
planes, are recurring motifs in the novel, but also flights as in escape, running 
away—the Polish title Bieguni refers to a religious movement [sic!] who 
believed that being in constant motion would protect you from Satan, who 
most easily can strike us if we stand still. This constant mobility is treated 
ironically (or not?) when juxtaposed with twenty-first-century advertising:
At the airport, a big ad on a glass wall all-knowingly asserts:
…
Mobility is reality.
Let us stress that it is merely an ad for mobile phones. (Ibid., 234)
Significantly enough, this comes immediately before the fragment bear-
ing the title of the novel‚ Flights. The Kunstkammer, the Museum der uner-
hörten Dinge and Tokarczuk’s prose are joined in the appeal to make us see, 
to look anew on things around us. They present new optics. One final 
quote from Flights will illustrate this. In the lengthy fragment “Kunicki: 
Earth”—a story that is developed throughout the novel, about a man 
whose wife and child suddenly disappear and the only thing left is the con-
tents of the woman’s bags—Kunicki experiences some sort of epiphany:
 J. INGVARSSON
77
Suddenly he realizes: there are different kinds of looking. One kind of look-
ing allows you to simply see objects, useful human things, honest and con-
crete, which you know right away how to use and what for. And then there’s 
panoramic viewing, a more general view, thanks to which you notice links 
between objects, their network of reflections. Things cease to be things, the 
fact that they serve a purpose is insignificant, just a surface. Now they’re 
signs, indicating something that isn’t in the photographs, referring beyond 
the frames of the pictures. You have to really concentrate to be able to main-
tain that gaze, as its essence is a gift, grace. Kunicki’s heart starts beating 
faster. (Ibid., 352–353)
Kunstkammer poetics, as suggested by the above examples, is charac-
terized by its fragmented style, where every fragment somehow is self- 
sufficient, its own story, while it may or may not contribute to a unifying 
plot or narrative. Also it takes no shame in mixing fact and fiction, unset-
tling the reader’s perception of what did actually happen, and also to make 
us aware, to beware. To trust and distrust, through associative play.
3.8  babbage. again
Let us summarize. Where our traditional interpretative traditions—despite 
the practice of “close reading”—have been established through distancing 
from the aesthetic experience, digital epistemology and Kunstkammer 
poetics encourage new sensations of presence. Rasmus Fleischer notes this 
too, in his postdigital manifesto:
The term postdigital does not signify a new cultural-historical stage, but 
rather a maturation of the digital experience that causes us to re-emphasize 
presence. … To use yet another concept with the prefix “post” is justified 
only by the need to take action against the denial of events, presence, and 
coexistence that continue to characterize our era’s discourse about digital 
culture. (Fleischer 2009, 43)22
There, in the insistence from digital epistemology on being close to us, 
we have an end point for this chapter, and a starting point for the chapters 
to come. However, since academic traditions—still—encourage the prin-
ciple of circular composition, let us return to Göran Printz-Påhlson and 
Charles Babbage. We will read it again.
22 On the concept of “presence,” see Hans-Ulrich Gumbrecht (2004).
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And yes. There are several media archaeological and digital dimensions 
to reflect upon in this poem: the importance in programming to maintain 
“the greatest accuracy even in small things”; or the fact that the first “bug” 
in a computer was indeed not a dragonfly but close enough: a moth. But 
I will dwell upon the following.
The mathematician sits right next to Trinity College near the river 
Cam. Here, in one of the cradles of European educational culture, he 
reflects on existence (Printz-Påhlson 2011, 165). Something has been 
added. Vidocq—that trixter!—changed his own length. The larva came 
out of the pupa like a dragonfly. What is strange, though, is perhaps not 
the deviation, but that everything, almost always, follows the laws of 
mechanics and nature. But then, once in a while it happens: “the other 
number comes up” (remember Tokarczuk’s longing for an encyclopedia 
containing “everything we don’t know”; Tokarczuk 2017, 78).
Babbage is in Cambridge, but these thoughts he now reflects upon he 
has learned not in the lecture hall, nor in the library, but from his machine. 
Every day, more people are born than those who die. A sober statement, 
but in Babbage’s monolog it adds a somewhat posthuman dimension: the 
dimension where one-sixteenth of a man has an intrinsic value, the upset-
ting of the rules of natural law, the transcendence of boundaries, the con-
firmation of the miracle. In and through the machine, Babbage sees this. 
In and through the digital, we observe this. Thus, let us never abandon 
reflection on history—through the machines.
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CHAPTER 4
“Books Are Machines”: Materiality 
and Agency from the 1960s to the 2010s
Abstract In the first section of this chapter, the materiality of digital 
media—that is, the progression from huge machines in the 1960s to the 
ubiquitous computing of the twenty-first century—is juxtaposed with the 
notions of fear, shifting from Bomb to Virus, tentatively as a result of the 
Y2K scare. This is exemplified with a few examples from art and literature. 
In the second section, two Swedish literary experiments, one from 1965 
and the other from 2010, are analyzed in their staging of digital technolo-
gies and in the effects this staging has on the notion of agency. The final 
section of the chapter raises the question of whether digital epistemology 
should be part of the digital humanities field or not.
[T]he general field of humanities education and scholarship will not take the 
use of digital technology seriously until one demonstrates how its tools 
improve the ways we explore and explain aesthetic works – until, that is, they 
expand our interpretational procedures. (Jerome McGann 2001, xii)
4.1  Digitization as a Lens
So far, we have repeatedly described digitization as an epistemological 
phenomenon. In the following, the perspective of digital epistemology 
will be developed through two historical examples, which intend to illumi-
nate some aspects of the history of digitization related to cultural artifacts. 
The first part of this chapter examines how the change in the materialities 
of digital technology from the 1960s and 1970s is also reflected in how 
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our threat scenarios evolved from the H bomb of the Cold War to the 
threat of networks and viruses. This is illustrated by analyses of both poetry 
and a couple of text-based works of art. The second part of the chapter 
examines two Swedish works which at intervals of about half a century 
stage a machine intelligence, a digital agency, which in different ways also 
install the agency of the human body.
The primary purpose here is to show that the perspective of digital 
epistemology is not a constant: a digital technology with machines as large 
as classrooms is of course different from personal computers, search 
engines and networks, which in turn have been supplemented with today’s 
ubiquitous systems. These different ways of organizing digital technology 
have epistemological effects: a strictly place-based, almost monstrous tech-
nology, a privilege for states and large corporations, generates metaphors 
and images that differ considerably from systems distributed to laptops 
and smartphones, or through networks and intelligent textiles. The sec-
ond and more analytical purpose of the text is to relate these various tech-
nological arrangements to cultural artifacts, texts, and show how the 
staging of agency can also be related to the history of digitization.
The chapter ends with a discussion on whether the concept of digital 
epistemology could be considered to contribute to the field of digital 
humanities.
4.2  DigitaL History anD tHreats
Despite the fear of criticism from media archaeologists, let us actually fol-
low the Gutenberg lead in a report of historical progression and accept the 
obvious: digital technology from the 1950s to the 2010s has seen some 
remarkable changes in size, mass, infrastructure and patterns of distribu-
tion. Through the lens of digital epistemology, we can observe this histori-
cal narrative in relation to the technologies of death.
Let us go back to the turn of the new millennium, or rather the last 
shivering seconds of the old one. These seconds vibrated with a certain 
intensity and these vibrations had a formula: Y2K—“Year 2000”—the 
digital bug that would end all functions, everything would just stop, as the 
zeroes and ones would not be able to make the transition from 99 to 00, 
creating chaos and mayhem in the civilized world.1 It should be stated that 
1 For a fascinating account of different stories concerning the Y2K, listen to the podcast 
Headlong: Surviving the Y2K (April 2019). To be found where you find podcasts (for exam-
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the digital systems that were under threat in this transition were actually 
mostly site-specific and well-established technologies, such as telephone 
networks, industrial control systems and mainframes, which had in com-
mon that they could not handle dates of more than three digits.2 This 
being said, the metaphorical effect—or the message—of Y2K was some-
thing else: Despite the fact that practically nothing happened (which may 
or may not be because we actually were prepared), Y2K announced that 
digital technology had moved away from calculators and computers, from 
laboratories and office spaces, from the distinct materiality so visible in 
science fiction and spy movies, to the entire culture. For a decade or so we 
had been familiar with personal computers, but it was Y2K that came to 
symbolize a shift in our digital awareness: The zeroes and ones had moved 
from the Machine to the Network. No coincidence, then, that our threat 
scenarios changed as well: from the Machine, the State and the Bomb, to 
Networks, Cells—and Viruses.
Y2K as a digital disaster is for example very different from the apocalyp-
tic scenario depicted a couple of decades earlier in the movie War Games, 
when the omnipotent computer W.O.P.R. converts a young boy’s gaming 
to a real nightmare, and a possible World War III (War Games 1983). The 
film is an excellent example of the close relation between “the Machine” 
and “the Bomb” that was so prominent in postwar scenarios.3 Another, we 
must say substantial example of the postwar relation to the Bomb is 
Anselm Kiefer’s monumental lead library Zweistromsland (Kiefer 
1985–1989). Kiefer’s library, also known as The High Priestess, is a con-
struction almost eight meters wide and four meters high, making its very 
size to a “bigger than life” (or “…death”) experience. It contains some 
200 large books with covers, and pages, in lead, standing in two accompa-
nying bookcases constructed in steel, decorated with wires and glass. The 
bookcases are named “Euphrat” and “Tigris,” respectively, and the 
German title of the artwork also addresses the Garden of Eden—the bibli-
cal origin of life on Earth.4
However, it is not Life but rather the Apocalypse that is at stake here. 
The ambiguous title of the work—the Land Between the Rivers and the 
ple Spotify, Stitcher, Apple Podcasts).
2 I would like to thank the anonymous Reviewer #2 for this clarification.
3 For a thorough account of the Bomb (at least from a US perspective), and the dangers 
lurking in its wake, see Schlosser (2013).
4 For an excellent documentation of, and introduction to, Zweistromland, see 
Zweite (1989).
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High Priestess—establishes double references: On the one hand, thoughts 
are led to the place of Eden’s garden, on the other to the powerful symbol 
of the Tarot card game, which can also be associated with the significance 
of lead in the alchemical tradition that was a particular interest of Kiefer’s 
(Badger 1989). The materiality of the book, here, is grotesquely exagger-
ated, and not only by lead and steel, but also by being associated with both 
biblical and occult discourses. But the context that interests us here is 
the Bomb.
Kiefer’s library was constructed in the late 1980s, in the heyday of com-
putational bureaucratization and the early days of the personal computer. 
In this context, the lead books signal a celebration of the medium of the 
codex, in the midst of the current flow of deterministic or pessimistic 
media philosophies, with their recurring prophecies about the death of 
books and the decline of reading in the era of television and digitization.5 
Thus, there is a message in the medium of lead books. In the final destruc-
tion to come (the 1980s also marked the peak of the Cold War) everything 
solid would melt, but lead, of course, was regarded as armor against radia-
tion.6 The very mass of this work of art—and the bare thought that this 
library will survive us all—tells the story of the enormous impact of the 
technologies that proposed the threat in the first place: the Bomb and the 
Machine.
4.3  WitHout us: uKon
The Swedish psychologist and poet UlfUKON Karl Olov Nilsson, alias 
UKON, debuted in 1990 with the poetry collection Kung-kung (King 
King). In 1992 he was represented in the anthology En elva från Göteborg 
5 Neil Postman’s concerned conservatism during the 1970s and 1980s is a striking example 
of this attitude (we shall return to Postman in the following chapter). A couple of decades 
later, Sven Birkerts (1994) lamented in The Gutenberg Elegies the loss of reading “real litera-
ture” in the coming electronic age of monitors, hypertexts and audio books. German media 
philosopher Norbert Bolz (1993), not without enthusiasm, claimed in the early 1990s that 
the medium of the book was no longer (then) capable of representing the complexities of 
social systems, and he also argued for the disappearance of the traditional author/reader 
contract as a consequence of the emergence of hypertexts.
6 On the road between Vadstena, the small medieval town in Sweden where I grew up, and 
Skänninge (another small medieval town), right up to the end of the 1980s there stood a 
small cottage fully covered in lead plates. The story was that the owner wanted to protect 




(A Gothenburg Starting Eleven—a pun derived from the fact that 
Gothenburg was the football capital of Sweden, with up to five teams in 
the premier division), where he published the poem “Utan oss” (“Without 
Us”), which soon became a recurring feature in his readings during the 
1990s. It is a typical performance poem, where the intensity and the manic 
repetitions actually work better in oral than in written form. It is still the 
printed version we have to content with here, though:
it is the earth without us and the words the trees the fire without us it is the 
wind the water the spring the blowing and the stillness the summer stillness 
it is the brown animals without us it is horse cow dog deer beaver elk ferret 
bear hedgehog it is rust fungus grass and the green silvery animals like frog 
snake silver fox silverfish plain fish toad and the sick soil water ice the happy 
snow rain sometimes hail and it is the black animals flies scorpions cock-
roaches panthers ravens magpies penguins the white animals that are polar 
bears shark lynx rabbit mouse grouse whale seal it is moon sunrise sunset 
and the animals of the sun lion chaffinch canary golden retriever some but-
terflies and aquarium fishes the cheetah the bumble bee it is the children 
without us it is the work the sowing the the harvest the war the the solitude 
the summer solitude it is the rest without us it is the party the meeting the 
simultaneity the dance it is waltz foxtrot jenka ballet bug bossanova twist 
hambo farandole gopak jig landler mazurka schuhplattler polka cha-cha 
mambo schottis trepak tarantella flamenco bump without us it is the cold 
the abscess the aching without us the leprosy the cancer the acne the leg 
ulcers the tennis arm the pneumonia the sprained ankle the worn ligaments 
the meniscus the cataract choreomaniacs atopic dermatitis electrical hyper-
sensitivity pulmonary edema earache child diseases like mumps rubella 
chickenpox, scarlet fever, whooping cough measles and the elderly diseases 
the infections the senility the pathetical the femoral neck fracture the vari-
cose the prostate the flashbacks the dreaming the shakings the atherosclero-
sis the incontinence it is the pinpricks the heartsink the samplings without us 
bandage sling cast plaster walkers crutches transportation service it is the 
nervousness without us the underarm sweat, the anxiety, the farts the tin-
nitus the crudities the nail biting the police the nurseries the post office the 
bank the scouts the railway instruments such as piccolo balalajka trombone 
electric organ games such as yatzy risk gin rummy battleship war volleyball 
it is earrings rings diadem things you got given away or just bought arm-
bands brooches barrettes porcelain animals necklaces small cactuses it is fla-
vors without us salty sour sweet bitter pungent spring rolls bacon edamer 
cheese pie and mash lemonade mille-feuilles without us biscuits meal of the 
day rye flour ranch dressing bouillabaisse dumplings it is ham rockets robots 
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foetus group dynamics highways hotels terraces porches balconies bowls 
with fruits and nuts now I know what to think about. (UKON 2005)
Obviously, a shorter quote would have been enough to demonstrate 
this text’s “point,” but on the other hand the sheer length of this monolog 
constitutes an important factor in the materiality of the poem. At least in 
order to demonstrate what is left, without us. It is “we,” and not the envi-
ronment or our cultural expressions, that disappear. At first glance, the 
text can be read as a comment (or companion) to Danish poet Inger 
Christensen’s poetry suite Alfabet (“Alphabet”) from 1981, where another 
manic order is established based on the alphabet and Fibonacci numbers, 
occupied with describing objects that “exist” (Christensen 1981).7 The 
initially hopeful and poetic designation of Christensen’s text occasionally 
turns into threats, as when “the rifle” with its “peaceful precision” takes 
place in this “enlightened chemical ghetto.” Christensen’s suite ends with 
a trip across the globe:
it looks like Barents Sea
is always alone with Barents Sea
but there behind Barents Sea
the water strikes Spitsbergen
and just behind Spitsbergen
the ice is floating around The Arctic Ocean
and just behind The Arctic Ocean
the ice is stuck on The North Pole. (ibid.)
The approach is naivistic and apocalyptic simultaneously. The child’s 
wide-eyed journey across the various fields of the globe is addressed in a 
poetry suite about nature’s presence and threatening extinction. 
Christensen’s combination of hope and threat is matched in UKON’s rant 
by the exhilaration that characterizes the poem’s scenario of annihilation. 
“Without us” contains several paradoxes. What is there “without us”? 
How are the underarm sweat, the tennis elbow and the group dynamics 
maintained when no people are there? Who dances mazurka, schuhplattler 
or polka if there is no one there to dance? Where are these things?
The poem at once becomes apocalyptic and philosophical—it begs the 
question of whether a phenomenon can remain after its carriers and 
7 Inger Christensen (1981). It can be noted that these arrangements make “Alphabet” a 
very written poem, while the frenetic monolog in UKON’s poem accentuates the oral per-
formance, which may strengthen the impression of panic.
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practitioners have been wiped out, a question that concerns notions of 
embodiment, materiality and perception. Just like the word “exists” in 
Christensen’s Alfabet, it is the phrase “without us” that constitutes the 
lasting impression of UKON’s poem. In both texts, these particular words 
accentuate to a great extent a paradigm that we, after N. Katherine Hayles, 
call the “presence-absence” pattern (and to which we shall return shortly). 
Written during the 1980s and 1990s, these two poems depict notions of 
the physical obliteration of humanity from the place where we live. If 
Anselm Kiefer had wanted to include poetry in his lead books, Christensen 
and UKON would have been suitable choices.
4.4  ubiquitous Viruses
It is some distance from the notions of the Bomb and the Machine to the 
threat from Y2K and what we—if we want to be a little intrusive—can call 
“digital mites” (we do not see them but they are all over the place): nano-
technology is everywhere and has provided us with a new community that 
is connected to, or constitutes, what we can call a digital subconscious. 
What has happened over the past 40 years is a shift among the carriers of 
digital technology: a shift from Monster to Mites, or from Machines to 
Networks; from States to Cells; and from Bombs to Viruses.
At the turn of the millennium, N. Katherine Hayles, in How We Became 
Posthuman, described this change as a shift between two epistemological 
paradigms: from the Gutenbergian era’s “presence-absence” to the “pat-
tern/randomness” paradigm of the digital age (Hayles 1999, 25–30).8 
Both the Bomb and the Machine manifest a presence that, even in its 
absence (few people have had access to nuclear weapons or the earliest 
computers), is associated with a complex threat: the state apparatus’s inhu-
man bureaucracy, the computer’s possible self-realization in the singular-
ity, the total devastation in a nuclear war. However—as with the false 
binary analog/d6igital—the concept of pattern/randomness does not 
establish the same kind of dichotomy as presence-absence. Randomness is 
not contrary to the pattern, quite the opposite—both are often operative 
8 Hayles typographically represents both of these concepts with a slash: Presence/Absence 
vs. Pattern/Randomness. But there are reasons to modify this typography, as presence- 
absence implies a dualistic paradigm, whereas pattern/randomness rather suggests a more 
flickering epistemology and should therefore reasonably be referred to by the slash, which 
indicates an ongoing operation. Moreover, Hayles uses the word “splice” to describe the 
slash, a word that of course also suggests editing tape recordings.
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at the same time. In the pattern of the code, the presence of the virus or 
the mistake is always a possibility.
It is easy to see the Bomb and the Machine, and even classic book cul-
ture, as an expression of a presence-absence paradigm: The Gutenbergian 
practice is characterized by the same dualism that shaped all modernity. 
The materiality of media point to the conditions in which the book’s 
printed text (and the book itself as object), or the physical presence of the 
computer, constitutes a material factuality also in its absence (it exists—
there). The same goes for the Bomb: it is not in itself a code, not some-
thing that is replaceable or arbitrarily distributed—it is where it is, in the 
Cold War laboratory, on the firing ramps, on the equipped submarines. 
Even in its absence it is presence; mass, materiality.
File sharing and ubiquitous systems have made us much more likely to 
accept an order where we distribute data—and viruses—instead of physical 
artifacts. Both biological and digital viruses have the property that they 
cannot be fixed to a given material carrier, but create their identity pre-
cisely through their instability, their way of spreading.9 The W.O.P.R. in 
War Games and Kiefer’s High Priestess are intimately associated with the 
Cold War; at the same time, the Bomb ( “A” or “H”) is related to the 
discourse of the Machine. Visually, popular culture from the 1950s to the 
early 1990s is full of examples of technologies which represent spectacular 
and strange but never abstract or randomly distributed examples of this 
presence-absence in print-based order, as opposed to the pattern/ran-
domness paradigm of the digital age.10 Q and MI6 agents had good con-
trol over the computers with their rotating magnetic tapes and their punch 
cards, and the nuclear weapons rested calmly in the superpower’s missile 
launch facilities, or for that matter in the mad scientist’s headquarters on 
a mechanical island, where they waited to be fired at his target and then let 
the ingenious ruler, or his computer, control the world. These fantasies 
remained as long as the terror balance prevailed on the international 
agenda. Machines with a capital M. Bombs with a capital B.
What happened during the 1990s and beyond was that not only nuclear 
weapons—and the know-how of the nuclear age—but also new informa-
tion technologies were distributed to more or less reliable powers around 
the world. When the computer was no longer perceived as a controlling 
9 Covid-19, obviously, being the alarmist and contemporary example.
10 Take any James Bond picture, Stanley Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove (1964), the aforemen-
tioned War Games (1983) or Jimmy T. Murakami’s animated film When the Wind Blows 
(1986), just to mention a few.
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device but rather as a personal tool, the machine with a capital M disap-
peared, together with the bomb with a capital B. No one really cared if the 
machine could learn to play chess—and no one feared any longer the mad 
professor in his hollow island. The machines still existed, of course, but 
they became more generally distributed, from offices and laboratories to 
our homes, or to the laps of seminar attendants and café visitors.
Today, two decades after the Y2K panic, file sharing, digital networks 
and phenomena such as ubiquitous data processing have transformed our 
management of physical artifacts into a distribution of patterns, temporary 
formations, clouds, rhizomes, cells—and viruses.11 The point here is that 
the technologies which distribute information reflect the technologies and 
metaphors for our own extinction: Y2K signaled that the bomb had been 
replaced by the virus, and that nuclear mass destruction had been replaced 
by epidemics and terror cells. Doomsday prophets do not preach when 
obscure liberation fronts in Asia or rednecks in Georgia get hold of nuclear 
warheads; although the threat of an atomic bomb attack may be much 
greater today than during the Cold War terror balance and top diplomacy 
(Brill and Luongo 2012). No, doomsday prophets bang the drum and 
ring the bell when pigs or birds cause new forms of influenza that could 
possibly haunt Western civilizations (not to mention the corona virus of 
2020, still haunting us as these lines are proofread).12
In other words: the unique Bomb has been replaced by the ubiquitous 
Virus. The lesson from the Y2K bug was—and this is the message of ubiq-
uitous data processing—that from now on, the digital is no longer tied to 
desktop devices, but is really present everywhere, inside everything. In 
addition, the alleged threat to our open society, and thus the threat to 
world peace, is organized not in totalitarian or imperialist bomb shelters, 
but in networks and cells. The terror, as Douglas Rushkoff pointed out a 
decade ago, is a virus (Rushkoff 2009).13
11 For a media archaeological study of the history of the computer virus, see Jussi Parikka 
(2007). Parikka describes the origin and establishment of the virus from a technology- historical 
perspective of production and reception—the digital virus is indeed older than the Y2K bug.
12 From the perspective of Actor-Network Theory (ANT), this means radically changed 
roles. On Latour and ANT, see footnotes and references to Chap. 3. What unites the present 
text with some main lines within ANT is that both the bomb and the virus are recognized as 
agents in the social network. Moreover, ANT could definitely be regarded as one of those 
theories that in itself is an expression of a digital epistemology, when digital culture inspires 
us to rethink our relations to materiality, and to objects.
13 Douglas Rushkoff does not describe terror as an act of war, but as a contagious set of 
destructive schemes, the distribution of which is in intimate relation to our media ecology. 
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4.5  tHe number of tHe beast
One final installation in relation to Y2K to be considered here is Linda 
Hilfling Ritasdatter’s artistic research project “Bugs in the War Room” 
and the book project Endless Endtime (Ritasdatter 2016–).14 The point of 
departure for her project is the Y2K scare, in particular as it was expressed 
in a 1999 letter to the apocalyptic Christian magazine EndTime, in which 
a reader named O.J.  Briant (at least that is what Ritasdatter tells us) 
invented his own number system (A = 6, B = 12, C = 18, etc.), with which 
he reaches the conclusive evidence that the word COMPUTER with this 
formula will be translated to the number 666—the disintegration of digi-
tal culture thus coincides with the arrival of the antichrist and the apoca-
lypse. The end of the world is thus near, something that apocalyptic 
Christians not infrequently greet with joy, as it foretells the return of Christ.
In a continuation of this Y2K prophecy, Ritasdatter has set out to create 
a never-ending—hence the name Endless Endtime—encyclopedia of all the 
phenomena that, according to O.J. Briant’s numerology, can be seen as 
manifestations of the number of the beast, and thus as a harbinger of the 
apocalypse. By copying the letter from 1999, but replacing the word 
“computer” with a variety of other words—generated by an algorithm 
that Ritasdatter designed according to Briant’s number system—she cre-
ates an encyclopedia of the apocalypse, an encyclopedia that every year (in 
May) is to result in a new edition with 666 different entries. The book is 
bound by hand by the publisher and artist Olle Essvik at Rojal publishing 
house. Not only this: Every new entry is also posted to the journal 
EndTime. In the 2016 edition, the first three words (which in addition to 
their connection to the number 666, are also explained with a brief note) 
are the following:
Not least, terror has had the effect that security checks at our airports during the 2000s 
became increasingly rigorous, albeit in many aspects a purely fictional construction (think of 
the glasses and cutlery provided by airport restaurants, or think of the line to security control 
as the target of an attack): “It does not take a military expert to see that a strategy of spot 
checking for dangerous fluids or scanning international phone calls is a losing battle against 
a foe that can pop up literally anywhere” (Rushkoff 2009).
14 The book will be published continuously in May each year and Ritasdotter’s algorithm 
will then have generated 666 new proofs of the world’s downfall. It is handbound by Rojal’s 




ACCU-CHEK MOBILE n.; A proprietary blood glucose measuring sys-
tem used for home monitoring of glucose which has a menu-driven 
screen and analyzed lifestyle data.
ADIDAS CAMPUS May refer to: (1) n.; Classic 80s suede sneakers fea-
turing a supportive cushioned collar. Suede upper; Textile lining. (2) n.; 
Corporate campus: At an All-Employee Meeting in November 2011, 
the CEO Herbert Hainer announced that the Adidas Group will invest 
further in their employees by building a Corporate Campus.
ADVANCE WARS n.; The Wars series is a video game series produced by 
Nintendo, also known as Famicom Wars (Famikon Wzu) in Japan and 
Advance Wars in the West. (Ritasdatter 2016)
In an essay published in the online magazine DATA Browser, Ritasdatter 
expands her investigation of the Y2K bug (Ritasdatter 2018). She inter-
viewed a security engineer in Chennai, India, about how she worked with 
the Y2K threat. The technician says that they had set up a “war room,” a 
360° meeting space, where everyone had their monitor and maintained 
contact with various clients through both digital and alternative commu-
nication channels (ibid., 141). Ritasdatter makes the observation that this 
crisis room is strikingly similar to movie history’s perhaps best-known war 
room, namely that in Stanley Kubrick’s (1964) tragicomic atomic bomb 
dystopia, Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love 
the Bomb (ibid.). In a continuation of this parallel, Ritasdatter points out 
that the war room of the Cold War—where, let us remember, the Bomb 
and the Machine were at the center—was characterized by a hierarchical 
structure and a linear ordering system, an order that in the film’s diegesis 
is disrupted by an eccentric and crazy General Ripper. It is, then, linear 
and binary structures that form the foundation of Kubrick’s war room. In 
the 1999/2000 Indian war room, however, there is another order 
(Fig. 4.1):
The table of the Y2K war room did not assemble top leaders, or represent a 
top-down hierarchy of order and execution. On the contrary, it was a gath-
ering as emergency-brigade, or the caretakers of global information archi-
tectures, ultimately calling for a different understanding of the war room’s 
relation to power; away from top-down management, with orders followed 
by execution, towards a model of continuous executable maintenance and 
feedback. (ibid., 145)
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This coincides entirely with Georg Rushkoff’s observation of the viral 
qualities of terror, which also confirms the shift from bombs to viruses, 
and from the paradigm of presence-absence to one of pattern/randomness:
Just consider the difference between a [Charles] Manson, whose commands 
to followers depended on his in-person charisma, and today’s terror cults 
who are capable of inciting activity entirely memetically through social 
media. (Rushkoff 2009)
In Ritasdotter’s text installation, digital technology is linked to the 
apocalypse, not as a bomb but as a cultural implosion, the digital collapse. 
The immense irony of the work is embodied in the fact that, in the words 
of the publisher Rojal, “we are committed to producing this Encyclopedia 
forever.” Although “forever” is understood to mean a fairly short time, 
given that the apocalyptic prophecy is to be realized, the book project 




sends rather an optimistic signal by ironically deconstructing, and contra-
dicting, the initial letter’s predictions.15
These examples, which in different ways are related to bombs and 
viruses, show that digital epistemology does not function as a single the-
ory of knowledge in the fold of history—it must be analyzed and consid-
ered as variants dependent on the materiality of communication at specific 
historical moments. The materiality of digital history, from the huge 
machine monsters in the 1960s–1970s to the ubiquitous “mites” during 
our own 2010s and 2020s, shows that different expressions and attitudes 
can be seen as reflections of this materiality. The bomb’s presence can be 
read manifestly with Kiefer, ironically and indirectly with UKON. The 
code’s pattern and its relation to Y2K are continually manifested in 
Ritasdotter’s art and book projects.
What does it mean, then, to relate cultural artifacts to the communica-
tion and organizational logic that—in various ways—has been promoted 
by digital technology since the 1950s? One way to investigate this is to 
draw attention to two Swedish literary works with almost half a century 
between them: Torsten Ekbom’s Signalspelet, which was published in 
1965, and Johannes Heldén’s Entropy Edition from 2010.
4.6  torsten eKbom 1965
The Swedish author-critic Torsten Ekbom (1938–2014) produced a 
handful of radical prose experiments during the 1960s, from variations on 
the French nouveau roman to cut-up exercises and ambitious collage 
experiments. Alongside this production, Ekbom—also a literary critic and 
avant-garde theorist—introduced to a Swedish public concrete poetry, 
game theory, cybernetics, William S. Burroughs, Susan Sontag and 
Marshall McLuhan, as well as European authors such as Lawrence Durrell, 
Alain Robbe-Grillet, Uwe Johnson and Witold Gombrowitz.
Ekbom’s third fiction book, Signalspelet (1965, “The Game of 
Signals”), declares itself not to be a novel but a “Prose Machine.” The 
book starts with five blank pages (only the page numbers at the bottom 
indicate any progress), followed by a page with the single line “Fem 
15 The motto for the Christian online magazine EndTime is “Preaching the Gospel of the 
Kingdom to every person on earth … Because the Endtime is Now!”; see Endtime 
Ministries, Inc.
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minuter gick” (“Five minutes passed”). This line is repeated with increased 




Five minutes passed. (Ekbom 1965, 10)





The car rushed on. (Ibid, 12)
However, the actual “Prose Machine” is never mentioned or 
described in the text, and thus we could conclude that “the book” itself 
constitutes the machine (and, after all, that is what it says on the title 
page: Signalspelet: en prosamaskin  – “The Signal Game: A Prose 
Machine”). If so, the text could be seen as a statement echoing 
Mallarmé’s Un coup de dés and symbolist machine aesthetics in its 
wake.16 It also could be seen as a critical remark upon the novel genre 
itself, regarded at the time by Ekbom himself as “dead” and “petrified” 
(Ingvarsson 1994). Even so, it is more likely that what we read is a rep-
resentation of a real-time output from a computer, a machine now pro-
grammed for making prose narratives. And this machine slowly spits 
out, fragment followed by fragment, a not very coherent story, includ-
ing a hotel and a bunch of agents (conveniently named A, B, C, D, E, 
F, G, H) communicating with each other by knocking signals on the 
walls. Somehow “Room number 17” plays an important role, as does 
Chapter 17, which appears several times in the book (a translator and 
introducer of William S. Burroughs in Sweden, Ekbom of course was no 
stranger to the literary cut-up and collage technique).
16 See Mark Hansen (2000), pp. 82–86. The book as machine is echoed also in much later 
notions expressed for example by Jerome McGann (2001: pp. 54–57), and even more explic-




Unlike many electronic texts today, though, the machine in Ekbom’s 
book is obviously not subject to any interactive processes—no more than 
the commonplace interactivity that any reader of any book is entangled in. 
No, the machine has (on a fictional level) been programmed, and what we 
read is its tentative output; the reader just has to accept its more or less 
literary result. Sometimes the computer malfunctions and the output, 
then, will only be dots and commas spread over the pages. This functions 
as a reminder of the vulnerability of the machine in those days, and of 
course is also a reminder of the dangers lurking in letting the machine 
control our everyday lives. In the 1960s and 1970s, the “state apparatus”—
a phrase inherited from Marx, but revived by computer technology—
became a metaphor for the bureaucracy that was the flip side of the 
emerging welfare states of the postwar Nordic countries (not to mention 
the East European states). The Swedish author Vilhelm Moberg 
(1898–1973) expressed this in 1959:
Thus, instead of the ancient, personal, patriarchal oppression, they have 
introduced a state apparatus that exerts an impersonal, anonymous, mechan-
ically functioning oppression. They have laid a solid foundation for a state 
capitalist society, where the gates on the backside slowly are opening up for 
the authoritarian state, in which the individual is obliterated by the collective 
and transformed into an object for state benefit. (Moberg 1959)
Around a decade later, in the 1970s, Swedish author Lars Gyllensten 
(1921–2006) connects the same state apparatus to computer technology:
One example is the extension of various computer systems and other meth-
ods for the authorities to obtain information about citizens in aid of the 
bureaucratic state apparatus – censuses, compulsory surveys, increased pow-
ers for different authorities to require citizens’ data and accounts, etc. 
(Gyllensten 1979, not paginated)
Ekbom’s machine, though, is programmed to create literature. And 
sometimes, somehow, it does (or, rather, it does so the whole time, albeit 
in different ways). Even though the diminutive plot describes a bunch of 
agents, Ekbom’s prose experiment, on both a fictional and factual level, 
sets up a structure actually devoid of human agents, or agency. The text “is 
produced” by a computer. And the actual text fragments are not written, 
but just chosen and assembled, by the author. As a result, the author is 
4 “BOOKS ARE MACHINES”: MATERIALITY AND AGENCY FROM THE 1960S… 
96
absent in a double meaning: both on the level of fiction (the machine that 
produces the text fragments) and on the actual level of conception (the 
cut-up process performed by Ekbom). The actual “story” that unfolds, 
with the agents knocking on walls, desperately trying to find something 
out, paints a sometimes funny but absurd and claustrophobic vision of a 
futile mission. The absurdity of the text echoes the bureaucratic angst of 
Kafka, but technologically updated.17 The Game of Signals, then, clearly 
establishes an opposition between the machine and human agency in 1965.
4.7  JoHannes HeLDén 2010
The Man/Machine confrontation of the 1960s differs quite radically from 
the positions taken in many electronic texts from the new millennium, and 
this can be illustrated with another Swedish example. Johannes Heldén’s 
digital flash installation Entropy Edition (published alongside the poetry 
book Entropi in 2010) is de facto programmed with text fragments but—
as opposed to the bulk of Ekbom’s scattered prose—these fragments are 
(seemingly) written by the author himself (Heldén 2010a).18
The interface of Heldén’s work reminds us of classic arcade games, 
those with falling stars or shells to be shot down by the player.19 In Entropy 
Edition, though, what happens when you “chase” the dots is that poetic 
fragments appear at the top and the bottom, lines like “the consciousness 
is searching” or “a smoky edge.” One poem emerges at the top, typo-
graphically more or less like a printed poem in a book. At the bottom, text 
17 There is a scene which was left out of Orson Welles’ 1961 adaptation of Kafka’s The 
Trial, where K is being guided by a scientist through a huge hall with computers, which are 
about to tell him his future. See http://www.wellesnet.com/Trial_MS_2.htm
18 Entropy Edition is an online work (in both Swedish and English versions) by Johannes 
Heldén (2010a). The work is also included as a CD-ROM along with the poetry book 
Entropi (2010b). In the later performance (and book) Evolution from 2014, Heldén and 
collaborator Håkan Jonsson claim that the author has stopped writing. The performance 
extrapolates the notion of the Turing test, and Jonsson/Heldén have also programmed an 
online poetry machine that creates new poems out of Heldén’s earlier poetry. The 
N.K. Hayles award-winning book Evolution—along with a preface, some chosen poetry from 
the online version and a couple of essays—contains the entire programming code for the 
online poetry machine. Once again, human agency is put in question. See Heldén and 
Jonsson (2014a, b). I will further call the book version Entropi (since it is printed in Swedish) 
and the online work Entropy Edition.
19 For example the game Missile Command (Atari 1980), see a gameplay here: https://
youtu.be/nokIGklnBGY (accessed July 2020). Thanks to Reviewer #2 for this suggestion.
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fragments will soon flash, appearing and disappearing in a horizontal space 
of six rows stretching from side to side. Heldén often operates with digital 
interfaces in his poetical practice, but technology itself is rarely a motif. 
Apart from scattered lines such as
the books are machines
or
a new presence confirmed real
the text itself does not explicitly deal with “electronic” or “posthuman” 
themes. Rather, the actual text fragments in Heldén’s poetic construction 
are biased towards impressions from nature; in fact, he is a distinct nature 
poet with a soft spot for postapocalyptic scenarios, where it is the ecologi-
cal disaster rather than the bomb that figures as the Reaper (Fig. 4.2).20
“The poem about the beautiful sunset has run into some problems,” a 
Danish critic wrote in 1971 (Hejlskov Larsen 1971, 172). If nature poems 
during the 1960s were put into question—with Göran Palm’s “new sim-
plistic” poem “The Sea” as perhaps the clearest statement—this can be 
said to have its origin in fatigue towards the overly lyrical, and overly 
elaborated, poetry of late modernism (Palm 1964).21 Nature poetry, along 
with central lyrics, was under attack, both from concretist poetics and 
from the so-called “new simplicity” movement. “The crisis of the beauti-
ful sunset” is also, in particular from the concretists, a consequence of an 
affirmation of the mechanical composition principle that also influenced 
Ekbom’s prose experiment. The depictions of nature that occur both in 
the Game of Signals and in his following collage novel, Spelmatriser för 
operation Albatross (1967, “Game Matrices for Operation Albatross”), are 
demonstratively flat, and in the latter case usually in the form of theatrical 
stage directions.
When nature, 50 years later, is under scrutiny by a poet such as Johannes 
Heldén, it is not in the form of sublime experiences or romantic 
20 In a 2013 essay, Norwegian scholar Hans Kristian Rustad examines the relationship 
between the printed and electronic versions of Entropy. He makes particularly careful obser-
vations of the visual elements in the online version, with associations with Piranesi and future 
industrial landscapes, and emphasizes the dystopian tone. He also points out that the falling 
bright spots at the same time represent just bright spots, a sense of hope. See Hans Kristian 
Rustad (2013).
21 For the full poem, see footnotes to Chap. 3.
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metaphors, but as a warning of the apocalypse to come.22 The book (in 
which Entropy Edition is included as a CD-ROM) has on its cover a gray-
scale photograph of a forested hill, with leafless trees in the background 
and a couple of bushes with the leaves left in the foreground—ecological 
concern informs the picture. The electronic edition generates sentences in 
the top poem like:
the vegetation watches over you
when you sleep
a new presence confirmed real
roadside, riverbank, star,
And in the rows at the bottom, you may read:
22 To clarify: It is not Heldén who takes nature back to poetry—nature has, of course, been 
present in poetry all the time. However, what is remarkable about Heldén’s artistic practice 
is the combination of technically innovative works and a fairly traditional—even moraliz-
ing—ecocriticism. The oscillation between these positions constitutes the dynamo of his 
artistry.
Fig. 4.2 Johannes Heldén, Entropy Edition (2010), screenshot
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Dumping grounds in the woods.
The trees defoliated. At least you get a clear view. (Heldén 2010a)
The emerging lines of text are projected against a slowly shifting back-
ground depicting abstract postindustrial and almost Escher-like labyrinths, 
or, as suggested by Hans-Kristian Rustad, reminding one of the etchings 
of eighteenth-century artist Piranesi (Rustad 2013, 28). In his essay on 
Heldén’s various versions of Entropi, Rustad emphasizes precisely the dys-
topian approach in the works: “We can thus conclude that Entropi por-
trays a civilization after a major disaster, or as a result of technological and 
industrial development, where nature’s resources are utilized for the last 
drop” (ibid., 29).
Thus, just like many other of Heldén’s works, including the Primary 
Directive (2006) and Evolution (2014), the reader is situated in various 
oscillating movements: between medium and “text”; between technology 
and body; between book and screen; and, especially in Heldén’s case, 
between “culture” and “nature.” One effect of this is that the pair quoted 
above has somehow been realized. “A new presence confirmed real”: the 
reading has installed this presence of body and text and thus the “books” 
have indeed become “machines.” But the statement also encourages us to 
reflect on the book as just a “machine” or as Johanna Drucker suggested 
already in 2003:
Instead of reading a book as a formal structure, then, we should understand 
it in terms of what is known in the architecture profession as a “program” 
constituted by the activities that arise from a response to the formal struc-
tures. … The literal has a way with us, its graspable and tractable rhetoric is 
readily consumed. But concrete conceptions of the performative approach 
also exist. (Drucker 2003, my italics)
Through its staging, its interface, Entropy Edition raises the question of 
why it could not suffice to present this text in analog, printed form. If we 
could claim that the paradigm of pattern/randomness generates the text 
in Entropy Edition, then the work also establishes a presence-absence rela-
tionship between the printed and the electronic texts. N. Katherine Hayles 
writes in Electronic Literature that some of the printed novels she discusses 
“both acknowledge their position within the print tradition and reproduce 
on their surface the mark of the digital” (Hayles 2008, 161). This holds 
true of the book version of Heldén’s Entropi as well.
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The printed text, the poetry book Entropi, accentuates its digital iden-
tity through a typographic “haze,” as each poem page operates with dif-
ferent shades of gray in the printed words. On the one hand, this can be 
said to reflect the grayscale on the book’s cover (which strengthens the 
codex’s analog identity); on the other, this technique seems to correspond 
to the electronic version’s appearing and disappearing text fragments 
(which strengthens the digital identity; Rustad 2013, 32). “If the seduc-
tions made possible by digital technology are endangering print, that same 
technology can also be seen as print in the making,” Hayles writes further 
(Hayles 2008, 162). “Print in the making”—in Heldén’s case this is almost 
a literal truth, since the grayscale of the text seems to simulate or represent 
a textual agency which is reinforced by the printed text’s relation to the 
electronic. Through this typographical measure, Heldén’s text adapts 
almost demonstratively to Johanna Drucker’s notion of the codex’s pro-
gram; the grayscale of the text guides the act of reading in the direction of 
this expected creation, even in printed form.
The reader thus has to engage in several bodily processes to make the 
text readable: turn on the computer, launch the browser, load the web-
page, and then search and click the small falling dots in order to make the 
text and the visuals appear. These are, of course, obvious activities in the 
encounter with the digital text and with every digital interface. But they 
can be put into a context that simultaneously separates the work from the 
experience of reading a literary codex, and at the same time establish a 
connection (and an “always-already-relationship”) with the body’s inter-
action in the codex-bound reading act. Cecilia Lindhé writes in one of the 
essays included in the printed edition of Evolution about Heldén’s nego-
tiations between paper and screen:
[w]hether print is flat and code is deep is of course significant here [Hayles 
2004]. But is the page really flat? Perhaps we may say yes at first but if we 
look, touch and feel it closely enough we sense the fibers and pores “that 
give every page both the texture and the depth into which the ink must sink 
without penetrating.” [Butler 2001] In Heldén’s work the page is never flat. 
Here it matters, claims a space and a particular presence. It forces us to 
reconsider our habituated view of paper. The page is perhaps not always 
what we think it is. (Lindhé 2014)23
23 The references in the quote relate to N. Katherine Hayles (2004) and Shane Butler 
(2011), s. 17 f.
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She then quotes a randomly generated text portion from the generic 
poetry machine Evolution, which is an important reminder of the printed 
text’s digital materiality:




What characterizes Entropy Edition, and Heldén’s work in general, is an 
ongoing negotiation of the relationship between technology and nature. 
It is a form of cybernetic ecocriticism where writing and reading are bodily 
activities. The involvement of the body in the act of reading electronic 
texts is, of course, a trivial observation when describing these works (and 
should be self-evident also in how we describe the reading of books and 
the turning of pages), but it is also a relationship that is repeatedly articu-
lated. The point here, however, is that the programming and the presence 
of the machine in Heldén’s case—contrary to Ekbom’s text—actually 
encourage agency.
It seems almost ironic that the fragments in Entropy Edition to such a 
high degree are occupied by nature. Why not just write nature poetry col-
lections, or ecocritical debate books, or get involved in some Green Party? 
One answer to this is that the agency (or fiction) of interactivity installs 
another critical approach to the literary experience—an activity that could 
be related to such modernist phenomena as the epic theater of Brecht with 
its effects of “Verfremdung,” or to different interactive and Fluxus instal-
lations during for example the 1960s.
The observation that agency—in relation to the machine—in Heldén’s 
work realizes the work to a greater extent than in Ekbom’s prose machine 
half a century earlier has an ambiguous effect: It is still the author who 
provides the text fragments—and in Heldén’s case also picture, sound, 
music and animation—which constitute the final poetic and aesthetic 
product. Perhaps in Entropy Edition, after all, we should be reminded that 
action is possible—and necessary.24 But at the same time, the activities of 
the texts in Entropi and Entropy Edition (both in the printed and  electronic 
24 From this perspective, the following work, Evolution, the programmed (online) machine 
that, without the reader’s participation, produces text fragments from Heldén’s entire pro-
duction, translates into a more pessimistic statement.
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versions, that is) accentuate the dystopian tendencies of the work. The 
language is somehow decomposing, and thus establishes a congenial com-
mentary on ecological decay, or on entropy as such. Rustad also notes this: 
“as if the words are disappearing or have already disappeared from the 
surface of the paper, perhaps as a result of the energy being gradually 
drained from the system” (Rustad 2013, 31). Action is possible, but our 
environment is still fading away.
The entropy of the title, of course, refers to thermodynamics, the diffu-
sion of energy and the decreasing order of existence.
Rustad, Hans-Kristian discusses this title and notes: “The fragments are 
locked on the screen and are available for interpretation, not just once, but 
at each reading of Entropy. In other words, the digital text is stable and 
permanent, and in that sense the text differs from what it is trying to the-
matize” (ibid., 30).25 This is evidently true, but we can also note that 
when the real entropy as a factual process is constantly proceeding, then, 
with each new staging of the text, neither the reader nor the outside world 
is the same.
4.8  on DigitaL Humanities
These various examples drawn from political history and (mostly) Swedish 
experiments were primarily aimed at, once again, showing digitization as a 
perspective—or as a lens—rather than as a collection of machines, tech-
niques, networks and databases. Ekbom and Heldén capture in their 
respective works—and at almost half a century apart—important aspects 
of the history of digitization and its relation to human and mechanical 
agency. These texts also show that digital epistemology (or “the com-
puter”) does not constitute one single perspective, one lens, but changes 
in relation to the manifestations of digital technology at specific historical 
moments.
That digitization today, through its ubiquitous qualities, permeates all 
aspects of our daily lives is a fact that naturally affects our perception of 
this reality; and this, in turn, should clearly influence the questions that 
academics ask in their analytical activities. By relating literary works and 
25 Rustad discusses the concept of “entropy” in depth in relation to Heldén’s text, and he 
also develops Hayles’ reasoning about the (digital) relationship between printed and elec-
tronic text, especially Hayles’ pairing of “imitation” and “intensification.” See also Hayles 
(2008), pp. 162–163, et passim.
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text-based works of art—in both print and electronic form—to digital his-
tory, these works can be read as expressions of various stages in the devel-
opment of computers and digitization. Whether we investigate change in 
the threat scenarios or analyze text-based experiments, we can observe 
how history, filtered through the digital lens, affects our perception 
of them.
So then: Does digital epistemology, as presented here, make a contribu-
tion to the ever-expanding field of digital humanities? Digital humanities 
as an emerging field of research has often been associated with studying 
texts using digital tools or building up extensive text databases (and theo-
rizing around them). In a productive continuation of these approaches 
and established archives, the emergence of the distance reading techniques 
mentioned earlier can be noted, with Franco Moretti and Mathew Jockers 
as prominent names (Moretti 2013; Jockers 2013). Surely, their pioneer-
ing work will be considered to be of great value for today’s and future 
humanities, and the epistemological implications of this practice are yet to 
be evaluated. Nevertheless, this book leaves databases, topic modeling and 
big data aside for the benefit of other epistemological and historical 
approaches to digitization and the humanities.
An illustrative example of the field’s somewhat ambivalent relation to 
epistemological perspectives is the anthology Digital_Humanities from 
2012 (Burdick et al. 2012).26 In the short section “Digital Humanities 
Fundamentals,” the authors argue that digital humanities is not so much 
a defined field as a handful of practitioners who have a common point of 
view; that is, that the printed text is no longer the culture-bearing medium 
for storing and communicating knowledge (ibid., 122). This opens up a 
broad definition of the field. Another section of the same introductory 
volume also discusses digital humanities in more epistemological terms, 
and the consequences this could have for the organization of academic 
activities:
Digital Humanities is engaged in developing print-plus and post-print mod-
els of knowledge. Both involve more than an updating of the knowledge 
delivery system. They entail the cognitive and epistemological reshaping of 
26 The number of introductions to the field of digital humanities has begun to become 
overwhelming. The above volume may here only serve as an example of initiatives and limita-
tions within the field.
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humanistic fields as a function of the affordances provided by the digital 
with respect to print. (ibid., 125)
The questions and perspectives raised by digital humanities challenge 
the boundaries of traditional academic disciplines (ibid., 82). This is com-
pletely in line with the epistemological implications of digitization as sug-
gested in this book. The authors of Digital_Humanities, though, reject 
the idea that the very use of digital tools would qualify a work as digital 
humanities—a pretty decent statement, since virtually every academic 
product today is digital at some level. However, when they move on to 
describe what they see as necessary competences in digital humanities, it is 
only about technical abilities, which also applies to the learning objectives 
for digital humanities described in the volume (ibid., 132–134).
There are now many manuals and anthologies in the field of digital 
humanities and the reason for this is, naturally, that it is still an emerging 
field. Nevertheless, it seems somewhat significant that a volume that holds 
a number of very open approaches to epistemological issues lands in a 
fairly instrumental practice when the scope of digital humanities is to be 
exemplified. Whether the concept of digital epistemology can be said to be 
contained under the digital humanities umbrella is really unimportant, but 
could of course give an indication of how (and if) the field perceives itself 
epistemologically rather than technically, and—in a continuation—also of 
how the field relates itself to the humanities in general.27
Two decades ago, in his Radiant Textuality (2001), Jerome McGann 
made the following observation:
[T]he general field of humanities education and scholarship will not take the 
use of digital technology seriously until one demonstrates how its tools 
improve the ways we explore and explain aesthetic works – until, that is, they 
expand our interpretational procedures. (Jerome McGann 2001, xii)
As we know, digitization has for a long time since then developed our 
modes of interpretation, but from an epistemological point of view these 
practices have not yet significantly influenced the curriculum of the 
humanities in regular classes. However, it would be deeply unfortunate if 
27 Of course, the struggle for how to define the digital humanities applies to research poli-
cies and financial funds. Some trends tend to absorb more funds than others, and getting 
inside or outside such a trend can have an impact on an individual researcher’s ability to 
realize his or her projects.
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digital perspectives on the humanities were relegated to parallel activities 
that run alongside regular course offerings. In many respects, Jerome 
McGann’s challenge from Radiant Textuality has still not been answered—
but we are working on it.
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CHAPTER 5
Towards a Twenty-First-Century Pedagogy 
for the Humanities
Abstract The concept of digital epistemology discussed here suggests 
that the historical curriculum should be revised, since “the digital”—
understood as a perspective or a lens (Lindhé 2013; O’Gorman, Marcel, 
E-Crit: Digital Media, Critical Theory and The Humanities. University of 
Toronto Press, Toronto, 2006)—shifts our focus in the treatment of his-
torical topics and aesthetics. Consequently, it is argued that the answers to 
the epistemological and pedagogical challenges of today lie not just in 
digital tools and devices, but also in early modern modes of thought. By 
combining digital perspectives with early modern modes of thought, we 
arrive at a defamiliarization (Shklovsky 1991; Agrell, Tidskrift för 
Litteraturvetenskap 1, 1997) of our own digital, pedagogical and theoreti-
cal present, as well as of our relation to cultural history and aesthetics. The 
chapter ends with further suggestions on how to implement digital episte-
mological perspectives in educational practices.
5.1  IntroductIon
In this book, we have heuristically labored with digital epistemology as 
different modes of thought, dedicated to capturing those parts of our 
culture that are not necessarily explicit or formally digital. I hope I so far 
have shown, or at least hinted, that—in addition to Moretti’s graphs and 
tables (Moretti 2013) —there are other digital ways to read Balzac, Austen 
and Tokarczuk, reading practices that are in line with O’Gorman’s 
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ambition to shift the analysis from hermeneutics to heuretics, from inter-
pretation to invention (O’Gorman 2006, 12). It is thus a matter of read-
ing and writing practices that differ from our teaching and research 
tradition as it has looked until recently. In the previous chapters we have 
located one such digital mode of reading practices in the field of media 
archaeology.
At the same time, digitization and our new forms of communication, 
and not least the bibliometrics propelled by computer technology and a 
neoliberal agenda, have often been used as arguments to undermine the 
position of the monograph in academic discourse. Therefore, it is appro-
priate to point out that the monograph, viewed through the lens of digital 
epistemology as a mode of thought rather than as a genre, should be able to 
regain—or consolidate—a significant position in academic knowledge 
production. Moreover, there is reason to reflect upon various academic 
forms of communication—such as the monograph, the peer review article, 
the collection of articles, the practice research, the seminar and digital 
formats—from epistemological rather than bibliometric perspectives.1 You 
cannot simply replace the monograph with a collection of articles without 
a reflection on what it does with the results of the research. And you can-
not simply put your lectures and seminars in a digital toolbox and expect 
that the learning result is identical.2
5.2  the two cultures 2.03
C.P.  Snow in 1959 famously coined the phrase “the two cultures,” by 
which he referred to the gap that has arisen between the natural sciences 
and the humanities, and the problems that occur when the two fields of 
1 In order to deconstruct the New Public Management logic of bibliometry, it would not 
be unfair to count the seminar as a lab, where everyone who contributes to the final version 
of the text should be regarded as a co-author.
2 One of many lessons learned by the distance teaching practices that has been forced upon 
us in the Corona pandemic of 2020. It is not a question of quality, but rather a matter of 
identifying that the epistemological teaching and learning content change when you change 
the format.
3 The following discussion on “the two cultures,” it must be said, is based on my experi-
ences from universities in the Nordic countries. I am aware that the situation may differ sig-
nificantly in different academic cultures, perhaps most clearly in the United States with its 
tradition of private funding, etc. So while the reader may or may not identify with the over-




research do not interact (Snow 2013 [1959]). Snow’s distinction has been 
used in our days as a metaphor for the lack of understanding between dif-
ferent academic traditions, and for discussing concepts such as “science” 
and “education.”
In the last decades, we can see two new cultures that have emerged in 
the humanities, and this time the watershed is spelled “digital humani-
ties.” Although digital humanities as a field of both research and educa-
tion has expanded significantly over the past decade, and external funding 
as well as local initiatives indicate the attractiveness of the field, the gap 
does not appear to have been bridged but rather consolidated—digital 
humanities often seems to exist as an activity separated from the regular 
curriculum. The perspective of digital epistemology, however, encourages 
us to affirm our digital contemporary in a mode of thought that does not 
disregard either history, theory or object. Anne Balsamo has similar 
thoughts in Designing Culture:
Fundamentally, we need to stop thinking about new digital technologies as 
the channels through which education is delivered, and instead explore the 
ways in which these technologies are implicated in the reconfiguration of 
knowledge production across domains of human culture. The aim then is to 
take these insights as the basis for rethinking structures and pedagogies 
within formal educational institutions. (Balsamo 2011, 137)
Digital tools are not just tools. They contribute, Balsamo believes, to 
the restructuring of our way of managing and distributing knowledge, and 
they offer new opportunities for pedagogy. At the same time, we know 
how strangely resistant educational systems are; we accept influences from 
the most diverse directions (gender theory, postcolonialism, queer theory, 
environmental humanities, etc.), but our disciplines and fields of research 
still essentially retain their curricula.4
I hope we now, in 2020, can look at the following as history. But far 
into the 2010s there was a clear skepticism among many practitioners of 
“traditional” humanities towards the digital curricula. This was partly 
caused by fear (new technologies, making the reading of books obsolete); 
4 In systems theory, we talk about autopoiesis (self-organization), operational closure and 
structural coupling. The system connects to the outside world (for example, new educational 
theories, new text concepts), but only to such an extent that one can still (autopoietically) 
confirm one’s own identity. For a description of comparative literature as a social system, see 
Ingvarsson (2015).
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or disinterest (“that digital thing is not my concern”); or envy (“they are 
taking all the funds”); or epistemological concern (a skepticism towards 
the seemingly positivist nature of big data research); maybe something 
else. And it is important to acknowledge that digital humanists themselves 
may have to take some blame for establishing this tension.
However, the tension between educational tradition and classical analy-
sis vis-à-vis databases, topic modeling and digital tools cuts right into the 
core of the media skepticism that the two cultures 2.0 express according 
to this reasoning. That skepticism has a history: It has existed at all times, 
a more or less automatic resistance to new media and new cultural expres-
sions (not least the romance genre was met with great suspicion in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and was advised to be withheld from 
easily influenced women). The opposition to the modern ether and mass 
media culture was formulated eloquently by Marshall McLuhan adept 
Neil Postman in the 1970s and 1980s—a book title like Teaching as 
Conserving Activity (1979) is a clear statement—and a quote highlights 
the book’s main theme:
Its [the education’s] aim at all times is to make visible the prevailing biases 
of a culture and then, by employing whatever philosophies of education are 
available, to oppose them. (Postman 1979, 20)
This attitude may seem rabid, but if you look past the moral dimensions 
you will find several modern echoes of Postman’s reasoning, in the 1990s 
for example with Sven Birkerts, and later also with Andrew Piper (although 
in very different modes). We shall return to them.
So let us take this media skepticism seriously and ask ourselves a two- 
part question: Should we develop strategies that constitute a form of 
counter-culture to the many problematic trends that digital culture inevi-
tably carries, or should we adapt and find ways in which we embrace digi-
tal culture as a resource and as a mode of thought in academic and 
educational work? The answers generated by this two-part question can be 
called “counter-culture” and “correspondence,” respectively.
5.2.1  Counter-culture
Sven Birkerts’ book The Gutenberg Elegies: The Fate of Reading in an 
Electronic Age was first published in 1994. There the author describes his 
sincere concern about a reading culture that he sees as threatened by mass 
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media in general, and digital culture in particular. About the (at the time 
of the book’s publication) new genre of hypertexts, Birkerts writes: “I 
stare at the textual field on my friend’s screen and I am unpersuaded. 
Indeed, this glimpse of the future – if it is the future – has me clinging all 
the more tightly to my books, the very idea of them” (Birkerts 1994, 
164). The new genre worries him. Birkerts has a powerful precursor in the 
above-mentioned Neil Postman, and a similar skepticism also echoed in 
2013 in Andrew Piper’s Book Was There: Reading in Electronic Times, in a 
passage about electronic texts where the author claims that “The more my 
body does, however, the less my mind does. Interactivity is a constraint, 
not a freedom” (Piper 2018, 18).5
It is easy to sympathize with this “Gutenbergian” pessimism, and if we 
consider it productively, we as researchers and teachers fostered within the 
humanities can regard reading, interpretation and the overall dedication 
to, and work with, the “analog” cultural heritage as an act of resistance to 
contemporary cultural discourse. It is our duty to create intellectual har-
bors for reflection, Archimedean points from which this contemporary 
culture can be critically observed—and the humanities is an indispensable 
tool for this endeavor.
It is obvious that Postman and his followers see pedagogy and classical 
education as a tool to free young pupils from the paralysis and confusion 
of modern media. To achieve this, we must refrain (preferably entirely) 
from an education that is congenial to the surrounding society—research 
and teaching will certainly adapt to the surrounding media environment, 
but only in order to offer a counter-culture.
This, of course, may sound conservative—or reactionary, even—but 
quite frankly, who should hold the banners of education and history, if not 
the humanistic and aesthetic disciplines? These also form the backbone of 
the knowledge that teachers in elementary and secondary school deliver in 
their professions. Thus, a great responsibility lies on those disciplines. 
5 When Piper compares digital reading to analog, he thus refutes the body’s interaction as 
part of an intellectual activity. This Cartesian thought figure—in addition to appearing some-
what obsolete—at the same time rejects ancient rhetoric’s relation of body, space and speech 
in the creation of experience and knowledge, something which, for example, Cecilia Lindhé 
(2013) emphasizes: “The significance of the body and the emphasis on Bodily senses in the 
rhetorical situation were thus crucial.” In fairness, though, it should be pointed out that 
Piper’s book discusses many interesting and productive perspectives on the relationship 
between book and digital culture.
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Moreover, trying to adapt education to digital cultures would still only 
mean that you are one step behind the youngsters themselves.
It would be tempting here to use the concept of defamiliarization 
(ostranenie) introduced by Russian formalist Viktor Shklovsky, a strategy 
to break the taken-for-granted perception of our environment, a trade-
mark of the avant-garde and other “difficult” poetry (Shklovsky 1991, 
passim). Why should traditional education not have the same effect, to 
interfere with the blurred perception of reality, obtained by our young-
sters as an effect of too much media consumption? But as Beata Agrell 
reminds us (in an essay from 1997 to which we shall return soon), 
Shklovsky’s concept is largely based on recognition—thus making defamil-
iarization a function more or less in contradiction to the concept of 
counter- culture in education.
5.2.2  Correspondence
But, if the humanities is to be anything other than a closed system, some 
kind of sanctuary, then we may have to try forms, in both teaching and 
research, that correspond to the surrounding culture. Out of those who 
would like to see an adaptation of the classroom to digital culture, we can 
count Anne Balsamo, already quoted, and N. Katherine Hayles. In both 
cases, they argue that humanistic competence is best communicated in an 
environment that gives room for the younger generation’s own languages 
and media. It is a version of the pedagogical notion of “experience-based 
learning,” which in this case means focusing on media habits and digital 
experiences. In How We Think (2012), Hayles asks how we can translate 
digital literacy into the ability to read, understand and work with, for 
example, literary texts? And how do we make possible the connection 
between these two areas of expertise?
While literary studies continue to teach close reading to students, it does less 
well in exploiting the trend towards the digital. Students read incessantly in 
digital media and write in it as well, but only infrequently are they encour-
aged to do so in literature classes or in environments that encourage the 
transfer of print reading abilities to digital and vice versa. The two tracks, 
print and digital, run side by side, but messages from either track do not leap 
across to the other. (Hayles 2012, 57)
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Perhaps the humanistic and aesthetic disciplines have been too restricted 
in allowing the production of multimodal texts within their own curricula? 
Hayles describes it as two parallel tracks that meet too rarely, or not at all. 
So, then: Should all students start blogging? Should the teacher tweet? Do 
we need to know programming? Should everyone work with databases 
and scanned texts? Sure, why not? But also, no, not necessarily—and this 
is where the media archaeological perspective enters. This chapter will 
advocate an attitude towards digitization in education and research which 
simultaneously promotes “digital literacy” and more traditional humanistic 
competences; a defamiliarization of contemporary culture, but not 
through resistance or by surrender to “digitization,” but through curios-
ity about the digital as a mode of thought, which also leads us to pre- and 
early modern modes of thought. Let us first, before we go into the modes 
of thought, look at some digital forms of expression.
5.3  dIgItal expressIons?
Digital epistemology is based on the fact that digital forms of expression 
affect how we view and process information, both contemporary and his-
torical. The notion of “digital forms of expression” requires, for the sake 
of clarity, a rather narrow definition in this context (this is not to say that 
phenomena that fall outside these examples do not support the following 
arguments). Thus, here are some examples of (a) digital practices; and (b) 
digital-born works of art.
5.3.1  Digital Practices6
The desktop has come to play a diminishing role in how we organize our 
digital files. In the personal computer’s “adolescence,” however, the desk-
top was an important entry-level metaphor, not least for humanists who 
felt uncomfortable with program code and flickering markers. In the met-
aphors of the desktop—documents, folders, trash—we felt at home. The 
hypertext pioneer Ted Nelson has repeatedly talked about what a missed 
6 Digital practice is, of course, incomprehensible. The phenomenon of ubiquitous comput-
ing means that we now have a great deal of access to, and use, digital technology without 
traditional interfaces in  the  form of  screens and  displays. The  ubiquitous qualities give 
the  whole existence some kind of  “digital agency.” There are reasons to  return to  this, 
but for the sake of clarity, I will here dwell upon more concrete interfaces such as the com-
puter desktop and search engines.
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opportunity in the development of human thinking it was when the desk-
top came to be the dominant interface, because it exerts such strong limits 
on the potential of thinking new that the computer medium possesses: 
“We must,” he wrote in 1999, “overthrow the paper model, with its four 
prison walls and peephole 1-way links” (Nelson 1999).7 It may have taken 
the decades that Nelson feared, but nowadays we are not quite so commit-
ted to the desktop metaphor. The hierarchical structure is not as promi-
nent any more, as many of us have more or less abandoned the folder 
structure to instead clump our documents into a single folder and online 
in different clouds, such as Dropbox, Box and ProDrive. Instead of brows-
ing folders we “google” our own hard drive—the verb reveals that the 
search engine is replacing the desktop as a metaphor. And on tablets and 
smartphones, we barely handle documents at all.
Searches on Bing and Google or in different library databases thus rep-
resent a partly different logic than the desktop and the hierarchical file 
structure. It is no different from the logic of the encyclopedia (or library 
shelf); we all remember how we searched for a keyword in the encyclope-
dia, only to find ourselves reading about a lot of other things on the same 
page as the entry we searched for.8 The point of the encyclopedia, after all, 
is that it is not organized according to a hierarchical principle—the ency-
clopedia is blind to any order of things outside the alphabetical (and to the 
order of things that direct the editor’s choices of headwords). The same 
goes for search engines: The words you type in the search box inevitably 
generate results that could be far away from the information you were 
actually looking for. However, it would be a mistake to call this handling 
of information management “democratic” or “neutral”—search engines, 
just like the authors of various encyclopedias or the manager of a library, 
work (or operate) in the interests of their owners. Somehow, we ourselves 
seem to contribute to these powers, as we more or less consciously design 
texts and headings with more than one eye directed towards the algo-
rithms of the search engine (and possible click effects).9 In the next step, 
the search engines have also identified our preferences and search history, 
7 The reason, Ted Nelson argues, that the “desktop” with “folders” and “documents” 
became the interface metaphor was that it was developed by Xerox Parc, which, with its 
extensive production of copiers and faxes, operates in the paper business. See Nelson (1999).
8 The similarities between the results from search engines and phenomena such as the 
encyclopedia and the library have been pointed out by (among others) Marco (Codebó 2010).
9 In a 2013 essay, “Sökrutan, flödet och humanioras framtid” (“The Search Box, the Flow 
and the Future of the Humanities”), Rasmus Fleischer argues:
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and will soon come up with suggestions and arrangements of our searches. 
A search on Google or Bing from a computer located in Sweden (and 
without tampering with VPN servers) generates completely different 
results than if you search for the same terms in, say, India or South Africa. 
Thus, the search engine is hardly more “fair” or more “neutral” than the 
hierarchically (and ideologically) arranged archives. But it does have 
another logic.
The same goes for the webpages to which the searches refer us. The 
information we are served is always part of some major network or overall 
interest. It could be a large company or authority, the provider of the web 
service, or the interests represented by the site’s advertisers. The informa-
tion provided by the webpages is very rarely self-sufficient, and in principle 
never completed, since the purpose is to direct our gaze or interest either 
towards the advertiser or away from the authority that runs the page.
5.3.2  Digital-Born Works
In the category of digital-born works we can—in this context, that is—
count both computer games and more or less interactive, platform-based 
or site-specific artworks. Interactivity as such is of course not unique to 
digital objects—even the codex invites interaction, mainly through page 
turning. But computer games and electronic works generally offer greater 
opportunities for multimodal and synesthesia experiences—image, sound 
and text, in both moving and static forms, cooperate.10 If computer games 
nowadays, with few exceptions, for commercial reasons invest in getting 
maximum dissemination (online games are more attractive than arcade 
games), digital art is characterized by an interesting dualism between on 
the one hand online-based works, and on the other site-specific  installations. 
Like Facebook, Academia.edu is designed to encourage tendencies toward narcissism. 
Users get detailed information on what search terms others have used to find their 
essays. This helps to train researchers in expressing themselves in a “search engine 
optimized” mode – thus writing in a way that will improve the position of the search 
engines, rather than in a literary style. The Universities’ communication departments 
urge the researchers routinely to go in the same direction.
10 Just as with the book as a medium, of course, it is absurd to summarize this huge field in 
a single mode of thought. I would therefore just like to point out some observations that can 
serve as a basis for further reasoning.
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It can be about utilizing virtual rooms such as CAVE, but also other more 
or less advanced digital constructions.11 Often, different gaming platforms 
are used to explore artistic expressions, as in several of Johannes Heldén’s 
works. An illustrative example is the early online work The Prime Directive 
from 2006, where the reader is first introduced to a title page, illustrated 
with a drawing of a natural motif depicting beavers by a lake. From there 
you come to a page with two animated books that rotate against a black 
background. As the user approaches the books with the mouse pointer, a 
heading and a short poem—or perhaps a motto—appear underneath 
them: “1 The Path of the Fragment” and “2 The Prime Directive.” When 
you choose one of the books you enter one of two different text/image 
spaces depending on which one is selected. Thrifty but suggestive anima-
tion appears, short text snippets and different sounds for different mouse 
clicks. Instead of the linear structure of the traditional reading of books, 
the reader is met here by an oscillation between headline, image and text 
fragments. Does the puzzle have a solution?
From Heldén we can also find an example of site-specific digital instal-
lation, the work Field, a multimedia installation displayed at HUMlab X, 
Umeå University, in the winter of 2015. In the leaflet accompanying the 
artwork, Heldén reflects upon the relationship between code, DNA and 
language, topics he has been occupied with for a long time. Throughout 
his works there are, as noted earlier, continuous negotiations between 
concepts such as technology, digitization, nature, creation, automation, 
games, language, life, artifact. From a posthumanist (and probably also a 
Heldénian) perspective, we cannot really draw a distinct line between 
these binaries: life and artifact, nature and culture, code and language, 
man and stone (Fig. 5.1).
In Field Heldén worked with soundscapes and screens, not only on the 
walls but also with one giant screen on the floor (one feature of HUMlab 
X), and exhibited 3D prints of slowly mutating jackdaws. Walking on the 
11 CAVE is the abbreviation for “Cave Automatic Virtual Environment,” a technology 
where the user is surrounded by visual information on all sides in a closed room. Virtual real-
ity (VR) glasses enhance the effect. CAVE is used for educational purposes as well as in 
industry, entertainment and art. McKenzie Wark has an interesting deconstruction of the 
CAVE phenomenon in his Gamer Theory (2007), where he imagines a game business offer-
ing, for a fee, “access to game consoles in a darkened room,” not unlike the existing CAVE 
technology. Wark contrasts this experience, and moreover the abrupt disruption of it, with 




Fig. 5.1 Johannes Heldén, from the installation Field, HUMlab X, Umeå 2015. 
Photograph
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interactive floor changed the texts on the walls, which also mutated, 
decomposed. In this combination of natural lyric and dystopia, the DNA 
of a jackdaw changes at the same time as a projected text is transformed 
into fragments; prose becomes poetic text. Four different mutations of the 
jackdaws have been produced by 3D printers and are displayed on the 
floor. The viewer must move in and through the artwork to stage the vari-
ous moments of image, sound, text and sculpture (for more, see Bolick 
2018). Indeed, Heldén’s installation is guided by a moral appeal (just like 
the emblem), but the bizarre combinations, fake mutated jackdaws and 
oscillating relations between the different parts of the artwork still echo 
many aspects of Kunstkammer poetics.
5.4  From mode oF expressIon to mode 
oF thought
Let us repeat. If we consider the internet as a huge archive, we find that 
search engine logic—which, as noted, partly coincides with well-known 
phenomena such as the encyclopedia and the library—in many aspects 
marks a return to the early modern order of the principle of pertinence—
or the subject principle, or dossier system—which has been introduced in 
earlier chapters. It is also a logic, or a sense of order, that is in accordance 
with the perspectives brought forward by media archaeology.
Many websites and digital works can also be said to be organized 
according to the principle of pertinence, in its associative rather than linear 
order—such as Heldén’s The Prime Directive. But perhaps even more so, 
these phenomena can be said to resemble the emblematic mode of thought 
that has been highlighted in previous chapters. Let us take this one step 
further: In her extensive study of Swedish novels of the 1960s, Beata 
Agrell has established the emblem as a kind of matrix for the open and 
challenging strategies that characterized large parts of the 1960s’ experi-
ments in literature and art, not only in Sweden but in culture at large at 
the time (Agrell 1993, passim). Agrell’s book is one of the first attempts 
to update the aesthetics of early modern emblematics into an analysis tool 
for more modern artistic expressions.12
In short, Agrell’s reading of the emblem means that she, in line with 
Daly (1979) and Manning (2002), considers this not as a curiosity or 
12 For an investigation into emblematic motifs and structures to the genre’s own contem-
porary literature, see Peter M. Daly (1998).
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banality, nor as mystification or a decodable rebus, but as a system of orga-
nizing knowledge. Agrell, too, thus views the emblem both as an art form 
and as a mode of thought (ibid. passim). The art form consists of the 
objects that were presented in emblem books and collections. And although 
the pictura can retrieve motifs from a variety of allegorical, biblical or 
mythological inventories, the image’s referential content is not given—a 
frog or a rose can have different meanings from emblem to emblem. This 
“arbitrary symbolism” is also reflected today in digital phenomena such as 
memes and GIFs. The associations created by the visual elements in, for 
example, memes are not static, but are always governed by the cultural and 
regional code in which they are generated and disseminated.
Even though he does not believe that “Madison Avenue has re- 
discovered emblem books,” Peter M. Daly, in an essay from 1988, makes 
some interesting connections between the Renaissance emblem and mod-
ern (1980s) advertising (Daly 1988, 352 and passim). The tripartite 
form—inscriptio, pictura, subscriptio—is everywhere, Daly observes, and 
he concludes:
While the emblem is certainly not a source or direct model for modern illus-
trated advertising, the two forms frequently employ texts and symbols in a 
similar manner to convey messages and persuade readers. (ibid., 362)
It is evident, if you start looking, that the logic and structure of the 
emblem appear in many cultural expressions, from poetry to advertising 
and webpages. The reason, however, why emblems have taken such a 
prominent role in this short introduction to digital epistemology is not—
as you may know by now—only their formal appearance, but the emblem 
as a mode of thought.13 Agrell sees this mode of thought as a “maieutic 
practice,” aiming “not to give knowledge of nature, but to redeem a sense 
of the visible that reveals a connection to ‘Creation’” (Agrell 1993, 51). 
This mode of thought and maieutic practice are congenial to the expres-
sions on many regular websites, as well as in Johannes Heldén’s works, for 
example. Both on webpages and in many digital works, an information 
surplus is created which makes a “finished” reading of the pages  impossible; 
13 In a later essay, Agrell develops her emblematic analysis, drawing lines from the 
Renaissance through Victorian literature and art to avant-garde, high modernism and to the 
experimental art scene of the 1960s. The present book can thus be said to be a continuation 
of Agrell’s ambitions to see emblematics as a mode of thought present under other aesthetic 
and media historical paradigms (see Agrell 1997, pp. 31–33).
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instead, the reader is invited to redirect his or her interest in an emblem-
atic way. This coincides with Daly’s observation that the “solution” to an 
emblem does not lie in revealing the background of the different compo-
nents; it is not a rebus or a riddle to be solved. No, the emblematic mode 
of thought instead encourages combination and composition—echoing 
Marcel O’Gorman’s earlier-mentioned ambition of “invention” rather 
than “interpretation.” This also coincides with what Peter Boot points out 
in Mesotext: Digitized Emblems, Modeled Annotations and Humanities 
Scholarship (2013):
The emblem’s use of multiple media, its wide variety of subject matter and 
its many intertextual relations make emblem studies very suitable for experi-
ments in humanities computing. (ibid., 13)
Johannes Heldén can, again, serve as an example. Several of Heldén’s 
poetic installations, including The Prime Directive, can be usefully related 
to emblematic modes of thought: the establishment of a text and image 
interaction that at once creates riddles and promotes the reader’s reflec-
tion; his or her active participation; and the view of nature “through the 
‘spectacles of books’” (as Manning 2002) points out in the motto to this 
chapter), which in this case may become “the spectacles of graphic inter-
faces.” If, in the seventeenth century, as Manning suggests, one lived in an 
environment of emblematic epistemology, today we live in a digital one.
Heldén’s previously mentioned installation Field from 2015 also shows 
an emblematic structure—image and text appear in an oscillating interac-
tion, an unfinished participatory process with a clearly moral message—
but the work also promotes the spatial order of the early modern 
Kunstkammer, which also is an expression of the principle of pertinence. 
The participant/viewer moves between seemingly disparate physical and 
digital objects in a room intended for this experience only.
This brings us to a concluding note on digital culture and older modes 
of thought (before we move into theoretical and pedagogical reflections). 
For it is striking that even though many digital expressions may appear 
“new” and “foreign” to the traditional humanist, they may as well be 
related to a variety of cultural genres, phenomena and modes of thought 
from the time before (or around) the breakthrough of modernity. In this 
book, attention has mainly been directed to some significant early modern 
forms, but “the early modern” is not really an end in itself for the juxtapo-
sitions that have been carried out here. In addition to the emblem, the 
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cabinet of curiosities and the principle of pertinence, we can mention the 
romantic fragment; salon culture; the rhetorical ekphrasis and enargeia; 
the ancient poetic collage technique cento; and other ancient concepts 
such as techné and methexis.14 These are principles for organizing, explor-
ing and problematizing our cultural heritage that do not necessarily follow 
a Gutenbergian and post-Romantic principle, or the concerned notion of 
evidence fostered by the natural and social sciences. This is not about 
reproducing knowledge, but creating new knowledge—and creating it 
anew from already existing material. Or, as Marshall McLuhan stated: I 
don’t explain – I explore (McLuhan 1968, xiii).
5.5  medIa archaeology, dIgItal epIstemology 
and pedagogIcal challenges
We can thus establish parallels between contemporary digital forms and 
older aesthetic expressions. But this must not be regarded merely as a 
curiosity, an intellectual musing over the similarities of existence; most of 
what we have around us can be likened to something else. No, the reason-
ing advanced so far is partly to show that the “digital” we observe is not a 
self-sufficient—or even completely new—sphere, but borrows expressions 
and modes of thought from aesthetic genres with a very long history. At 
the same time, the “digital” establishes new connections and its own logic, 
whose theoretical and educational implications are the final subject of 
this book.
This is, of course, not the first attempt to unite digital practices and 
pedagogical challenges. The hypertext pioneer, author and theorist 
Michael Joyce, in Of Two Minds: Hypertext Pedagogy and Poetics, already 
14 The ekphrasis has long been understood as a verbal description of a visual expression, for 
example a verbal description of a painting, but as Cecilia Lindhé (2013) has shown, the con-
cept originally meant a form of enargeia, a vividness; that is, a striving to create images in the 
minds of the audience. The focus is thus on the recipient of the message rather than the refer-
ent (interaction rather than representation). The cento was the poetic tradition of later antiq-
uity where new poetry was created by assembling collages of earlier poems (see Sigrid 
Schottenius Cullhed 2015). Techné is one of the Aristotelian forms of knowledge and refers 
to skills, both artistic and craft (see, for example, Wylie Sypher 1968, passim). The premod-
ern era made no distinction between art and other skills; everything was techné—for example, 
da Vinci was not both an artist and an inventor, his skills were simply contained within the 
same concept. Methexis is originally part of the mimesis concept and refers to participation 
(see Sypher 1968, pp. 86–88; and Christopher Kelty 2016).
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in 1995 suggested some radical changes in the teaching situation, made 
possible by hypertexts and the software Storyspace (which he himself 
developed together with Jay Bolter in 1987):
Let us say, then, that in the new cosmology learning and teaching are both 
decentered and distributed, i.e. hooked together and mixed up. Thus, when 
Martha Petry and her American literature students at Jackson Community 
College build a Storyspace around the poetry of Walt Whitman there is a 
natural confluence and linkage among the machine-based learning conversa-
tion, the textual encounter, and the gathering of scholarly resources. It is a 
linkage that software like Storyspace is uniquely suited both to enact and to 
represent. The learning conversations embodied in students’ journal 
responses not only are graphically linked to Whitman’s lines as part of the 
encounter with the text but, indeed (and quite naturally), also find their way 
into the resources that the teacher-scholar brings to bear upon the text. The 
learners truly take their place as co-equals in an interpretive community. 
(Joyce 1995, 121)
This is a line of argument not so different from Marcel O’Gorman’s 
(2006). However, in the mid-1990s the fully equipped computer lab in 
schools was still a rarity, and Storyspace or hypertext software in general 
was not commonplace. Today the situation is different. And the ubiquity 
of digital tools and gadgets puts us in a more privileged position to com-
bine digital interfaces, media archaeological perspectives and historical 
juxtapositions.
In other places in this book, media archaeology has been mentioned as 
a congenial expression of digital epistemology. For example, it has been 
suggested that search results on Google or Bing correlate well with the 
activity of juxtaposing our own research results, and the same search 
engines—not to mention the library databases—give us unprecedented 
opportunities to dive into individual years. But media archaeologists do 
not arbitrarily parallel their results—the archive has nodes (just like the 
search engine, by the way). These digital and media archaeological per-
spectives, at the same time, challenge the theories that since Romanticism 
have consolidated a subject-object position between theory and text, art 
and reality. Media archaeology and search engines both encourage us to 
re-examine cause and effect, materiality and presence.
This must of course also affect how we work actively in the teaching 
situation, for a start by not seeing the internet as a problem, or the online 
 J. INGVARSSON
125
student as a disruption. Instead, these new forms of knowledge can chal-
lenge us to relate cultural artifacts to each other in new ways.
In previous chapters, Marcel O’Gorman’s E-Crit has been mentioned 
as an inspiration for the present work. O’Gorman applies an educational 
model that he devised with inspiration from W.J.T. Mitchell, which he 
calls “Hypericonomy.” A “hypericon” is an image that, in Mitchell’s words 
from 1994, works like “a piece of movable cultural apparatus, one that 
may serve a marginal role as an illustrative device or a central role as a kind 
of summary image … That encapsulates an entire episteme, a theory of 
knowledge” (Mitchell 1994, 49). Mitchell continues: “They are not 
merely epistemological models, but, ethical, and aesthetic ‘assemblages’ 
that allow us to observe observers. In their strongest forms, they merely 
serve as illustrations to theory: they picture theory” (ibid.).
The point is, then, that the images, “the hypericons,” not only repre-
sent and present—they do something, too. O’Gorman emphasizes this 
aspect on the basis of Friedrich Kittler’s media historical project: Critical 
thinking is not a text about culture, but rather a method of writing with 
cultural expressions. The practice of hypericonomy, for O’Gorman, gets 
concretized in an exercise in which the student is asked to create a diagram 
according to a model, in which s/he is asked to combine a private child-
hood memory with one of William Blake’s (1757–1827) poems, as well as 
with a visual interpretation model from Mitchell and some other parame-
ters. Out of this they will make a comment which blends the personal and 
historical with theory and popular culture. O’Gorman continues:
Hypericonomy is not about immediately throwing out our current discur-
sive practices, but about provoking change and inventing transitional, even 
provisional, strategies that bridge the gap between print-centric and 
computer- centric practices. (O’Gorman 2006, 95)
This is not a brutal transformation of curriculum, but rather a thought- 
provoking practice with the intention of bringing together the “two cul-
tures” I described above. Thus, for O’Gorman, William Blake’s writing is 
a prime example of “hypericonomy.” Blake’s images do not constitute 
conventional illustrations of the text, nor does the text form any obvious 
commentary on the image; instead, they create an intricate interplay of 
feedback loops and new insights.15
15 For Blake and digital perspectives, see also Whitson and Whittaker (2012).
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O’Gorman sees great potential in leveraging personal, and private, 
experience as a starting point in his “hypericonic” pedagogy. It is a subjec-
tivity which, of course, is congenial to digital culture’s at once more pri-
vate but at the same time more open logic. On the web we see constant 
interplay between the individual and the collective, an expression of which 
are the flickering identities on social media.16
The hypericon is an interesting point of departure, and W.J.T. Mitchell 
also uses it to point out the duplicity in the title of his well-known book. 
The hypericon is not an example of a picture theory but rather acts as an 
imperative, to picture theory. Images (like, one can argue, literary texts 
and all cultural artifacts) do something; they establish discursive practices 
that can point out different directions. Cultural artifacts shape and create 
(“picture”) theory. But if we push the media archaeological perspective a 
little further, it is clear that both O’Gorman and Mitchell—despite their 
historical perspectives—overlook some “hypericons” in their respective 
practices. We can now see that William Blake’s combination of text and 
images has striking similarities with the emblem as a mode of thought. 
And by turning our attention to several of the aforementioned pre- and 
early modern aesthetic expressions, we can find ways of thinking that cor-
respond well with “hypericonic” practice. An example of this is the 
emblem. Returning to Peter M. Daly, he describes the emblem’s episte-
mological qualities thus:
Rather than describe a mode of thought by reference to motifs of clearly 
demonstrable hieroglyphic provenance, whether Egyptian, pseudo- Egyptian 
or Renaissance, I propose to use the term to describe an attitude to combi-
nation and composition. (Daly 1979, 82)
Thus, in digital pedagogy, Marcel O’Gorman sees a shift from “inter-
pretation” to “innovation” (see Chap. 1). This coincides with Peter Daly’s 
observation that the “solution” to an emblem lies not in revealing the 
background of the components—not in their provenance—but rather in a 
productive approach between combination and composition (to “create” 
instead of “interpret”). The emblem’s and hypericon’s approach to its 
sources seems to coincide with the aforementioned principle of pertinence.
16 Another example is how young people share the communications they have with their 
cell phones—they share each other’s texts, overhear each other’s calls, etc. This was observed 




The emblem, in its many configurations, thus bears obvious similarities 
to hypericons as discussed by Mitchell and O’Gorman. The hypericon, in 
this appearance, is also a way of exploring cultural history in a productive 
and non-hierarchical way. It is about seeing the pedagogical situation not 
as a reproduction of existing knowledge, but as an opportunity—just like 
the in emblematic practices—to relate the search for knowledge, through 
the analysis of the artifact, to a world outside the material being processed. 
Combination and composition.
In this combination of digital pedagogy and early modern forms of 
knowledge, we approach Shklovsky and defamiliarization (ostranenie) 
again. When Agrell (1997) reads the emblematic form of thought as a 
strategy for defamiliarization, she emphasizes that Shklovsky’s essay does 
not draw attention to the artwork itself, but to the “processes of percep-
tion” it sets in motion: “The artwork is thus not autonomous, but focuses 
on a certain type of observation, which it, at the same time, through its 
built-in approach, evokes” (ibid., 28). Here we see a strategy aimed at the 
user, which we can now also translate to several digital practices such as 
hyperlinks, interactivity, immersion and so on. This aim involves a recogni-
tion: “The artifice here consists in manipulating the original. In the reuse, 
deviations and obstacles should be utilized, in order to de-automate the 
perception of the previously familiar, and thereby make it foreign …” 
(ibid.).
By combining a sensibility towards our digital contemporary with a 
curiosity about various early modern forms of thought, we achieve just 
such a defamiliarization—and thus it is a defamiliarization of both digital 
culture and our traditional cultural history. What until recently has caused 
digital culture to be an obstacle for our humanist colleagues is nothing 
more than a post-Romantic view of education—a legacy, that is, of moder-
nity’s expurgation of early modern forms—where “the work,” “the 
genius” and “originality” (not to mention “History” and “the Nation”) 
was placed at the center of the analysis and the curriculum. Our digital 
practices point in other directions, just like early modern modes of thought 
and genres. The skepticism towards “the digital” that for a long time 
could be observed within the humanities could be related to an acceptance 
of a banal linearity of history (a view of history it ironically shares with 
both development optimists and technophiles). Because this skepticism, it 
turns out, seems to be rooted in the notion that the pursuit of digital 
means the end of the analog (although as we have seen in Chap. 1, they 
do not constitute a binary couple), multimodality becomes a threat to 
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codex; the databases are a threat to writing history; the internet and Wiki 
culture are a threat to reading and education. In addition, it is not uncom-
mon to view digital publishing as a threat to the monograph.
5.6  conclusIons and challenges
My reasoning in this text leads to a vision of an educational situation 
where, with the help of technology, we can change the pedagogical per-
spective on its subject from provenance (origin, genealogy) to another, 
more associative, but not free, sorting principle—the principle of perti-
nence. There are a number of historically interesting but rather poorly 
explored modes of thought and concepts that could prove to be marvel-
ously congenial with digital culture,Analog vs digital and which have only 
been hinted at here. In Chap. 1, I suggested that digital epistemology can 
be seen as a “digital humanities sans digital tools and objects”—yet the 
analytical examples in this chapter have been taken from digital works 
(albeit to illustrate digital practices). Let us, therefore, clarify that the 
point of this stipulation is to emphasize that it is possible to conduct teach-
ing and research in line with a digital epistemology without using data-
bases, algorithms, electronic works, fan fiction or topic models to any 
particular extent. It is possible to conduct “digital” humanities, exploring 
the modes of thought of the emblem and the cabinet of curiosities, and 
how they can be used to develop new (or old) learning processes in both 
primary and university education. You can encourage pupils’ and students’ 
work by using digital tools, or compile their surveys into emblematic or 
other pre- or early modern structures—loci communes, salon culture, the 
fragment and beyond. It is easy to imagine a situation where students 
explore emblematic thought forms and the principles of the Kunstkammer, 
and with these models in front of them produce exciting new compilations 
of “Edinburgh,” “The 1950s,” “Grass,” “The Color Blue” or “Simone de 
Beauvoir.” At the same time, they will teach us something about forms of 
knowledge in our own digital age. I actually see Gunnar D. Hansson’s 
aesthetic program (see Chap. 3) as a very productive source of inspira-
tion here.
It would be a shame for those of us who are interested in digital per-
spectives on the humanities if we scare away colleagues who possess genu-
ine historical expertise. That risk exists if we continue to cultivate the two 
tracks that traditional humanists and some digital humanities practitioners 
still maintain to some extent. One reason for this is that some of us still see 
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“the digital” as a set of tools and practitioners, and not as an epistemologi-
cal endeavor, a digital epistemology.17 By raising our eyes from the appa-
ratus towards epistemology and cultural history and viewing academic 
practice through this lens, we can suggest some possible directions and 
challenges for educators and researchers:
 1. Update humanities’ working methods from Gutenberg to Jobs, from a 
book-bound practice and theory paradigm to a multimodal, media 
archaeological and transmedial ditto.
 2. Do not limit the notion of “the digital” to digital objects or even digi-
tal tools (although the latter are a good prerequisite).
 3. Explore and establish multimodal relationships between multiple cul-
tural expressions, showing that all culture always already is interme-
dial/heteromedial (Bruhn 2010).
 4. Link historical perspectives to the present, connect humanistic topics to 
the private, create new research perspectives.
 5. Encourage a curiosity for the materiality of media and thus for “tactile” 
cultural history.
 6. Encourage multitasking capabilities and associative ability.
 7. Get away from regarding digital tools as a problem (“cheating,” “pla-
giarism”), but see them as tools for education, by encouraging creative 
combinations of information—text, image, sound; present, past, future.
 8. Encourage traditional teaching methods, but at the same time encour-
age the student to put this information into new contexts.
 9. Encourage a productive defamiliarization of both contemporary media 
expressions and cultural and aesthetic history, and not least to establish 
a de-automation of educational practice as such.
17 See also O’Gorman (2006, 103):
[A] pedagogical practice that ignores materiality (or that flattens human physicality 
into pixels on a screen) will not have the capacity to transform the academic apparatus 
in any humane way. Web-based distance education has already changed the way we 
understand the university, but it has simply transposed print-centric habits (with var-
ied success) into a new learning space. I believe that the transformation of the aca-
demic apparatus is most likely to occur by means of physical agents that engage 
directly with the traditional material structures of learning, from the essay, to the 
classroom, to the entire campus itself.
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With what has been stated here, it may seem that digital epistemology 
is paving a path away from traditional humanities, and away from publish-
ing monographs. The purpose here, however, is quite the opposite. By 
looking at digital culture epistemologically, it becomes possible to regard 
the printed monograph precisely as an expression of an epistemic discourse 
(a discourse we have long taken for granted, and therefore not considered 
as such). Digital culture gives us the conditions to finally realize what the 
monograph actually means (the medium being a message), and that it 
must therefore be preserved, not as a genre but as a mode of thought among 
others, an interface and a tool for knowledge production with special char-
acteristics and effects. A mode of thought that most likely is different from 
the collection of articles, the practice research, the peer review article, the 
seminar and the digital Kunstkammer.
The idea in this reasoning is, finally, to initiate a process that can lead 
on to establishing a platform where traditional historians and digital archi-
vists, exegetes and multimodal pedagogs, theorists and graphic designers, 
can meet and discuss the future of the humanities.
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